From wage stagnation to impoverishment of workers

The inflationary crisis of the last three years represents a major turning point for hundreds of millions of workers. In many countries, wages are no longer automatically adjusted to inflation. As long as inflation varied between 1.5% and 2.5%, the erosion of purchasing power could easily be countered by collective agreements to adjust wages in line with changes in the cost of living.

Over the course of 2022, according to calculations by the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) ([1]), the most basic expenses, such as energy, food, housing and transport costs, have risen up to four times faster than wages. Although the average hourly wage also rose by 4.4%, the inflation rate was 9.2% for the EU as a whole [2].

Real wages, which provide the only relevant information on pay trends after inflation has been taken into account, therefore suffered a significant decline in all EU Member States, as well as in almost all countries, including the UK or USA.

This situation had nothing to do with the ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s, as corporate net profits rose and profit margins remained at high levels in most countries. It was in response to this situation that economists spoke of greedflation, based on the existence of excess profits, monopoly rents and price rises linked to speculation.

The question of excess profits and profit margins that remained high despite the pandemic is far from trivial, but I prefer to deal with it later in a separate article dedicated to this aspect.

In this first article, I believe it is essential to focus on the effects of the inflationary surge of recent years. I will begin by presenting four graphs that largely speak for themselves. The first shows the trend in average inflation in the EU. The second shows cumulative inflation between the fourth quarter of 2021 and the first quarter of 2023. The third graph shows the trend in real wages, which I propose to refine by showing the extent of the fall in real wages by sector of activity and level of qualification.

Fig 1 – Annual inflation rate in the EU  (Jan 1997 – June 2023)

Inflationary spike is concentrated between Q4 2021 and Q1-2023.

 Fig 2 – Cumulated inflation rate between Q4-2021 and Q1-2023, per country

There are major variations between states, with particularly high inflation rates in Eastern Europe. This should be studied, but the fact of belonging or not to the euro zone seems secondary to other factors linked to economic structure, political orientations, etc.

The overall trend is clearly identifiable: the inflationary shock has resulted in a loss of purchasing power and a fall in real wages of around 4-5% on average, with larger declines of 7-8 or 10% in some countries. These variations are primarily the result of measures to limit price rises or of spontaneous or stimulated wage compensation.

Fig. 3 – Evolution of real wages (hourly basis) between Q1-2022 and Q1-2023

Belgium is the only country where real wages rose slightly between quarter 1 of 2022 and the first quarter of 2023. This is explained by the existence of an automatic indexation system, applied to both the private and public sectors, with admittedly some time lags and slight variations, but overall 98% of workers, recipients of minimum social benefits or pensioners have seen their pay adjusted in line with inflation.

Belgium is the only country where real wages rose slightly between quarter 1 of 2022 and the first quarter of 2023. This is explained by the existence of an automatic indexation system, applied to both the private and public sectors, with admittedly some time lags and slight variations, but overall 98% of workers, recipients of minimum social benefits or pensioners have seen their pay adjusted in line with inflation.

Figure  4 – Evolution of real wages following level of payment / type of activity between Q1-2022 and Q1-2023

In some countries, different sectors of activity have absorbed the inflationary shock in different ways. In France, the automatic indexation of the minimum wage has certainly protected low-paid workers or those with lower qualifications. In Spain, Germany and Greece, low wages also suffered less from a loss of purchasing power and real wages were therefore protected by upward adjustments in the amounts paid.

The haemorrhaging of purchasing power seems to have stopped in 2023, even though the European Trade Union Institute notes that real wages continued to fall by an average of 0.8% in the second quarter of 2023 (compared with the same quarter of 2022) [3].

But the concern remains as said ETUC General Secretary Esther Lynch : “Trade unions have won much-needed pay rises that have protected our members from the worst effects of the cost of living crisis driven by corporate profits. But there are too many loopholes that allow companies to sidestep collective bargaining. Two years after the start of the inflationary crisis, workers’ purchasing power has still not been properly restored.” For Esther Lynch, this situation is not only causing misery for millions of workers and their families, but it is also pushing economies towards a new recession. “We desperately need to put more money into the pockets of working people, who reinvest it in the local economy, instead of letting the ultra-rich pile billions into their offshore accounts. With the next European elections coming up, we call on our 45 million members to vote for parties that will give workers the power to win fair and just pay rises.”

The lowering of shrinking real wages is primarily the result of lower inflation, which will fall from 12% in October 2022 to 4% towards the end of 2023. However, there is no sign that a wage catch-up has begun. Although the ECB and the European Commission are predicting an average rise in wages of 5.9% in 2023 for the eurozone, this is far from offsetting the fall in real wages over the last year. For the WSI economists at the Hans Böckler-stiftung, there is no doubt that on a cumulative basis, from 2021 to 2024, real wages will have recorded a net decline of between 5% and 10%, except for Belgium, which therefore appears to be an ‘anomaly’. I’ll come back to this in an article specifically devoted to the Belgian automatic indexation system and its possible extension to other countries.

In the meantime, I would like to point out that even in the upper echelons of the European Commission, forecasts are very cautious about the possibilities of a wage catch-up. Indeed, the report Labour Markets and wage development in 2023, published at the beginning of 2024 under the responsibility of DG Employment and Social Affairs and Inclusion, notes that “the losses in real wages that have been recorded since the end of 2021 are weighing on household purchasing power and continuing to wreak havoc (sic). The financial distress of workers has increased significantly and the rate of material and social deprivation among all workers has risen considerably.” (sic again). At the same time, it is noted that “the social shock caused by the inflationary crisis has been less brutal than the effects caused by the financial crisis of 2007-2008, thanks in particular to the resilience of labour markets and the effectiveness of the response to the crisis at EU and national level”. The report’s authors note a number of trends which I find most worrying:

• The trend towards wage convergence between EU Member States is waning or even being reversed;

• Wage discrpancy between Member States, both within and outside the eurozone, tend to increase;

• Wage inequalities within Member States are widening, and there has been a marked increase in the proportion of low-paid workers, especially women. The combination of low pay and involuntary part-time work leads these workers into a situation of in-work poverty from which it is difficult to escape;

• Last but not least, the major trend of wage stagnation that began in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis is being confirmed and is moving in some countries towards a downward trend in real wages. Part of the workforce is in the process of moving from a situation of “permanent wage moderation” to one of structural in-work poverty. Figure 5 illustrates these findings perfectly.

Fig 5 – Annual evolution of nominal and real wages for euro-zone (2000-2022)

Italy is the country that best embodies the shift from stagnation to falling wages. However, France is not to be outdone – especially since 2017 – as it appears that real wages there are undergoing a significant erosion that not even the increase in the Smic, even though it is indexed to inflation, seems able to counteract.

Fig 6 – Evolution of average wage in France (2015-2023).

While it is true that data from Eurostat, the ECB, the OECD and the World Bank (as reported on the Statista website) show variations, these in no way contradict the fundamental features we have identified here. Indeed, the overall diagnosis is the same: after a decade of wage moderation, recent years have been characterised by a fall in real wages of between 4% and 5%, and sometimes more. At the same time, there is one country – Belgium – where wage earners as well as benefit takers or pensioners are protected for the rising cost of living.

Admittedly, the ‘anomaly’ represented by the Belgian case is not as such able to reverse the global trend, but its case also reveals that it is possible to protect purchasing power while preserving a certain economic vigour. In fact, the automatic indexation of wages and minimum social benefits has not led to higher inflation or a drop in business competitiveness, but has instead supported economic activity with a growing GDP of 1.4 while other countries like France of Germany almost slieded into recession.

For the editorial writers of the Financial Times, there is no doubt that wage compression and the erosion of purchasing power are factors fuelling the general economic sluggishness that began with the great recession of 2008. The ‘polycrisis’ – a somewhat evasive notion that refers to the systemic crisis of capitalism – is therefore also and above all a crisis of the neoliberal model.

Figure 7 – Average annual wages in 2022 in constant prices and local currency, indexed to 2000

Clearly, this neoliberal growth model, propelled by the globalisation of trade and increasing financialization, is no longer capable of generating growth (which, incidentally, is not sustainable) or guaranteeing prosperity for large sectors of the population, not only for the working classes but also for sectors of the middle classes. Of course, income from capital is not doing too badly – to say the least – but for those socio-professional categories who derive their income from work (predominantly salaried, if not ‘self-employed’ or linked to small-scale economic activities), times are getting tougher and tougher. This diagnosis certainly deserves to be refined, by taking into account, for example, the importance of property wealth or capital income from investments, which protect both old and new generations from being downgraded to the ‘world below’.

Even if it was temporary – which is far from certain in view of the ecological crisis and growing geopolitical tensions – the rise in inflation has acted as an accelerator of social inequalities, which are ultimately a reflection of class inequalities…

That’s why, if we ever had to represent society visually, we’d have to start by drawing a shape that doesn’t look like a rhombus, but rather a sort of figure 8, with the top half widening, the middle half contracting and the bottom half swelling…

To understand this process, it is no longer enough to talk about ‘social downgrading’ – from which class to which other social class? – or to lament about how hard upward social mobility has become, but to recognize that large sectors of the population are undergoing a kind of objective and subjective ‘re-proletarianisation’. In the absence of collective social mobilisation, this development translates into fierce competition to maintain one’s social rank, if not to try to climb the social ladder in a competition where the losers far outnumber the winners. Social interactions tend to become increasingly utilitarian, subject to the imperative of self-valorization, and resemble increasingly to an incessant social competition or ‘positional struggle’.

But the society of über-competing individuals is obviously also a source of frustration and resentment. It is quite obvious that the scale of this process of ‘reproletarisation’ and its seemingly irresistible nature also explains why social exasperation feeds the ‘retropic’ rhetoric that stirs up hopes of a return to the golden age of prosperity that should be based on ethnocentrism and a racist and classist rejection of the most vulnerable instead of solidarity and distributive justice.

In case the tone of these comments is too ideological, I strongly recommend reading some objective data such as the Gini index. The Gini index (or coefficient) is a synthetic indicator of the extent of social inequality (income and wealth). Varying between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (extreme inequality), the higher the Gini index, the greater the inequality. Close to zero, we have a very egalitarian society; above 0.25 or 0.30, inequalities exist but are contained, and above 0.40, society becomes extremely unequal.

Sources : World Bank, OCDE, calculations by author ; * based upon income without patrimony

(sources : Banque Mondiale, OCDE, calculs par l’auteur ; * basé sur les revenus, sans prise en compte du patrimoine des ménages

This brief overview shows a number of things that are important to remember at a time when demoralization and pessimism all too easily prevail. Firstly, it is not true to say that the ‘European social model’ is dead. The proof is that in some countries inequalities are being reduced, thanks in particular to the maintenance of social buffers. Secondly, overall, the European social model is still strong enough to resist rather well to many turbulences (financial crisis, recession and pandemic). At the same time, the welfare state is also in a state of financial distress. We need only think of the particularly poor state of health care in some countries, the under-funded public services that are leading to a decline in the quality of services provided to the population, the crisis in the education systems, and the shortcomings of the social welfare systems, with restrictive access to replacement incomes that are often insufficient to meet real needs. We should also mention the scale of unsatisfied social needs that citizens will never be able, with the low incomes or poorly paid jobs to which they still have access, to meet themselves. Too many people are constrained to substandard housing and cant afford a decent living conditions. There is the deteriorating health after years of work not to forget specific social services in terms of education or human care for the elderly, etc. There is a vast amount of work to be done but I won’t go into all of it here…

I will simply conclude by reminding you that there have been social setbacks before and that nothing is lost. That’s why in the second part of this trilogy, I’ll be looking at the Belgian social model of automatic indexation while I will tackle in the third article the issue of wage poverty, precarity and how to deal with it, focusing on a number of very different countries whose experiences could be an inspiration for collective resistance.

[1] WSI Report No. 86e, July 2023, WSI European Collective Bargaining Report – 2022 / 2023  – ISSN 2366-7079 ; Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) of the Hans Böckler Foundation

[2] En réalité, la chute du pouvoir d’achat fut encore plus grande lorsqu’on prend en compte l’augmentation des coûts de la vie les plus essentiels. Les données pour tous les États membres de l’UE sont fournies dans le tableau publiée en annexe de cet article.

[3] https://www.etuc.org/en/document/end-cost-living-crisis-increase-wages-tax-profits

Quand l’inflation remet le salaire au cœur de la question sociale (1)

La crise inflationniste de trois dernières années représente un tournant majeur pour des centaines de millions de travailleurs. Dans beaucoup de pays, les salaires ne sont plus ajustés automatiquement à l’inflation. Tant que celle-ci variait entre 1,5 et 2,5%,  l’érosion du pouvoir d’achat pouvait facilement être contrecarrée par une négociation collective ajustant les salaires à l’évolution du coût de la vie.

Au cours de l’année 2022, selon les calculs de l’Institut Syndical Européen (ETUI) [1], les dépenses les plus élémentaires, comme l’énergie, les biens alimentaires, le logement ou les frais de transports, ont augmenté jusqu’à quatre fois plus vite que les salaires. Certes, le salaire horaire moyen a également augmenté de 4,4% mais le taux d’inflation s’élevait à 9,2 % pour l’UE [2].

Les salaires réels, qui fournissent la seule information pertinente sur l’évolution des rémunérations après la prise en compte de l’inflation, ont dès lors subi un recul important dans tous les États membres de l’UE.

Cette situation n’avait rien à voir avec la « stagflation » des années 1970 puisque les bénéfices nets des entreprises ont augmenté et que le taux de marge s’est maintenu à des niveaux élevés dans la plupart des pays. C’est en réponse à cette situation que des économistes ont évoqué la greedflation [3], fondée sur l’existence de surprofits, de rentes monopolistique et d’une hausse des prix liée à la spéculation.

La question des surprofits, de taux de marge qui se sont maintenus à des niveaux élevés malgré la pandémie est loin d’être anodine mais je préfère la traiter ultérieurement dans un autre article spécialement dédié à cet aspect.

Dans ce premier article, je pense indispensable de mettre d’abord la focale sur les effets de la hausse inflationniste des dernières années. Je commencerai par présenter quatre graphiques qui parlent en grande partie pour eux-mêmes. Le premier montre l’évolution de l’inflation moyenne dans l’UE. Le deuxième montre l’inflation cumulée entre le quatrième trimestre 2021 et le premier trimestre 2023. Le troisième graphique montre l’évolution des salaires réels que je propose d’affiner présentant l’ampleur de la baisse des salaires réels suivant les secteurs d’activités et au niveaux de qualification.

 

Fig 1 – Evolution annuelle du taux d’inflation dans l’UE

(janvier 1997- juin 2023)

Lecture : La hausse inflationniste se concentre sur la période T4 2021 et T12023. (Eurostat)

 

Fig 2 – Taux d’inflation cumulée sur la période  (T4-2021 et T1-2023)

Des variations importantes existent entre les états avec des taux d’inflation particulièrement élevés dans l’est-européen. Il faudrait en étudier mais le fait d’appartenir ou pas à la zone euro paraît secondaire par rapport à d’autres facteurs liés à la structure économique, aux orientations politiques, etc. (source OCDE)

Figure 3 – Evolution des salaires réels (horaires) du T1-2022 au T1-2023

 

La Belgique apparaît comme l’unique pays où les salaires réels ont connu une légère augmentation du trimestre 1 de 2022 et le premier trimestre 2023. L’explication est fournie par l’existence d’un système d’indexation automatique, appliqué au secteur privé et public, avec certes des décalages dans le temps et des légères variations mais globalement 98% des travailleurs, des bénéficiaires des minimas sociaux ou des retraités ont vu les montants de leurs rémunérations être ajustés à l’inflation. (sourceOCDE)

 Figure  4 – Evolution des salaires horaires réels par secteur d’activité / niveau moyen de rémunération entre T1-2022 et T1-2023

Dans certains pays, les secteurs d’activités ont amorti le choc inflationniste différemment. En France, l’indexation automatique du salaire minimum a certainement protégé les bas salaires ou les niveaux de qualification inférieurs. En Espagne, en Allemagne et en Grèce, les bas salaires ont également moins souffert d’une perte du pouvoir d’achat et les salaires réels ont donc été protégés par des ajustements à la hausse des montants. (source OCDE)

La tendance globale est clairement identifiable : le choc inflationniste s’est traduit par une perte de pouvoir d’achat et une baisse des salaires réels de l’ordre de 4 à5 % en moyenne avec des reculs plus importants de 7-8 ou 10% dans certains pays. Ces variations sont avant tout le produit de mesures limitant la hausse des prix ou d’une compensation spontanée ou impulsée des salaires.

L’hémorragie du pouvoir d’achat semble s’être arrêtée en 2023 même si l’institut syndical européen constate que les salaires réels ont continué à se tasser de 0,8% en moyenne au deuxième trimestre 2023 (par rapport au même trimestre de 2022) (source ETUC)[4]

Mais l’inquiétude demeure. Pour la secrétaire générale de la CES, Esther Lynch, a déclaré : « Les syndicats ont obtenu des augmentations salariales indispensables qui ont protégé nos membres des pires effets de la crise du coût de la vie provoquée par les profits des entreprises. Mais il y a trop d’échappatoires qui permettent aux entreprises d’esquiver les négociations collectives. Notre constat est sans appel : deux ans après le début de la crise inflationniste, le pouvoir d’achat des travailleurs n’a toujours pas été correctement rétabli. »[5]. Pour Esther Lynch, cette situation est non seulement à l’origine de la misère de millions de travailleurs et de leurs familles, mais pousse les économies vers une nouvelle récession. « Nous avons désespérément besoin de mettre plus d’argent dans les poches des travailleurs, qui le réinvestissent dans l’économie locale, au lieu de laisser les ultra-riches empiler des milliards sur leurs comptes offshore. À l’approche des prochaines élections européennes, nous demandons à nos 45 millions de membres de voter pour des partis qui donneront aux travailleurs le pouvoir d’obtenir des augmentations de salaire justes et équitables. »

Le ralentissement de la baisse des salaires réels est avant tout le résultat d’une inflation moindre, passant de 12% en octobre 2022 à 4% vers la fin de l’année 2023. Toutefois, aucun signe invite à croire qu’un mouvement de rattrapage salarial aurait commencé. Même si la BCE et la Commission Européenne évoquent une hausse moyenne des salaires de 5,9 % en 2023 pour la zone euro, cette augmentation est loin de compenser la baisse des salaires réels enregistré au cours de l’année précédente. Pour les économistes du WSI de la Hans Böcklerstiftung, il ne fait aucun doute que sur une base cumulée, de 2021 à 2024, les salaires réels ont enregistré un recul net de 5 à 7%, excepté pour la Belgique, qui apparaît de ce fait comme une « anomalie ». J’y reviendrai dans un article spécifiquement dédié au système d’indexation automatique belge et son éventuelle extension à d’autres pays.

Dans l’immédiat, je tiens à signaler que même dans les hautes sphères de la commission européenne, les prévisions sont très prudentes sur la possibilité d’un rattrapage salarial. En effet, le rapport Labour Markets and wage development in 2023, publié début 2024 sous la responsabilité de la DG Emploi et Affaires sociales et inclusion constate que « les pertes de salaires réels qui ont été enregistrées depuis la fin de 2021 pèsent sur le pouvoir d’achat des ménages et continuent à faire des ravages (sic). La détresse financière des travailleurs s’est accrue de manière significative et le taux de privation matérielle et sociale de l’ensemble des travailleurs a augmenté considérablement. » (re-sic). En même temps, le constat est fait que « le choc social provoqué par la crise inflationniste a été moins brutal que les effets provoqués par la crise financière de 2007-2008, notamment grâce à la résilience des marchés de l’emploi et à l’efficacité de la réponse à la crise au niveau de l’UE et au niveau national ». Les rédacteurs du rapport observent plusieurs tendances qui me paraissent des plus inquiétantes :

• La tendance à la convergence des salaires entre les états-membres de l’UE s’estompe ou recule.

• Les écarts salariaux entre les états-membres, tant au sein de la zone euro qu’à l’extérieur de celle-ci tend à s’accroître.

• Les inégalités salariales au sein des états-membres se creusent, et la composante des travailleurs à bas salaires, surtout des femmes, connaît une augmentation notable. La combinaison de bas salaires et du temps partiel involontaire conduit ces travailleuses dans une situation de pauvreté laborieuse duquel il est difficile de sortir.

Last but not least, la tendance lourde d’une stagnation salaires qui a débuté à la suite de la crise financière de 2008, se voit être confirmée et évolue dans certains pays vers une tendance à la baisse des salaires réels. Une partie du salariat est en train de basculer d’une situation de « modération salariale permanente » vers une condition de pauvreté laborieuse structurelle. La figure 5 illustre parfaitement ces constats.

Figure 5 – Evolution annuelle des salaires nominaux et réels pour la zone euro (2000-2022)

L’Italie est le pays qui incarne le mieux le basculement d’une stagnation à baisse des salaires. Toutefois, la France n’est pas en reste – surtout depuis 2017 – car il apparaît que les salaires réels y subissent une érosion significative que même l’augmentation du Smic, pourtant indexé sur l’inflation, ne semble pas en mesure de contrecarrer.

Figure 6 – Evolution annuelle du salaire moyen en France (2015-2023). (Salaire Moyen Par Tête – SMPT)

 S’il est vrai que les données d’Eurostat, de la BCE, de l’OCDE ou encore de la Banque Mondiale (repris dans par le site Statista) laissent apparaître des variations, celles-ci ne contredisent nullement les traits fondamentaux que nous avons identifié ici. En effet, globalement le diagnostic est le même : après avoir subi une décennie de modération salariale, les années récentes se caractérisent par une baisse des salaires réels, de 4 à 5%, parfois davantage. En même temps, il existe une pays – la Belgique – où le salariat échappe à cette tendance lourde.

Certes, « l’anomalie » que représente le cas belge n’est pas de nature à pouvoir inverser la tendance globale, mais son cas révèle aussi qu’il est possible de protéger le pouvoir d’achat tout en préservant une certaine vigueur économique. En effet, l’indexation automatique des salaires et des minima sociaux ne s’est pas traduit par une inflation supérieure ni une baisse de la compétitivité des entreprises mais a plutôt soutenu l’activité économique.

Pour les éditorialistes du Financial Times, il ne fait aucun doute que la compression des salaires et l’érosion du pouvoir d’achat sont des facteurs qui nourrissent l’atonie économique générale initiée par la grande récession de 2008. La « polycrise » – une notion quelque peu évasive qui désigne le caractère systémique et structurel de la crise du capitalisme – est donc également et avant tout une crise du modèle néolibéral.

Figure 7 – Salaires moyens à prix constant et devise locale, avec l’année 2000 comme indice de base

De toute évidence, ce modèle néolibéral de croissance propulsé par la mondialisation des échanges et une financiarisation croissante n’est plus à même de générer une croissance (non soutenable au demeurant) ni de garantir une prospérité à de larges secteurs de la population, non seulement pour les classes laborieuses mais aussi pour des secteurs des couches moyennes. Bien sûr, les revenus du capital ne s’en tirent pas trop mal – c’est le moins que l’on puisse dire – mais pour les catégories socio-professionnelles qui tirent leurs revenus du travail (à dominance salarié, sinon « indépendant » ou lié à des activités économiques à petite échelle), les temps sont de plus en plus durs. Ce diagnostic mériterait certainement d’être affiné, en intégrant par exemple l’importance du patrimoine immobilier ou des revenus du capital tirés de placements qui préservent les anciennes et nouvelles générations d’un déclassement vers le « monde d’en bas ».

Même si elle fut passagère – ce qui est loin d’être certain au vu de la crise écologique et des tensions géopolitiques croissantes – la hausse inflationniste a fonctionné comme un accélérateur des inégalités sociales qui sont reflètent, in fine, des inégalités de classe…

C’est pourquoi, si jamais il fallait représenter la société visuellement, il faudrait commencer par dessiner une forme qui ne ressemble pas à un losange mais plutôt à une sorte de 8 dont le sommet est en train de s’élargir tandis que le milieu se contracte et que la moitié inférieure se gonfle…

Pour comprendre ce processus, il ne suffit plus d’évoquer le « déclassement social » – de quelle classe vers quelle autre classe sociale ? – ni de se lamenter sur la panne de l’ascenseur social mais reconnaître que de larges secteurs de la population subissent une sorte de « (re)prolétarisation » tant objective et subjective. En l’absence de mobilisation sociale collective, cette évolution se traduit par une compétition féroce pour maintenir son rang sinon pour tenter de gravir péniblement l’échelle sociale dans une compétition où les perdants sont bien plus nombreux que les gagnants. Les interactions sociales tendent à devenir de plus en plus utilitaristes, soumis à l’impératif d’auto-valorisation et s’apparentent à une incessante « lutte des places ».

Mais la société des individus en compétition est bien évidemment également source de frustration et de ressentiment. On pourrait l’hypothèse que l’ampleur de ce processus de «reprolétarisation» et son caractère apparemment irrésistible explique aussi pourquoi l’exaspération sociale nourrit les discours « rétropiques » qui agitent l’espoir d’un retour de l’âge d’or de la prospérité fondé sur l’ethnocentrisme et d’un rejet raciste et classiste des plus vulnérables.

Si jamais la tonalité de ces propos serait trop idéologique, je conseille vivement la lecture de quelques données objectives tel que l’indice Gini. L’indice (ou coefficient) de Gini est un indicateur synthétique permettant de rendre compte de l’ampleur des inégalités sociales (revenus et patrimoine). Variant entre 0 (égalité parfaite) et 1 (inégalité extrême), les inégalités sont d’autant plus profondes que l’indice de Gini est élevé. Proche de zéro, nous avons une société très égalitaire ; au-dessus de 0.25 ou 0.30, les inégalités existent mais sont jugulées et au-delà de 0.40, la société devient extrêmement inégalitaire.

 

Sources : Banque Mondiale, OCDE, calculs par l’auteur ; * basé sur les revenus, sans prise en compte du patrimoine

 

Ce bref aperçu montre plusieurs choses qu’il me semble important de rappeler en ces temps où la démoralisation et le pessimisme l’emportent bien trop facilement. Primo, il est faux de dire que le « modèle social européen » a vécu. Pour preuve, dans certains pays, les inégalités reculent, notamment grâce au maintien d’amortisseurs sociaux. Secundo, globalement, le modèle social européen résiste plutôt bien aux turbulences (crise financière, récession et pandémie). En même temps, l’état social est « mal fichu » et en situation de détresse financière. Pensons aux soins de santé particulièrement mal en point dans certains pays ; aux services publics sous-financés donnant lieu à une baisse de qualité des services rendus à la population ; à la crise que traverse les systèmes éducatifs ou encore aux manquements des systèmes de protection sociale avec un accès restrictif aux revenus de remplacement très souvent insuffisants face aux besoins réels. Il faudrait mentionner aussi l’ampleur des besoins sociaux insatisfaits que les citoyens ne pourront jamais, avec les faibles revenus ou le travail mal rémunéré auquels ils ont encore accès, prendre en charge par eux-mêmes : logements insalubres ou hors de prix ; dégradation de la santé après des années de travail, services sociaux spécifiques en termes d’éducation ou de prise en charge humaine des ainés, etc. Le chantier est vaste et je n’en ferais pas l’inventaire ici…

Je terminerai simplement en rappelant que des reculs sociaux, il y a eu auparavant et que rien n’est perdu. C’est pourquoi j’aborderai dans le second volet de cette série la question de la paupérisation salariale et les modes d’y répondre, en plaçant la focale sur quelques pays très différents dont la trajectoire paraît particulièrement riche d’expériences.

Rome-Bruxelles-Paris 29 mai-2 juin 2024

 

Source ETUC-CES

 

[1] WSI Report No. 86e, July 2023, WSI European Collective Bargaining Report – 2022 / 2023  – Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI) of the Hans Böckler Foundation

[2] En réalité, la chute du pouvoir d’achat fut encore plus grande lorsqu’on prend en compte l’augmentation des coûts de la vie les plus essentiels. Les données pour tous les États membres de l’UE sont fournies dans le tableau publiée en annexe de cet article.

[3] contraction de « greed » ou vénalité et d’inflation

[4] https://www.etuc.org/en/document/end-cost-living-crisis-increase-wages-tax-profits

[5] https://www.etuc.org/en/pressrelease/report-pay-still-not-keeping-prices

When the automobile workers achieve a historic victory and workers’ control makes an unexpected comeback.

After forty-one days of strike action, the UAW (United Automobile Workers) union has achieved a historic victory over the big three automakers Ford, General Motors and Stellantis (Chrysler). This victory puts an end to 43 years of concessions and defeats that began in 1979, when the UAW agreed to suspend all agreements signed with Chrysler’s then-bankrupt management. During this long period, nearly 60 production sites were closed or relocated to Mexico, and the union had continually accepted, albeit reluctantly, wage moderation and productive flexibility in addition to a category of workers performing the same operations, but paid $10 or $15/hour less called ‘second tier’ (second segment). At the same time, the automotive sector has undergone a profound transformation and is enjoying a resurgence of activity. Employing 1.2 million workers today, compared with 850,000 in 1980, automakers have diversified with the arrival of German (VW, Mercedes) and Japanese (Toyota, Nissan, Honda) brands and, more recently, the accelerated development of electric vehicle production sites.

The advances achieved by the UAW are historic in several respects. In addition to a 25% increase over four years (the duration of the collective agreement), and the integration of temporary workers into the permanent category (CDI), it is above all the abolition of the dual system with second-tier workers that represents a victory over precariousness and overexploitation, since these workers will benefit from an increase of up to 150% of the hourly wage in certain cases. The union also won the restoration of cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), which had been abolished in 2008. Applied to all Big Three unionized workers, the restoration of indexation should add 8% to the wage increases obtained elsewhere. Temporary staff with more than 90 days’ seniority will be immediately converted to permanent status. Future temps will become permanent workers after nine months, which will count towards their progression to the top rate of the pay grid. The only downside to this victory lies in the area of pensions: although Ford has agreed to reinject resources into the pension funds, this is still insufficient to guarantee the same pension rights to all categories of workers.

How was such a victory possible?

A change in union leadership played a key role in this victory. The UAW’s new president, Shawn Fain, was elected after a hard-fought battle by a radical caucus United All Workers for Democracy, which has been formed a decade ago. Two years ago, this caucus had won the election of the president by direct suffrage, but narrowly failed to win the internal vote. Over the following year, the UAW union leadership was rocked by a series of corruption and personal enrichment scandals. During this turbulent period, Shawn Fain gained recognition as a grassroots unionist opposed to concessions and pay inequality. In the spring of 2023, Fain led an internal campaign around the slogan ‘No corruption, No concessions, No tier’, winning the internal election against Ray Curry, who represented a more moderate orientation towards the Big 3.

Shawn Fain has appeared on several occasions with Bernie Sanders and led a media campaign since his election, announcing the return of a unionism capable of bringing about social progress. By articulating a discourse centered on social justice with a critique of class contempt towards those who work, Shawn Fain embodied a desire among members to obtain good wages and regain a social condition assimilated to the middle class. It‘s also true that in adopting the Green New Deal, the government under President Joe Biden had been very generous to manufacturers. Subsidies and interest-free loans to finance the ecological transition amounted to considerable sums, on the order of $25-30 billion per manufacturer. The UAW’s new leadership sensed that the time for offensive action had finally arrived.

Shortly after his election, Shawn Fain mobilized members by announcing the return of combat unionism, unafraid to engage in conflict with the firm conviction that he could win. By announcing a calendar of stand-up strikes, Fain mobilized the powerful memorial symbol of the sit-down strikes of 1936-1937, which had enabled the UAW to gain union recognition. [1].

Sit down strike at Fischer Body Plant in Cleveland (1936)

The stand-up strike campaign targeted all three manufacturers simultaneously, a departure from the previous period. Previously, the tried-and-tested tactic had been to target a single manufacturer and then extend wage gains to the other two. But this mode of action had become outdated, if not counter-productive. Indeed, any union concession on working hours or wages resulted in symmetrical setbacks at the other manufacturers. The relocation of assembly plants to southern states or Mexico, where there was no union representation, gave management a formidable weapon, which it did not hesitate to use to wrest concessions from the historic plants in the Great Lakes area (Detroit-Flint-Chicago-Cleveland). To break out of this spiral of social regression, the ‘Big Three’ had to be targeted simultaneously. This bold and, in some respects, risky choice required the firm guarantee of being fully capable of shutting down sites for an extended period. In early September, the UAW announced a schedule of forty staggered strike days, but without disclosing which sites would be shut down. In this way, the union gave itself the means to multiply the disruptive effect, disrupting supply and creating chaos in production schedules.

This strike tactic drew its strength from the surprise effect compared to a networked, just-in-time organization of the work process. Not knowing where the union would strike, the manufacturers had piled up stocks of engines and other essential components. But against all odds, the union chose to organize walkouts and strikes elsewhere than in assembly plants, bringing distribution centers to a standstill before targeting assembly units for high-end vehicles such as 4 x 4s or luxury models.

By alternating strikes in logistics centers, assembly plants and essential component manufacturing units, the UAW succeeded in maximizing the disruptive effects of work stoppages while sparing its strike fund. Every plant affected by a work stoppage was completely shut down, and every UAW member received $100 per day of strike pay…

At sites not affected by a work stoppage, workers were instructed to refuse overtime and to work in the strictest possible manner, respecting technical instructions and safety standards to the letter. At the beginning of October, the UAW announced that there were no concerns about continuing strike action until thanksgiving (November 23)… In mid-October, General Motors and Ford began to concede wage increases and the return of indexation. Chrysler-Stellantis still refused to follow suit, prompting the UAW to concentrate strike action at this manufacturer, making Carlos Tavares, whose annual salary is $26 million, the epitome of managerial venality.

Stop the descent into hell

When Ford and General Motors began to make concessions on one or other point in the list of demands, the UAW decided to push the envelope by stepping up the pressure on Chrysler-Stellantis, the most reluctant of the three. Caught between concessions from other manufacturers, where production was resuming, and strikes targeting the most profitable models, Stellantis finally agreed to reopen the former Jeep Cherokee plant, assigning it to the manufacture of electric batteries and the creation of 5,000 jobs, enabling the 1,500 laid-off workers to be rehired by the end of 2022.

This decision represents a real turning point in the American tradition of industrial relations. In 1946, the UAW had led a one hundred and thirteen-day strike at General Motors to obtain the right to ‘open the books’ and, above all, the right to veto any decision affecting the organization of production. For Walter Reuther, then head of the UAW and a socialist activist trained in the doctrine of workers’ control [2]the stakes were of strategic importance. Seeing the arrival of numerically controlled machine tools, Reuther was convinced that unionism limited to wage demands would sooner or later be overtaken by technological innovations. But for General Motors, it was out of the question to concede even a particle of its managerial power. After 113 days of strike action, management had conceded, in the interests of social peace, wage increases and collective guarantees (security, health insurance, retirement) never seen before. But this victory was also a defeat… Having been purged of communist militants during the McCarthy era, the UAW had retreated to the agreed perimeter of industrial relations, leaving management free rein in decisions concerning work organization and investments.

According to Daniel Bell, then an editor at Fortune magazine, the UAW had only won a Pyrrhic victory, and the mountain of dollars that financed labor peace served above all to mask the emasculation of counter-power unionism. While Bell’s reasoning is far from wrong, for nearly three decades, auto workers saw their standard of living rise steadily to the point of embodying the social figure of the middle-class worker. But this trend was reversed in the 1980s, when auto workers were paid less and less, and their middle-class status began to erode. Nevertheless, the UAW’s new management team succeeded in transforming the feeling of downgrading into a resource for mobilization, invoking the need for wage ‘redress’ while positioning itself as a protagonist in safeguarding the American dream. This approach is far from “anti-capitalist”, but for the hundreds of thousands of workers in the sector and the union, it had become urgent to break the interminable cycle of defeat and social setbacks. In other words, the ideological stakes are there, but will remain secondary to the material stakes and the need to build up again a strong union is capable to exert is collective power.

The unexpected comeback of workers control

In addition to the strictly economic aspects, there is another victory to be highlighted. The 43-day strike led to the agreement to reopen Stellantis’ Belvidere plant. This concession revives the best traditions of workers’ control. [3] For the first time in union history, we obtained the reopening of a plant without having to accept wage losses or sacrifice jobs elsewhere. Better still, we’ve secured the same wage levels, health insurance coverage and pensions as the thermal assembly plants, already covered by collective bargaining agreements.”

This interpretation is no exaggeration. For Barry Eidlin, professor of sociology of industrial relations at McGill University, the reopening of the Belvidere plant marks a turning point, as it is the first time that the union has obtained the reopening of a plant while influencing investment choices and the organization of the work process. Previously, the UAW had only succeeded in postponing a closure or maintaining activity by making major wage or statutory concessions.

The doctrine of workers’ control is also behind a series of actions aimed at keeping electric vehicle production activities within the historic automotive perimeter. At the beginning of October, the UAW won the right for GM’s planned 6,000 electric vehicle job creations to be covered by the general framework agreement, rather than by a separate agreement with discounted wages. This victory also concerns semi-subsidiaries (joint-venture companies) such as Ultium Cells in Lordstown, Ohio, where the 1,300 workers will see their wages adjusted upwards from $16.50 to $28/hour, an advance that will be extended to seven other electric motor component manufacturing units.

General Motors in Spring Hill is another example of the topicality of worker control. At this Tennessee plant, GM decided to outsource painting and plastic molding to a company where wages start at $15 and end at $19 after four years. Although electric vehicles would have no impact on the paint and plastics activity, workers covered by automotive company agreements had suddenly been laid off. By obtaining the extension of wage scales and collective guarantees to companies manufacturing components, the UAW removes any advantage to outsourcing certain activities and avoids the fragmentation of work collectives along wage lines justified by technological pretexts. From now on, being assigned to certain specialized activities in the electric vehicle sector will no longer result in underpayment, which is no mean feat in a fast-growing market. Of the 14 million passenger cars sold each year in the United States, the share of electric vehicles is growing rapidly, reaching an annual volume of 800,000 units, representing 6% of the total, and almost doubling sales by 2021.

Climate and electoral issues

For the UAW, these multiple victories over the Big Three represent real war trophies which should enable it to force its way into the hands of manufacturers employing non-unionized workers. The equalization of wages in the electrical sector with those in the thermal sector is a victory that should make it easier to win over workers, who are still very skeptical about the ecological transition. For Shawn Fain, the ‘Green-Blue’ alliance is essential: “The climate crisis is not a fanciful rumor, and it’s essential that the ecological transition takes place while respecting the principles of social justice. We can’t accept green jobs being created by imposing low wages without collective guarantees.”

The stakes are of course high, including politically, since Donald Trump is opposed to the electrification of the car fleet “because these are low-paying jobs”. To counter Trump’s reactionary populism, the UAW has chosen not to throw itself into the arms of Democrat Joe Biden, but to demand guarantees on wages and union representation first. This tactic may seem very moderate, but it’s not without effect, since Joe Biden showed up at a picket line. Clearly, he will need the support of Midwestern autoworkers to win in these states, which have been hit by deindustrialization and the impoverishment of a working class that once believed itself to be middle-class…

Obtaining equal wage scales for EV sector is a key to enlarge unionization

Given that Tesla’s factories are all union-free and without collective bargaining coverage, and that most foreign automakers are in the same situation, the union victory over the Big Three is undoubtedly also a concession inspired by a certain opportunism on the part of the big historic automakers: the market share of the Big 3 taken together achieved 42%, compared with 80% twenty years ago… For the US automakers, it is essential to preserve their market share, and to achieve this goal, they have every interest in reducing the competitive gap with their rivals. [4]. Having been forced to concede substantial wage increases and the end of the dualist system, it’s clear that the Big 3 are now making it easier for unions to enter competitors’ premises, to prevent the latter from exploiting their competitive advantages. It may be unusual, but fundamentally, I don’t see why any union tactic should hesitate to put competitors in competition… So there’s no reason not to believe Shawn Fain when he announces that the UAW will return to the bargaining table in 2028 to negotiate with the Big Five or Big Six instead of sticking with the Big Three. To snatch a victory is no small thing, and to open up the prospect of social progress even less so. In this sense, the victory of the auto strike is a turning point that also opens up a perspective for all workers.

Towards a union revival?

Seen from Europe, this still seems anecdotal, but the UAW has not only changed direction and orientation, but has transformed its scope of action and succeeded in gaining union recognition in sectors and trades far removed from the automotive industry, such as Chicago casino workers, aeronautical workers, agri-food workers and even university lecturers, who now account for 10% of the union’s affiliates. How was this achieved? Firstly, by conducting relentless organizing campaigns (sometimes even deep organizing), an essential step in negotiating collective agreements and representing workers on issues of working conditions. It should be remembered here that the employer is obliged to recognize a union section as an interlocutor as soon as 30% of workers affiliate to a union, whatever it may be, and a majority of voters confirm this choice in a consultation[5].

Some conclusions and perspectives

In Europe, we had become accustomed to seeing American unions as impotent, if not extremely moderate, ready to make all kinds of concessions. The rise of a new teachers’ unionism, with victories in several states (see Wim Benda’s article on the victorious education strikes), put this caricature into perspective somewhat, but many analysts continued to believe that in the private, competitive sector, management remained the only master on board. Admittedly, there were a few union breakthroughs, such as at Amazon in Staten Island [6] but beyond that, the situation seemed as hopeless as ever.

Wrongly so, and the historic victory in the car industry shows that the readiness for collective action and collectivism does exist, and that an offensive trade unionism can win a contest of strength. [7]. The renewed popularity of trade unionism that emerged in many places after the pandemic, and which some sociological surveys had been able to identify, particularly at generational level, is confirmed by the facts. At the same time, such changes do not occur spontaneously, but are the result of a prolonged effort by socially-rooted militant networks to renew trade unionism. This implies not only a more offensive orientation, but also the mobilization of workers around unifying demands across statutory divides and inequalities (ethno-racial and gender) and, last but not least, the boldness to use mobilization tactics that break with the ritualized game of social dialogue where employers dictate what is and isn’t negotiable.

The case of the USA shows that such shifts are possible, even with an extremely bureaucratized and even corrupt union. This does not mean that this is always and everywhere the only way forward. In Mexico, General Motors long enjoyed the support of Miguel Trujillo López’s Confederation of Mexican Workers. But after years of attempts to democratize the CTM, the 6,232 GM workers in Silao (Guanajuato state) finally voted 76% in favor of recognizing a new union, the Sindicato Independiente Nacional de los Trabajadores y Trabajadoras de la Industria Automotriz (Sinttia). It has to be said that the former union had signed for the umpteenth time a collective agreement that brought no wage improvement and accepted the imposition of productivity gains through work intensification alone. When, in 2019, the Mexican government reformed the labor code to pave the way for the democratization of worker representation, GM workers in Mexico didn’t hesitate to form a new union, which has now achieved a majority majority; an example that was followed by others at Goodyear or Saint Gobain [8].

Admittedly, there are many differences between the situation in the United States and that in countries like France where, in addition to the dispersal of union forces and the absence of real strike funds, the unions are confronted with bargaining rules that are increasingly played following the managerialist conception of ‘social dialogue’ (or neocorporatism). But beyond national differences and the obstacles that can be identified, we certainly face a convergence in terms of workers’ being ready to engage in action and win a dispute.

Article republished from Les Mondes du Travail online journal (November 14, 2023)

Notes

[1]. In the midst of the economic crisis, the strikers decided to occupy the workshops, preventing lockouts and the mobilization of scabs. It took several sit-down strikes in 1936-1937 before General Motors and Chrysler finally conceded union recognition and negotiation with a committee of shop stewards. Ford continued to refuse unionization, sometimes violently, mobilizing the Pinkerton – a veritable bosses militia – and fire gunning upon the picket lines. At Ford, the UAW only gained union recognition in 1941, after the introduction of new regulations imposed by Roosevelt’s administration in 1937 and the United States’ entry into the war.

[2] For a biography of Walter Reuther, see Nelson Lichtenstein (1996), The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, Basic Books, NY; see also the critical review by Jane Slaughter, co-founder with Kim Moody of the journal Labor Notes, a protagonist since 1979 of the union revival in the USA.

[3] This doctrine grew out of practical experience in the early 20th century in companies in several countries (Russia in 1905, England, Italy and Belgium in 1917-1922), where trade unions exercised a veto over all management decisions (working hours, working conditions, work organization) while demanding a right of inspection over company management (Open the books!). Workers’ control became part of the official doctrine of several trade union confederations and certain social-democratic parties in the post-war period. Mitbestimmung or co-determination represents a more moderate variant, but it is important not to confuse worker control with co-determination or participation in management. According to the original doctrine, the trade union must retain full independence, and consider the exercise of worker control as a kind of dual power situation which at the same time forms a school preparing workers for self-management or worker management. Réforme d’entreprise ou contrôle ouvrier ? Débat public entre François Bloch-Lainé, Ernest Mandel et Gilbert Mathieu, in Cahiers du C.E.S., n° 70-71, prefaced by J.-M. Vincent, E.D.I., Paris; see also Hélène Hatzfeld (2020), “Le contrôle ouvrier : diffusion et disparition d’un imaginaire”, in Histoire Politique n°42 | DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/histoirepolitique.691, Béllanger Jacques (1986), “Le contrôle ouvrier sur l’organisation du travail: Étude de cas en Grande-Bretagne”, in Relations Industrielles / Industrial Relations, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1986), pp. 704-719, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23073111

[4]. In the first half of 2021, General Motors was the leading automaker in terms of market share in the USA, with 16.48% of the market for cars and commercial vehicles. Toyota came second, with a market share of 15.01%. In third place was Ford, with a market share of 11.92%, closely followed by Stellantis (11.48%) and Honda (10.02%).

[5]. If a majority of workers want to form a union, they can choose a union in one of two ways: if at least 30% of workers sign cards or a petition indicating that they want a union, the NLRB will hold an election. If the majority of voters choose that union, the NLRB will certify the union as your representative for collective bargaining. An election is not the only way for a union to become your representative. Employers can voluntarily recognize a union based on evidence – usually signed union authorization cards – that a majority of employees want it to represent them. Once the union is certified or recognized, the employer is obliged to negotiate terms and conditions of employment with the union representative.

[6]. Mometti, Felice. “Amazon aux Etats-Unis: de la défaite de Bessemer à la création d’un syndicat auto-organisé à New York,” in Mouvements, vol. 110-111, no. 2-3, 2022, pp. 98-108. https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.110.0098

[7] For a presentation of the theory of mobilizations and ‘collectivism’, see John Kelly (1998), Rethinking Industrial Relations, Mobilizations, Collectivism and Long Waves, Routlegde, London. For a review , see Stephen Bouquin, “Quand le collectivisme refait surface” in Les Mondes du Travail, n°30, pp. 210-217.

[8]. Thanks to this reform, the election determining the degree of representation had become compulsory, and had taken place in the presence of observers from the International Labour Office and Industry ALL, the federation organizing automotive workers worldwide. Since the introduction of the new law, the new unions have won recognition in an impressive array of multinational firms. See ‘Democratic Unions can Become a Reality’, article published May 25, 2022 Industry All .

 

Fin du travail ou crise du salariat ? Une revue des débats (1997)

S. Bouquin (1997) « Fin du travail ou crise du salariat ? Revue des débats sur la fin du travail », in Banlieue-Ville-Lien Social n°13-14, mars-juin 1997, pp. 291-326].

Stephen Bouquin**

Dans cette contribution, je présente une revue critique des débats sur la fin du travail. Je développerai dans un premier temps les discours proclamant la fin du travail par l’avènement, qui de la société informationnelle, qui la civilisation du temps libre ou encore de la société post-laborieuse. Dans le deuxième point, ces approches sont ensuite soumises à une critique factuelle et analytique. Dans le troisième point, je présente de l’objet « travail » la définition qui me semble la plus cohérente, m’inspirant ici des travaux de Pierre Naville et Jean-Marie Vincent. Avant de proposer une autre fin du travail par l’abolition du salariat, je tenais à présenter de manière synthétisée les traits de l’évolution actuelle du travail, soulignant ainsi non pas un décentrement mais plutôt un retour en force de la centralité du travail. En cela, l’évolution sociale révèle effectivement le caractère erratique des analyses proclamant la « fin du travail » et par conséquence, la nécessité d’intégrer dans un projet de libération la question du travail tout en refusant de se borner à l’horizon de la relation salariale. Lire la suite

Les savoirs dans la société marchande : industrialisation, mobilisation, appropriation ?

[S. Bouquin (2005), «Les savoirs dans la société marchande: industrialisation, mobilisation, appropriation?», in Cahiers Marxistes n°230 (avril-mai 2005), pp. 51-66

[format pdf]

 

La société de la connaissance : un nouveau paradigme et nouvelle époque ?

Serions-nous entrés dans une nouvelle ère, celle du capitalisme cognitif ou, pour le dire en termes plus lisses, la « société de la connaissance » ? Nombreux sont les discours scientifiques ou politiques qui défendent cette interprétation[1]. Ainsi peut-on lire dans le rapport du Conseil sur le capital social et humain que « l’Europe d’aujourd’hui connaît une transformation d’une ampleur comparable à celle de la révolution industrielle ». Toutefois, bien souvent, aucune définition de cette « société de la connaissance ». Quant à son origine, elle est de toute évidence technique ou scientifique.

En effet, la quasi-totalité des textes officiels présentent la « société de la connaissance » – parfois nommée « âge informationnel » – comme le résultat de l’émergence et de la diffusion des nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication (NTIC)[2]. Nous vivons une nouvelle « révolution technologique » qui s’impose à tous comme une sorte de divinité sécularisée. Grâce à internet, la téléphonie mobile, les envois de mails et de messages, les multiples processus de communication et d’échanges se déroulent désormais en temps réel. Ce qui bouleverse tant la sphère de consommation que la sphère productive. Les NTIC provoquent une contraction de l’espace-temps et permet aussi une accélération fulgurante des processus d’échanges et de communication. La représentation topographique du monde serait devenue caduque puisque nous nous nous retrouvons dans un espace à la fois réel et virtuel, unifié et différencié, hiérarchisé et horizontal. Nous pourrions poursuivre les éléments de description mais deux objections peuvent d’ores et déjà être faites.

Primo, si tant est qu’il y a lieu d’évoquer une « révolution technologique », quelle est sa nouveauté ? Nous connaissons depuis deux siècles une accélération fulgurante de l’évolution humaine, une interdépendance accrue entre systèmes sociaux et techniques sur fond de croissance de la production et des richesses. Les connaissances – découvertes scientifiques, innovations, le développement de savoir-faire – forment un des principaux moteurs de cette accélération. On pourrait situer le début de ce processus de bouleversement permanent au début des Lumières voire au cours du 14ème  siècle et début de la renaissance qui marque un changement profond dans la perception du monde avec notamment l’utilisation de la perspective dans la représentation picturale. Plutôt que de faire coïncider la société de la connaissance avec une sorte de « post-modernité » de la seconde moitié du 20ème siècle, il serait plus judicieux de l’insérer dans une sorte de longue durée qui correspond grosso modo à la modernité capitaliste.

Secundo, l’affirmation selon laquelle la « révolution technologique » coïncide avec une transformation des rapports sociaux nous semble très hasardeuse et difficilement démontrable. Cette révolution technologique, comme l’ensemble des formes sociales de connaissance, n’absorbent pas l’épaisseur de la réalité sociale, elles s’y immiscent en la transformant en partie mais sans pour autant transformer les rapports sociaux. Ainsi, parallèlement à la « déterritorialisation » des conditions d’existence des nouvelles élites mondiales, nous observons aussi une réclusion territoriale accrue pour certaines catégories populations. Comment interpréter autrement le choix de confiner des groupes sociaux au sein de quartiers, de zones urbaines, voire de continents entiers ? On pourrait dire la même chose à propos de l’injonction de « mobilité » que subissent les chômeurs de longue tout en étant tantôt relégués dans la catégorie des inemployables tantôt considérés comme faisant partie des précaires toujours disponibles ? On pourrait poursuivre la démonstration en mettant en cause l’affirmation que la société de la connaissance annonce « une nouvelle ère de prospérité, de développement humain décuplé et démultiplié par les nouvelles technologies, la nouvelle économie et les nouveaux emplois ». L’éclatement de la bulle internet en 2001, avec le NASDAQ qui connait une chute vertigineuse, passant de 5000 à 1500 points, coïncide avec des faillites retentissantes (AOL) et un vaste mouvement de concentration et centralisation des capitaux de la « nouvelle économie informationnelle ». De toute évidence, la société de la connaissance ne garantit nullement, par la simple vertu technologique, un nouvel âge de prospérité[3].

Souvent, la persistance de clivages sociaux et d’inégalités sociales est interprété comme résiduels, autant de scories ou d’archaïsmes dont il faudrait se débarrasser au plus vite possible. C’est là une erreur absolument consistante avec le déterminisme technologique qui caractérise les discours sur la société de la connaissance. Cette approche déterministe néglige fondamentalement les rapports sociaux et le facteur humain, en particulier celui du « travail vivant ». Or, ces rapports sociaux sont aujourd’hui encore, même plus que jamais, sous l’emprise de la logique de valorisation et les conduites sociales, l’agir des uns et des autres demeurent déterminés par celle-ci. Cela signifie donc que ce n’est pas la technique mais l’injonction de valorisation et de profitabilité qui préside aux conduites sociales.

Il y a notamment cette contrainte impérative de répondre à la concurrence sur le marché capitaliste, de survivre face aux capitaux concurrents ; ou encore la contrainte sociale imposée par la nécessité de devoir subvenir à ses besoins, la plupart du temps par le travail salarié. Au moment où dans les sociétés occidentales, le rapport social salarial englobe 80 % de la population, de manière directe ou indirecte, il serait dommage de l’oublier. Les autres formes de travail – le travail des indépendants, des professions libérales – ne subsistent que pour certains métiers protégés à cet effet. Parfois, nous pouvons observer leur extension, mais une étude plus fine montre très rapidement qu’il s’agit alors de parasubordinati comme les nomment les juristes et sociologues italiens – pays où le phénomène est en effet significatif. Ces catégories d’individus demeurent en effet dépendantes de quelques donneurs d’ordre tandis que les free-lance, y compris pour les métiers créatifs, ne jouissent pas nécessairement de plus de libertés mais se voient contraints de développer des formes de multi-activité.

Selon l’approche libérale, un des traits caractéristiques de la société de la connaissance, c’est bien l’idée que nous sommes tous détenteurs d’un capital humain contenant notre savoir, notre intelligence et nos capacités d’agir. Le savoir sert alors de clef de compréhension (et parfois de justification) des inégalités sociales. En bas de l’échelle sociale, on retrouve les non-qualifiés, les ouvriers des industries disparues ou encore les victimes de l’échec scolaire. En haut de l’échelle sociale, on retrouve les travailleurs de la connaissance, les knowlegde workers, les ingénieurs, techniciens, informaticiens, chercheurs scientifiques, etc.  Celles et ceux-là même qui seraient dotés de compétences hautement valorisables et qui bien sûr sont prêts à se former tout au long de la vie.

Bien évidemment, les qualifications par le diplôme (y compris universitaire) deviendront une denrée périssable mais cela ne devrait pas empêcher le travailleur cognitif, détenteur de son savoir et donc des moyens de production, de développer ses connaissances initiales.

Certaines analyses vont encore plus loin. Souvenons-nous de cette vaste enquête au sujet du Quotient Intellectuel de Charles Murray et Richard Hernstein qui montrait une corrélation entre le QI obtenu lors de tests et la position sur l’échelle sociale[4]. En suivant les conclusions de ces deux auteurs, il devient difficile de ne pas attribuer la pauvreté des Afro-américains ou d’autres en bas de l’échelle comme la conséquence de leur faible QI[5]. En méconnaissant le poids des structures et des rapports sociaux, cette grille d’analyse ne fait rien d’autre que de naturaliser les inégalités sociales de classe, de race ou de genre.

La connaissance, un nouveau facteur de production ?

Est-ce que les promesses de prospérité non tenues par propagandistes de la société de la connaissance invalident pour autant la signification des transformations ? A cette question, certains chercheurs d’inspiration opéraïstes comme Yann Moulier-Boutang et Enzo Rullani, répondent par la négative. Pour eux, nous serions entrés dans l’ère du « capitalisme cognitif » ce qui permet de souligner la continuation d’un système social avec ses caractéristiques fondamentales (polarisation des inégalités, domination) mais aussi la nouveauté. Après avoir connu le capitalisme mercantiliste ( 16ème – 17ème siècle), fondé sur l’hégémonie d’une accumulation de type marchande et prédatrice (colonisation); puis le capitalisme industriel fondé sur l’accumulation du capital extensive et intensive fondé sur l’exploitation du travail et le rôle moteur de la manufacture dans la production de marchandises, nous serions en train de basculer dans le capitalisme cognitif fondé sur l’accumulation du capital « immatériel », la production et la diffusion des savoirs qui confèrent un rôle moteur à l’économie de la connaissance [6].

Il est important de préciser que pour les auteurs comme Yann Moulier-Boutang ou Enzo Rullani, la succession des époques du capitalisme n’évacue pas la production « industrielle matérielle » tout comme celle-ci n’a pas chassé les échanges marchands qui prévalaient à l’époque du mercantilisme. Il s’agit donc d’une logique ou d’une configuration qui « ré-agence, réorganise et remodèle » le capitalisme qui précédait. En même temps, les partisans du capitalisme cognitif semblent ne pas avoir résolu la question de la nature des changements en cours. Est-ce un changement graduel, continu, quantitatif ou de nature qualitative ? On n’en sait rien… Pour Enzo Rullani, suivant en cela Toni Negri, la connaissance serait devenue un facteur de production distinct, existant aux côtés du capital et du travail. Mais en quoi est-ce que ce capitalisme cognitif fonctionnerait de manière différente du capitalisme tout court[7] ? A nouveau, la réponse reste évasive… Les savoirs seraient devenus une médiation avant de s’autonomiser. Pour Rullani, la valorisation de ce facteur intermédiaire obéirait à des lois particulières :

«Le travailleur, aujourdhui, n’a plus besoin d’instruments de travail (c’est-à-dire de capital fixe) qui soient mis à sa disposition par le capital. Le capital fixe le plus important, celui qui détermine les différentiels de productivité, se trouve désormais dans le cerveau des gens qui travaillent. C’est la machine-outil que chacun porte en lui. C’est cela la nouveauté absolument essentielle de la vie productive d’aujourdhui » [8].[nous soulignons]

Cette interprétation nous semble absolument erronée et elle porte l’illusion de la nouveauté à son comble. Que le capital dispose du pouvoir nécessaire pour s’approprier les progrès scientifiques est un aspect premier de l’analyse de Marx. Dans les Grundrisse, livre préparant la rédaction du Capital, Marx s’opposait justement à une analyse qui lui est souvent attribuée mais qui appartient en fait à l’économiste britannique David Ricardo. Marx développe une théorie de la forme-valeur du travail distincte de la théorie ricardienne de la valeur-travail limitée à la durée de travail nécessaire. Marx poussait la réflexion plus loin :

« Ce n’est ni le temps de travail, ni le travail immédiat effectué par l’homme qui apparaissent comme le fondement principal de la production de richesses ; c’est l’appropriation de sa force productive générale, son intelligence de la nature et sa faculté de la dominer, dès lors qu’il s’est constitué en un corps social. En un mot, le développement de l’individu social représente le fondement essentiel de la richesse (…). L’accumulation du savoir, de l’habilité ainsi que de toutes les forces productives générales du cerveau social sont alors absorbées dans le capital qui s’oppose au travail. Elles apparaissent désormais comme une propriété du capital, ou plus exactement du capital fixe »[9].

Aujourd’hui, on pourrait en dire autant à propos de la connaissance ou des savoirs scientifiques ! La source première de l’efficacité du capitalisme se situe dans sa faculté à transformer le travail vivant dans ses aspects tant physiques que psychiques et cognitives en travail mort. En intégrant les tâches et les opérations réalisés auparavant par le travailleur dans des processus automatisés, le capital réduit la quantité de travail humain socialement nécessaire à production constante. Les tâches automatisées ne sont pas seulement des opérations de type manuelles, il s’agit aussi d’activités et de fonctions intellectuelles comme la programmation, la mesure, la surveillance, le contrôle, etc. L’analyse sociologique du procès de travail l’a amplement démontré : bon nombre d’innovations sont bien plus qu’une substitution des hommes par des machines, ce sont aussi des réorganisations managériales, productives, organisationnelles qui intègrent des savoirs faire, les « ficelles du métier » et par-dessus tout la maîtrise du procès de travail. La rationalisation du procès de travail vise à réduire les temps nécessaires (ce que Marx désignait par « boucher les pores du temps de travail » mais aussi ce sont des modes opérationnels qui visent à mobiliser l’effort et l’engagement du travail humain (de la pyramide des besoins de Maslow à la psychologie du travail de la gestion des ressources humaines). Le capital ne se limite donc pas à un parc de machines ou d’ordinateurs en réseau, ni à des actions cotées en bourse, mais forme un rapport social de domination nécessaire à la captation de la survaleur générée par le travail vivant[10]. De ce point de vue, il n’y a pas de rupture avec ce qui précédait mais juste une élévation de degré, une extension de la subsomption réelle du travail »[11].

Il nous faut rappeler que l’importance stratégique des savoirs et de la connaissance sont loin d’être une nouveauté pour le management. Depuis la publication en 1959 de l’ouvrage d’Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, il est autorisé de penser que l’entreprise perd une ressource lorsqu’un technicien hautement qualifié quitte l’entreprise. D’autres pensent que la connaissance est essentiellement endogène à la firme puisque l’offre de compétences crée les conditions propices à sa valorisation. Selon Michael Polanyi (The Tacit Dimension, 1966) il faut distinguer deux formes de connaissance : « Soit elles sont explicites, codifiées dans les routines organisationnel/es et elles se résument à ce qui est chiffrable, intelligible, directement compréhensible et exprimables par chaque individu dans l’organisation ; soit elles sont informelles, tacites et restent fragmentaires pour les individus. Dans le deuxième cas, les connaissances sont constituées de l’expertise technique informelle d’une part et des croyances et aspirations personnelles d’autre part » [12]

Cette conception clinique et instrumentale des connaissances permet d’orienter l’action managériale vers l’accapparement des savoirs faire informels ou empiriques pour mieux les objectiver et rationaliser leur mobilisation dans le seul but d’accroître la productivité. Trente ans plus tard, le knowledge management devient un enjeu incontournable qui va à son tour nourrir une objectivation systématique de la production de connaissances, les formaliser afin d’organiser leur circulation fluide et fonctionnelle, maîtriser la transmission (par base de données inter-reliés), augmenter la maîtrise du flux productif et prescrire une « dynamique de progrès » de façon procédurale. Il faut en prendre toute la mesure : les organisations apprenantes et le knowledge management ne font qu’ouvrir la voie à une sorte de semi-automatisation du management lui-même [13].

Mutations du travail ou permanence des contradictions ?

Pour les tenants du capitalisme cognitif comme nouvelle « grande transformation », il se produit aussi un phénomène de « déprolétarisation ». Ainsi, le programmeur qui développerait un logiciel nouveau aurait immédiatement conscience de son statut d’auteur ou de créateur. Le retour de la propriété de son travail devient alors une exigence évidente à laquelle correspondent les rémunérations par stock-options ou le statut de travailleurs indépendant. Il en découlerait une désintégration objective et subjective du salariat comme condition de prolétaire exclu par la civilisation capitaliste du travail industriel.

A l’inverse, pour certains auteurs comme Pierre Rolle[14], cette interprétation reste très marquée par la tradition prédominante de la sociologie du travail française, incarnée par Georges Friedmann et Alain Touraine et qui se caractérise par une analyse privilégiant l’acte de travail ou les dimensions techniques qui négligent la prise en compte du rapport social salarial. Dans l’hypothèse où la technique transformerait de fond en comble le travail, nous sommes forcément engagés dans une succession d’étapes et de phases historiques. Suivant cette grille d’interprétation – que Pierre Rolle qualifie de proudhonienne et non-marxienne – le travail, après avoir été artisanal, puis professionnel puis déqualifié et taylorien, va commencer à s’enrichir sur le plan technique (cfr. la polyvalence et l’enrichissement du travail manuel en tant que promesse « post-taylorienne ») avant de pouvoir s’« intellectualiser » à nouveau.

En réalité, l’idée que le « travail immatériel » ou « cognitif » permettra de dépasser la condition salariée n’est pas très différente. Mais résiste-t-elle à l’épreuve des faits ? On est en droit d’en douter, sachant que le travail immatériel et cognitif est loin de se diffuser à l’ensemble des activités sur l’ensemble du globe terrestre. Pour en prendre la mesure, il suffit de lire No Logo de Naomi Klein (2002) qui montre l’ampleur du travail d’usine dans les pays du Sud ou encore interroger les données statistiques du Bureau International du Travail pour constater l’ampleur des formes matérielles industrieuses du travail dans le monde [15]. Les travailleurs de la connaissance appartiennent-ils à un groupe social distinct ? A nouveau, il est permis d’en douter puisqu’aujourd’hui, même les ingénieurs et techniciens ont (parfois) le sentiment de « travailler à la chaîne ». Les travailleurs de la santé, infirmiers aides-soignants ou médecins, exécutent des opérations de plus en plus parcellisées, simplement parce que la logique de rationalisation des services de soins s’appuie sur une division sociale et technique du travail, et démultiplie les normes, les procédures en élargissant les possibilités de prescription du travail. Les travailleurs des soins de santé tendent à être absorbés dans la même logique de rationalisation auparavant attribué au travail manuel de l’industrie. La fabrication d’un progiciel comme SAP s’est faite en observant et distinguant les séquences bien définies du process. La programmation de ces progiciels se nourrit d’informations rassemblées lors d’audits sur le procès de travail qui dévoilent le work flow ce qui permet d’intégrer à la fois les dimensions formelles et informelles. L’architecture de ces progiciels vise à prescrire les modes opératoires (la procédure) tout en offrant l’avantage de marges d’autonomie nécessaires aux ajustements, à la flexibilité et à la qualité. La plupart des enquêtes montrent que l’usage des progiciels se traduit par une standardisation des procédures et des données, une prescription et un enchaînement automatique des tâches et in fine, un contrôle accru des performances individuelles[16]. Et tout cela peut s’organiser à distance, en élargissant le périmètre d’action et de contrôle.

Certes, la responsabilité informationnelle des salariés s’accroît, les tâches « s’élargissent » mais l’autonomie dans le travail est de plus en plus procéduralisée et l’engagement subjectif se focalise sur le respect des délais, la satisfaction client et les normes de qualité à respecter. Il est dès lors tout à fait compréhensible que les NTIC facilitent un « retour » du taylorisme (assisté par ordinateur) que l’on retrouve dans les centres d’appel et la grande distribution sous une forme « chimiquement pure ». La traçabilité n’existe pas seulement pour l’origine de la viande bovine puisqu’elle a commencé dans l’industrie automobile où les opérateurs ont commencé dès les années 1990 à « signer » individuellement chaque opération sur chaque poste de travail. Il est évident qu’avec une telle puissance de captation et de centralisation informationnelle, les NTIC autorisent la démultiplication de nouveaux panoptiques où il s’agit de tout voir sans être vu (courriels, flux d’information, cookies sur le web). Mais il faut constater que l’intelligence artificielle n’a toujours pas réalisé ses promesses qui datent pourtant des années 1960 et de l’époque de cybernétique où certains voulaient reproduire le cerveau dans une machine. En vain ce qui n’empêchera pas de « machiniser » toujours plus les opérations humaines en les insérant dans des process automatisés hybrides à l’image du cyborg et d’un usage de plus en extensif des technologies informationnelles.

Plutôt que de voir le travail cognitif ou « immatériel » supplanter des modes opératoires antérieurs, nous pensons qu’il faut d’abord reconnaître la poursuite des processus d’automation et la dissociation croissante entre l’opération (automatisée et processuelle) et l’opérateur. La division technique du travail devient alors de plus en plus une division sociale qui se libère des contingences techniques. La production de biens et de services devient moins dépendante des qualifications, des métiers, des postes de travail, de la technologie et peut mobiliser librement le travail vivant en se libérant des contraintes techniques (puisqu’il suffit de suivre la procédure). Paradoxalement, au moment où le travail vivant se réduit sur le plan quantitatif, les systèmes productifs deviennent de plus en plus sensibles à l’action de celui-ci. Comment interpréter autrement le développement de systèmes de motivation, de surveillance, un ensemble de sanctions négatives et d’incitations ? A l’heure du travail de la connaissance et du capitalisme cognitif, les vrais casse-têtes des DRH s’appellent « présentéisme », burn-out et plus largement les « mauvaises ambiances toxiques » … Les travailleurs intellectuels (concepteurs, techniciens, ingénieurs) sont fatigués, désenchantés, relativisent l’importance du travail dans leur vie, comptent leurs heures, se syndiquent parfois aussi. Les cadres, auparavant loyaux et dévoués, adoptent des conduites analogues aux ouvriers [17]. Pour comprendre et expliquer ces phénomènes, il faut commencer par se défaire d’une interprétation proudhonienne du travail qui s’aveugle sur la « déprolétarisation » la « désouvriérisation » simplement parce que le travail est en train de changer sur le plan technique. Au lieu de cela il faut commencer par reconnaître la continuité et l’extension du rapport salarial et en tirer toutes les conséquences. Cornelius Castoriadis, dans un texte publié en 1961 dans la revue Socialisme ou Barbarie avait exposé avec clarté le nœud gordien du travail dans le capitalisme :

« L’organisation capitaliste de la société est contradictoire au sens rigoureux où un individu névrosé l’est : elle ne peut tenter de réaliser ses intentions que par des actes qui les contrarient constamment. (…) Le système capitaliste ne peut vivre qu’en essayant continuellement de réduire les salariés en purs exécutants – et il ne peut fonctionner que dans la mesure où cette réduction ne se réalise pas. Le capitalisme est obligé de solliciter constamment la participation des salariés au processus de production, participation qu’il tend par ailleurs à rendre impossible » [18].

Il n’est pas difficile de retraduire cela en des termes plus contemporains : par-delà les changements techniques, le rapport salarial et le travail dans la société capitaliste est traversé par des logiques contradictoires. Le management suscite la créativité mais va en même brider celle-ci dès qu’elle sort du cadre. L’employeur attend l’implication dans le travail mais le vécu du travail alimente un regard désabusé et désenchanté. Les réflexions sur le capital humain reflètent la contradiction que doit gérer le management des ressources humaines sans être en mesure de la résoudre : il doit obtenir une implication maximale mais a besoin pour cela qu’elle soit plaisante, intéressante, consentie et intériorisée. Dit autrement, le management a besoin de l’aliénation des travailleurs qui doivent adhérer à la croyance d’être des libres détenteurs de leur capital humain faute de quoi le mécanisme d’extorsion de survaleur qui a lieu au cours de la prestation de travail commence à se gripper…

Gestion du portfolio de compétences et valeur du capital humain

A l’origine, dans la littérature économique, le capital humain fut considéré comme la résultante combinée de quatre durée temporalités : durée des études, durée du travail effectué et durée d’ancienneté au sein de la dernière entreprise (capital humain « spécifique » ou indicateur de la spécialité). Mais depuis une dizaine d’années, une nouvelle conception a émergé et le capital humain ne serait rien d’autre qu’un stock de connaissances en cours de renouvellement. Comment en mesurer la valeur ? Le marché (interne ou externe) du travail répond mal à la question puisqu’il se base de plus en plus sur une non-transparence des prix (au-delà d’un certain montant, on n’affiche pas son salaire). Par ailleurs, le marché ne règle pas les rétributions individuelles et surtout les variables dont la finalité est de récompenser ou de stimuler l’effort (le « salaire de réserve et d’efficience »).

Pour François Stankiewicz, seule une définition adéquate du capital humain permettrait d’identifier les déterminants de la « valorité » du salarié. Refusant à juste titre de mesurer la contribution individuelle à la valeur ajoutée – ce qui suppose la possibilité de décomposer le produit en un ensemble de productivités marginales, ce qui est devenu impossible aujourd’hui – Stankiewicz propose d’utiliser l’indicateur de « valorité différentielle »[19] plus pertinente que celle de productivité car elle permet d’articuler la notion de capital humain aux politiques de rémunération des entreprises. Le capital humain est devenu une boîte noire qui peut s’ouvrir et dont on peut mesurer le contenu en distinguant deux variables : primo, le coût d’intégration et deuxio le coût d’adaptation. Les deux coûts sont négativement corrélés au capital humain. Le coût d’intégration est fonction de la capacité d’apprentissage de l’entrant et cette capacité ne dépend pas uniquement de la formation de base mais aussi de son parcours. Le coût d’adaptation dépend de la capacité d’apprendre des savoirs dans le futur, et c’est ici qu’interviennent les savoir-faire méthodologiques [20].

Pour Stankiewicz, le capital humain forme un ensemble stratifié de savoirs basiques et de savoirs opérationnels, plus ou moins combinés en fonction des parcours. Moyennant une organisation apprenante, l’entreprise sera en mesure d’en bénéficier de façon optimale. Ce bénéfice n’est toutefois pas illimité. En effet, la gestion concrète du capital humain peut entrer en conflit avec l’innovation, la plasticité organisationnelle et le développement des opportunités créatrices de valeur dès lors que sont utilisés des objectifs de performance et de productivité qui figent l’avenir en utilisant des critères définis ex ante, bornant l’activité créatrice. Or, comme on voit mal l’entreprise mettre entre parenthèses ces objectifs – sauf dans des cas isolés tel que le département de R&D – il en découle que le capital humain sera toujours bridé ou enfermé dans un carcan. Nous retrouvons donc mutatis mutandis la contradiction fondamentale entre la logique de valorisation qu’enferme la relation salariale et la libération à laquelle vont aspirer les salarié·e·s.

Le salut par la technologie ?

La question de savoir si les nouvelles technologies permettent de dépasser le système social actuel demeure souvent posée par les tenants de la société de la connaissance. En même temps, c’est seulement lorsqu’elles répondent au besoin d’extension et d’approfondissement du cycle d’accumulation du capital que les nouvelles technologies se diffusent rapidement. La mise en réseau d’informations a été développé au début des années 1960 mais l’application d’internet et l’interconnectivité des ordinateurs n’a connu son essor –fulgurant il est vrai – qu’à la fin des années 1990 après de vastes travaux d’infrastructure (les « autoroutes de l’information ») consentis avec un investissement public sous l’administration Clinton. L’investissement initial (R&D) fut très élevé mais une fois que celle-ci fut réalisée, la production/reproduction de l’innovation a fortement baissé en termes de coûts. Les produits numérisés sont dès lors très facilement mobilisables par les capitaux concurrents. Il est vrai que cette logique entre contradiction avec la logique marchande et sur ce point, Negri et Rullani ont raison de dire que la valeur de la connaissance ne dépend pas de sa rareté mais « découle uniquement des limitations établies, institutionnellement ou de fait, de l’accès à la connaissance » [21]. Par conséquent, pour que la valorisation puisse se développer suffisamment il devient impératif d’en limiter la diffusion et l’accès, ne serait-ce que temporairement :

« La valeur d’échange de la connaissance est donc entièrement liée à la capacité pratique de limiter sa diffusion libre. C’est-à-dire de limiter avec les moyens juridiques (brevets, droits d’auteurs, licences, contrats) ou monopolistes, la possibilité de copier, d’imiter, de “réinventer”, d’apprendre les connaissances des autres » [22].

Ceci annonce une logique d’enclosure des communs du savoir et l’utilisation de moyens extra-économiques pour assurer des rentes de marché et la constitution de monopoles. Mais la nouveauté fait également défaut dans ce domaine. Les trouvailles scientifiques ou technologiques ont toujours connu ce type d’enclosure. Le marché du travail, l’échange de biens, la captation de ressources naturelles ont toujours eu besoin de dispositifs juridiques et d’une intervention étatique. Fondamentalement, nous ne retrouvons qu’à une échelle élargie la contradiction entre le développement des forces productives – avec un usage et une diffusion potentiellement gratuite – et les rapports sociaux de production capitalistes qui cherchent, à tout prix, à reproduire le statut de la marchandise, l’opposé des potentialités de la science, de la connaissance et des avancées technologiques.

De façon similaire, il est aujourd’hui techniquement absolument réalisable d’automatiser la production à un degré tel que le temps de travail pourrait être réduit à quinze ou vingt heures par semaine pour toutes et tous, mais à condition de sortir de la logique de la valorisation capitaliste.

A l’opposé de ces potentialités autogestionnaires contenu dans le procès de travail, le capital atteint un tel degré de concentration et de centralisation du capital qu’il devient nécessaire de mettre en concurrence à l’échelle planétaire les filiales, les business units, les équipementiers et sous-traitants car sans concurrence inter-capitaliste, le flux incessant du cycle d’accumulation serait interrompu à la manière d’une embolie. Les formes de production, de consommation et de mobilisation de la main d’œuvre s’adaptent donc à cet impératif d’une concurrence globale. L’entreprise se fragmente et tend même à devenir une coquille creuse avec l’émergence de l’entreprise sans usine et la mobilisation de la marque comme voie d’accès au marché final. Le Capital s’échappe de l’entreprise en tant qu’unité productive et forme juridique pour mieux pouvoir se déployer à l’échelle de la société. La logique de valorisation enveloppe l’ensemble de la société et des activités sociales, réduisant le développement humain à ce qu’il y a de solvable et de valorisable, transformant le « monde en marchandise ». Ce qui est non seulement le cas du vivant (biotechnologies), de la vie sociale (les loisirs et la culture) mais aussi des sciences et des savoirs.

Une production scientifique marquée du sceau de la valorisation

L’activité scientifique reflète une grande continuité avec la période précédente « industrialiste » : nous voyons émerger à l’université une division fonctionnelle du travail et une rationalisation croissante avec l’instauration d’indicateurs quantitatif objectivant la performance et la productivité. Perdant son autonomie déjà très relative, la technique commande désormais la science par l’aval [23]. Il en découle un basculement de la recherche scientifique dans un mode industrialisé avec un impératif de sérialisation et de standardisation. Cette tendance s’affirme aujourd’hui avec vigueur mais avait déjà commencé lors de la mise en place des programmes de recherche nucléaire. Ne laissant aucune place à la libre démarche spéculative, organisant le recrutement avec une rationalité bureaucratique absolue, le travail de recherche se soumet de plus en plus à une division fonctionnelle et hiérarchisée des tâches et des opérations au sein d’institutions fermées sur elles-mêmes. La science est devenue un objet économique à part entière, entièrement intégré à la logique socio-économique capitaliste. Il n’est guère difficile d’observer comment cet accaparement de la production des savoirs, y compris à l’université, est par l’impératif de la valorisation (brevets, publications, start-ups). Le travail de chercheur reproduit toutes les procédures de standardisation : allant du « copier-coller » (avec ses dimensions anomiques que sont le plagiat) à l’exécution à la chaîne de contrats de recherche ; de la réalisation d’économies d’échelles au recyclage des données d’une étude à l’autre. L’évolution des modes de financement de la recherche accélère la PME-ïsation des laboratoires et centres de recherche tandis que l’apparition de critères d’excellence organise la mise en concurrence des unités de recherche. La contractualisation de la recherche consacre ici une sorte de prolétarisation du travail scientifique : course aux contrats, satis­ faction de la commande, valorisation autour de standards d’excellence, auto-censure et mise au rebut de la pensée critique. Parallèlement, la « propriété intellectuelle » devient un produit privatisable et commercialisable, soumis à la logique d’échange et de rentabilité.

Au-delà de ces aspects apparents, il y a l’instrumentalisation de la finalité de la recherche elle-même. La recherche scientifique s’auto-soumet à la logique marchande, commerciale, avec une hiérarchisation nouvelle qui traverse autant les sciences naturelles que les sciences sociales. Prenons deux exemples pour illustrer notre propos : 1) l’instrumentalisation de la biologie (technologie) à des fins privées et 2) l’instrumentalisation de la sociologie à des finalités idéologiques et étatiques.

En biologie, nombre de start-up se sont développées, en biogénétique notamment. Nombreuses sont les inventions qui ont été congelées par le système des brevets, entre autres dans le domaine de pharmacologie. Au nord (les pays de l’OCDE), l’existence de marchés solvabilisés par la protection sociale a orienté la recherche vers des médicaments dont le financement est socialisé, comme ce fut le cas avec le HIV. En revanche, les pathologies qui se concentrent dans l’hémisphère Sud tel que la malaria et qui font pourtant des centaines de milliers de victimes chaque année ont longtemps été négligés dans la recherche fondamentale [24].

Par rapport à la sociologie, il est tout aussi important de poser à la fois la question de son implication dans la construction de son objet et d’interroger les modalités de construction de cet objet. Une telle réflexivité est indispensable si on veut objectiver le travail du sociologue comme une composante de la division intellectuelle du travail :

« La sociologie, comme auparavant les sciences physiques et la technologie, s’intègre dans le désenchantement du monde ; elle bouscule la tradition et désacralise les comportements, en écartant les explications extra-sociales, magiques ou religieuses du social. En même temps, elle produit de l’ambivalence, voire une nouvelle pensée magique, en renvoyant le plus souvent aux acteurs une image négative deux-mêmes, en les persuadant de leur relative impuissance face aux experts et thérapeutes des pathologies sociales »[25].

Les contradictions sociales finissent par disparaître et l’épaisseur de la réalité sociale finit par s’évanouir. La production de connaissances sociologiques se réduit de plus en plus à la production de connaissances appliquées et applicables à des objets dissociés et fragmentés et dont la pertinence n’est plus déterminée par sur un régime de vérité (positiviste) mais par le mirage mystificateur que représente l’excellence et le degré de transférabilité (d’échange) pour la production de valeurs. Les effets déstabilisateurs de cette extension du règne de la marchandise sont à leur tour lissés, en premier par les sociologues eux-mêmes. Certains évoqueront la société post-industrielle alors que l’on assiste à une industrialisation de la nature (production agricole, production culturelle, production des savoirs). D’autres désigneront la société du risque (Ulrich Beck) ou évoqueront la modernité réflexive (Anthony Giddens) mais dans l’ensemble ces changement ne sont que les épiphénomènes sociétaux d’un mouvement impulsé par la révolution technologique. En désignant comme cause première la technologie ou la science, les déterminations systémiques d’un capitalisme globalisé restent hors-cadre de la réflexion et la sociologie devient tendanciellement de plus en plus muette.

A force de ne pas prendre de recul, la réflexion scientifique sur le social devient une sorte de myopie certes polychrome mais incapable de saisir les dynamiques structurelles à l’œuvre. Elle devient dès lors science de la prévision (improbable et non advenue) ou de l’attente (toujours surprise par l’évènement). L’économie politique demeure hors champ pour les sociologues tandis que les économistes se font comptables d’équations et de mécanismes que les évènements invalident de façon récurrente (les crises adviennent toujours de manière inattendue), mais sans ébranler les croyances ni la division du travail suivant des délimitations disciplinaires. Suivant cette vision appauvrie, le marché n’est rien d’autre qu’un mode opératoire d’agencement, de coordination des actions ; une pure confrontation de l’offre et de la demande et par-là une sanction positive ou négative des activités ; la monnaie n’est plus qu’un pur moyen pour exprimer les mouvements des prix et non un rapport où s’entremêlent le social, le symbolique, le politique (l’Etat) ainsi que des jugements sur ce qui est socialement acceptable pour la valorisation et l’accumulation ; le travail n’est rien d’autre que l’exercice d’une activité généralement rémunérée et exercée dans de plus ou moins bonnes conditions et non un rapport social asymétrique instaurant la vente et la consommation de la force de travail avec l’aide de l’état et sous le contrôle du capital.

Alors que les forces destructrices écologiques ou guerrières s’accumulent partout, le changement social qui s’opère demeure aveugle et incontrôlé. Les « avancées » technologiques ne sont pas d’une grande aide ; pire, elles deviennent source d’opacité du monde et suscitent la fermeture des êtres humains sur eux-mêmes. La marchandisation de l’intelligence sociale et des savoirs devient méconnaissance du social tandis que le besoin de compréhension du social, sur fond de crise étendue des rapports sociaux, actualise les formes de croyance religieuses et le retour en force du pouvoir magique et de l’essentialisme.

 

* Maître de conférence en sociologie (Université de Picardie Jules-Verne), chercheur au Laboratoire CNRS G. Friedmann (Université de Paris 1).

Notes

[1]. Jean BOURLÈS, « La société de la connaissance. L’Europe face au défi mondial », ln Pierre DOCKÈS, Ordre et désordres dans l’économie-monde, Paris, PUF, 2002, pp. 167-202 ; Bernard Paulré, «De la New Economy au capitalisme cognitif», ln Multitudes n°2, mai 2000, pp. 25-43

[2]. www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/knowledge_society/library_fr.htm (consulté le 25 juin 2003), « Résolution du Conseil sur le capital social et humain » et « Construire la société de la connaissance : les interactions du capital social et humain », Document de travail des services de la Commission SEC(2003)652.

[3]. Souvenons-nous que l’apparition de la Fort T n’a pas empêché la profonde crise de 1929.

[4] Charles MURRAY et Richard HERNSTEIN, The Bell Curve : Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, 1994.

[5] Signalons quand même les nombreuses critiques émises à l’égard de cette étude, entre autres celles portant sur le caractère tout à fait biaisé de l’instrument de mesure, puisque l’intelligence est mesurée à l’aune d’un modèle ethnique et classiste à l’opposé des couches reléguées et paupérisées.

[6] Yann MOULIER-BOUTANG, « Capitalisme cognitif et nouvelles formes de codification du rapport salarial », in Carlo VERCELLONE (dir.), Sommes-nous sortis du capitalisme industriel ?, Paris, La Dispute, 2002, pp. 305-319; Enzo RULLANI, «Le capitalisme cognitif: un déjà-vu ?», in Multitudes, n°2, mai 2000, pp. 87-96. Voir aussi la contribution de Yann Moulier-Boutang dans ce numéro des Cahiers Marxistes.

[7]. Enzo RULLANI, op. cit., Multitudes, pp. 88-89.

[8]. Toni NEGRI, Exils, Mille et une nuits,1998, p.19.

[9]. Karl MARX, Fondements de fa critique de l’économie politique [Grundrisse], Edition Anthropos, 1968, Tome 2, pp. 209-231.

[10]. Il s’agit aussi d’une captation qui va au-delà du rapport salariant / salarié: les rapports sociaux de sexe, le patriarcat (même si ses formes ont changé) permettent la mobilisation par le Capital du travail domestique comme facteur de reproduction de la force de travail. Le système scolaire correspond aussi à une forme d’investissement social dans la reproduction de la force de travail.

[11]. «Subsomption» [subsumere] est un concept utilisé par Marx pour désigner la domination de la force de travail par le capital ; ou dit autrement la domination du travail abstrait sur le travail concret. Par subsomption réelle, Marx désigne que cette soumission se fait réellement, donc également subjectivement, à l’inverse d’une subsomption formelle qui est d’abord disciplinaire et réglementaire. Dans le système capitaliste, la subsomption passe par l’existence d’un marché de la force de travail, composé de travailleurs juridiquement libres (ce que n’étaient pas les serfs ni les esclaves) mais en réalité soumis à la nécessité de vendre leur force de travail pour subvenir à leurs besoins.

[12]. Michael POLANYI, The Tacit Dimension, 1966, New York, p.59 (notre traduction).

[13]. Jean-François BALLAY, Capitaliser et transmettre les savoir-faire de l’entreprise, Eyrolles, Paris, 1997.

[14]. Voir Pierre ROLLE, Travail et salariat. Bilan de la sociologie du travail, PUG, Grenoble,1988.

[15]. Son compte-rendu peut-être très journalistique sur les zones franches où l’on retrouve un travail forcé sur les chaînes de production qui vont de l’électro-ménager aux semi-conducteurs passant par les chaussures de sport est édifiant à ce sujet. Selon les estimations de l’auteure, environ 180 millions de salariés travailleraient au tournant de l’an 2000 dans l’industrie localisée dans des « zones franches » éparpillés dans l’hémisphère Sud. Voir Naomi KLEIN, No Logo, Acte Sud, 2002, 734 pp.

[16]. Laure LEMAIRE, Systèmes ERP, emplois et transformations du travail, Fondation Travail-Université, Namur, 2002.

.[17] Le sentiment de ne pas être reconnu à sa juste valeur est celui qui se révèle être le moins sensible aux clivages professionnels ou les niveaux de qualification (p. 282) tandis qu’un tiers des cadres supérieurs (cadres encadrants) ont le sentiment d’être exploités (p. 287), voir Christian BAUDELOT et Michel GOLLAC, Travailler pour être heureux. Le bonheur et le travail en France, Fayard, Paris, 2003,

[18]. Paul CERDAN (Cornelius CASTORIADIS), « Le mouvement révolutionnaire sous le capitalisme moderne », in Socialisme ou barbarie, volume VI, 13• année, avril-juin 1961, p. 85.

[19]. François STANKIEWICZ, « Productivité ou valorité du salarié : une autre représentation du travail», in Problèmes Economiques, 4 décembre 2002, n° 2787, p. 4.

[20]. Aussi appelés «méta-connaissances» par les cognitivistes, à savoir l’aptitude à identifier un problème et à hiérarchiser les causes.

[21]. La connaissance n’est peut-être pas une marchandise pure mais la force de travail ne l’a jamais été non plus. L’achat de la force de travail par l’employeur lors du recrutement ne garantit nullement son efficacité lors de sa consommation (la mise au travail). A l’inverse de marchandises inertes non vivantes, l’appropriation n’est donc jamais totale.

[22]. Enzo RULLANI, op. cit., mai 2000, pp. 87-96.

[23]. Jean-Marc LÉVY-LEBLOND, « Pour une critique de la science », in Rencontres Philosophiques-Espace Marx, 30/11/2000. http://www.humanite.fr/journal/2000-12-07/2000-12-07-235983 (consulté le 25 juin 2003) et Jean-Marc LÉVY-LEBLOND et Alain JAUBERT, (Auto)critique de fa science, Seuil, Paris, 1975.

[24]. Voir à propos des maladies négligées la campagne pour la levée des brevets et la constitution d’un fonds public de la recherche sous l’égide de l’OMS. Voir https://dndi.org/

[25] Jean-Marie VINCENT, « Les conditions de possibilité d’une sociologie critique », in Contretemps (papier), 2001, n°1, p. 91.

Les travailleurs de l’automobile remportent une victoire historique aux Etats-Unis

Stéphen Bouquin // (publié en ligne – Les Mondes du Travail – 14 novembre 2023)

Après quarante et un jours d’actions de grève, le syndicat UAW (United Automobile Workers) a obtenu une victoire historique sur les trois grands constructeurs Ford, General Motors et Stellantis (Chrysler). Cette victoire met fin à 43 ans de concessions et de défaites initiées en 1979, lorsque l’UAW avait accepté la suspension de toutes les conventions signées avec la direction de Chrysler alors en faillite. Au cours de cette longue période, près de 60 sites de production ont été fermés ou délocalisés vers le Mexique et le syndicat n’avait cessé d’accepter, certes à reculons, une modération salariale et la flexibilité productive en plus d’une catégorie de travailleurs effectuant les mêmes opérations, mais payés 10 ou 15 dollars/heure en moins appelés « second tier » (second segment). En même temps, le secteur de l’automobile s’est profondément transformé et connaît un regain d’activité. Employant aujourd’hui 1,2 million de travailleurs contre 850 000 en 1980, les constructeurs se sont diversifiés avec l’arrivée des marques allemandes (VW, Mercedes) ou japonaises (Toyota, Nissan, Honda) et plus récemment, le développement accéléré de sites de production de véhicules électriques.

Les avancées obtenues par l’UAW sont historiques à plusieurs égards. Outre une augmentation de 25 % échelonnée sur quatre ans (la durée de la convention collective), l’intégration des travailleurs temporaires dans la catégorie des permanents (CDI), c’est surtout l’abolition du système dualiste avec des travailleurs de second rang (second tier) qui représente une victoire sur la précarité et la surexploitation puisque ces travailleurs bénéficieront d’une augmentation pouvant atteindre, dans certains cas, 150 % du salaire horaire. Le syndicat a également obtenu la restauration de l’indexation des salaires sur le coût de la vie (appelé COLA pour Cost Of Living Adjustment) qui avait été supprimé en 2008. Appliquée à l’ensemble des travailleurs syndiqués des Big Three, la restauration de l’indexation devrait ajouter 8 % aux augmentations de salaires obtenues par ailleurs. Les intérimaires ayant plus de 90 jours d’ancienneté passeront immédiatement au statut de permanent. Les futurs intérimaires deviendront des travailleurs permanents au bout de neuf mois, qui compteront pour leur progression vers le taux supérieur de la grille salariale. Le seul bémol de cette victoire se situe au niveau des retraites, même si Ford a accepté de réinjecter des ressources dans les fonds de pension, cela reste insuffisant pour garantir les mêmes droits de retraites à l’ensemble des catégories de travailleurs.

Comment une telle victoire a-t-elle été possible ?

Le changement de direction syndicale a joué un rôle déterminant dans cette victoire. Le nouveau président de l’UAW, Shawn Fain, a été élu après une rude bataille menée par une tendance de gauche, United All Workers for Democracy, qui s’était constituée il y a de cela un dizaine d’années. Il y a deux ans, cette tendance avait obtenu l’élection du président au suffrage direct, mais échouait de justesse à emporter le vote interne. Au cours de l’année suivante, la direction syndicale de l’UAW a été éclaboussée par une série de scandales de corruption et d’enrichissement personnel. Pendant cette période agitée, Shawn Fain a su gagner une reconnaissance comme syndicaliste de base opposé aux concessions et aux inégalités salariales. Au printemps 2023, Fain a mené une campagne interne autour du mot d’ordre « pas de corruption, pas de concessions et pas d’inégalités statutaires » (« No corruption, No concession, No tier »), emportant l’élection interne contre Ray Curry qui représentait une orientation plus modérée à l’égard des Big 3.

Shawn Fain s’est affiché à plusieurs reprises avec Bernie Sanders et a mené une campagne médiatique dès son élection en annonçant le retour d’un syndicalisme capable d’apporter des avancées sociales. En articulant un discours centré sur la justice sociale avec une critique du mépris de classe envers ceux qui travaillent, Shawn Fain incarnait une volonté des membres d’obtenir de bons salaires et de retrouver une condition sociale assimilée à la classe moyenne. Il est vrai aussi qu’en adoptant le Green New Deal, le gouvernement sous la présidence de Joe Biden s’était montré très généreux envers les constructeurs. Les subventions et les prêts sans intérêts pour financer la transition écologique atteignaient des montants considérables, de l’ordre de 25 à 30 milliards de dollars par constructeur. La nouvelle direction de l’UAW a pressenti que le moment pour mener une action offensive était enfin advenue.

Peu après son élection, Shawn Fain a mobilisé les adhérents en annonçant le retour d’un syndicalisme de combat qui n’a pas peur d’engager un conflit avec la ferme conviction de pouvoir l’emporter. En annonçant un calendrier de grèves « stand-up » (debout), Fain mobilisait le puissant symbôle mémoriel des « sit-down strikes » (grèves assises) des années 1936-1937 qui avaient permis à l’UAW d’obtenir une reconnaissance syndicale [1].

Grève « sit down» dans l’usine Fischer à Cleveland (1936)

La campagne de grèves Stand-up ciblait simultanément les trois constructeurs, ce qui représente une nouveauté par rapport à la période précédente. Auparavant, la tactique éprouvée consistait à cibler un seul constructeur pour ensuite étendre les avancées salariales vers les deux autres. Mais ce mode d’action était devenu désuet, sinon contre-productif. En effet, toute concession syndicale autour du temps de travail ou des salaires se soldait par des reculs symétriques chez les autres constructeurs. La délocalisation d’usines d’assemblage vers les États du Sud ou le Mexique, dépourvus de représentation syndicale, donnait une arme redoutable aux mains du management qui n’hésitait pas à s’en servir pour arracher des concessions dans les usines historiques dans le périmètre des Grands Lacs (Detroit-Flint-Chicago-Cleveland). Pour sortir de cette spirale de régression sociale, il fallait prendre simultanément les « Big Three » pour cible. Ce choix, audacieux et à certains égards risqué, exigeait la ferme garantie d’être en pleine capacité de mettre des sites à l’arrêt pendant une longue période. Début septembre, l’UAW annonçait un calendrier de quarante jours de grève échelonnées, mais sans divulguer les sites qui seraient mis à l’arrêt. De cette manière, le syndicat se donnait les moyens de démultiplier l’effet disruptif, en désorganisant l’approvisionnement et en créant un chaos dans les plannings de production.

Cette tactique de grève tire sa force de l’effet surprise par rapport à une organisation du procès de travail en réseau et en flux tendu. Ne sachant pas où le syndicat allait frapper, les constructeurs avaient empilé les stocks de moteurs et d’autres composants essentiels. Mais contre toute attente, le syndicat a choisi d’organiser des débrayages et des grèves ailleurs que dans les usines d’assemblage, en mettant à l’arrêt les centres de distribution avant de cibler les unités d’assemblage des véhicules de haut de gamme comme les 4 x 4 ou les modèles de luxe.

En alternant les grèves dans les centres de logistique, les usines d’assemblage, les unités de fabrication de composants essentiels, l’UAW a réussi à maximaliser les effets disruptifs des arrêts de travail tout en ménageant sa caisse de grève. Chaque usine affectée par un arrêt de travail était complètement à l’arrêt et chaque affilié à l’UAW touchait une indemnité de 100 dollars par jour de grève…

Dans les sites non affectés par un arrêt de travail, les travailleurs avaient pour consigne de refuser les heures supplémentaires, de travailler de la manière la plus stricte possible, en respectant à la lettre les consignes techniques ou les normes de sécurité. Début octobre, l’UAW annonçait que la poursuite des actions de grève jusqu’à thanksgiving (23 novembre) ne posait aucun souci… Mi-octobre, General Motors et Ford ont commencé à concéder des hausses de salaires et le retour de l’indexation. Chrysler-Stellantis refusait encore d’embrayer le pas, ce qui a poussé l’UAW à concentrer les actions de grève chez ce constructeur, faisant de Carlos Tavares, dont le salaire annuel atteint 26 millions de dollars, l’incarnation de la vénalité managériale.

Arrêter la descente aux enfers

Quand Ford et General Motors ont commencé à faire des concessions sur l’un ou l’autre point du cahier de revendications, l’UAW a décidé d’enfoncer le clou en accentuant la pression sur Chrysler-Stellantis, le plus réticent des trois. Pris en tenaille par les concessions des autres constructeurs où la production reprenait et des grèves ciblant les véhicules les modèles plus rentables, Stellantis a fini par accepter de réouvrir l’ancienne usine de Jeep Cherokee en y affectant la fabrication de batteries électriques et la création de 5 000 postes de travail, permettant la réembauche des 1 500 travailleurs licenciés fin 2022.

Cette décision représente un véritable tournant dans la tradition états-unienne des relations industrielles. En 1946, l’UAW avait mené une grève chez General Motors de cent treize jours chez pour obtenir un droit de regard sur la comptabilité de l’entreprise (« open the books ») et surtout un droit de veto sur toute décision affectant l’organisation de la production. Pour Walter Reuther, à l’époque dirigeant de l’UAW et militant socialiste formé à la doctrine du contrôle ouvrier [2], l’enjeu était d’importance stratégique. Voyant arriver les machines-outils à commande numérique, Reuther était convaincu qu’un syndicalisme limité aux revendications salariales serait tôt ou tard dépassé par les innovations technologiques. Mais pour General Motors, il était hors de question de concéder ne serait-ce qu’une parcelle de son ouvoir managérial. Mais après 113 jours de grève, la direction avait concédé, pour obtenir la paix sociale, des augmentations salariales et des garanties collectives (sécurité, assurance maladie, retraite) jamais vues auparavant. Mais cette victoire était aussi une défaite…  Après avoir été purgé des militants communistes pendant le maccarthysme, l’UAW s’était replié sur le périmètre convenu des relations industrielles, laissant au management toute latitude dans les décisions concernant l’organisation du travail et les investissements.

Selon Daniel Bell, alors journaliste de la revue Fortune, l’UAW n’avait emporté qu’une victoire à la Pyrrhus, et la montagne de dollars qui a financé la paix sociale a surtout servi masquer l’émasculation d’un syndicalisme de contre-pouvoir. Si le raisonnement de Bell est loin d’être faux, pendant près de trois décennies, les ouvriers de l’automobile ont vu leur niveau de vie augmenter de manière constante jusqu’au point d’incarner la figure sociale de l’ouvrier appartenant à la classe moyenne. Mais cette tendance s’est inversée à partir des années 1980, date à partir de laquelle les ouvriers de l’automobile étaient de moins en moins bien payés tandis que leur leur appartenance à la classe moyenne commençait à se déliter sérieusement. Il faut néanmoins reconnaître l’habilité de la nouvelle équipe dirigeante de l’UAW qui a su transformer le sentiment de déclassement en ressource de mobilisation, invoquant la nécessité d’une « réparation » salariale tout en se positionnant comme protagoniste dans la sauvegarde du rêve américain. Cette approche est loin d’être « anticapitaliste » mais pour les centaines de milliers de travailleurs du secteur et le syndicat, il était devenu urgent de rompre le cycle interminable de défaites et de reculs sociaux. Dit autrement, les enjeux idéologiques existent mais resteront secondaires par rapport aux enjeux matériels…

Le retour inopiné du contrôle ouvrier

Il y a lieu de souligner une autre victoire, en plus des aspects strictement économiques. Les 43 jours de grève ont permis d’obtenir l’accord de la réouverture de l’usine de Belvidere de Stellantis. Cette concession arrachée renoue avec le meilleur des traditions du contrôle ouvrier [3] : « Pour la première fois dans l’histoire syndicale, nous avons obtenu la réouverture d’une usine sans devoir accepter des pertes de salaire ni sacrifier des emplois ailleurs. Mieux, nous avons obtenu que les montants des salaires, la couverture d’assurance maladie et les pensions seront identiques aux usines d’assemblage thermique, déjà couverts par les conventions collectives. »

Cette interprétation n’est pas exagérée. Pour Barry Eidlin, professeur en sociologie des relations industrielles à l’université McGill, la réouverture de l’usine de Belvidere marque un tournant car c’est la première fois que le syndicat obtient la réouverture d’une usine tout en pesant sur les choix d’investissements et d’organisation du procès de travail. Auparavant, l’UAW n’obtenait que l’ajournement d’une fermeture ou le maintien d’activité en faisant d’importantes concessions salariales ou statutaires.

La doctrine du contrôle ouvrier est également à la base d’une série d’actions qui visent à maintenir les activités liées à la production de véhicules à propulsion électrique au sein du périmètre historique de l’automobile. Début octobre, l’UAW obtenait que les 6 000 créations d’emplois prévus par GM dans le secteur électrique seront couverts par la convention-cadre générale plutôt que par une convention distincte avec des salaires au rabais. Cette victoire concerne également des semi-filiales (entreprises en joint-venture) comme Ultium Cells de Lordstown, dans l’Ohio, où les 1300 travailleurs verront leurs salaires ajustés à la hausse, passant de 16,50 dollars à 28 dollars/heure, une avancée qui sera étendue à sept autres unités de fabrication de composants pour les moteurs électriques.

General Motors à Spring Hill est un autre exemple illustrant l’actualité du contrôle ouvrier. Dans cette usine du Tennessee, GM avait décidé d’externaliser la peinture et le moulage en plastique dans une entreprise où les salaires commencent à 15 dollars et se terminent à 19 dollars après quatre ans. Bien que les véhicules électriques ne changent en rien l’activité de peinture et de plasturgie, les travailleurs couverts par les conventions d’entreprise de l’automobile avaient soudainement été licenciés. En obtenant l’extension des grilles salariales et des garanties collectives aux entreprises fabriquant les composants, l’UAW enlève tout avantage à externaliser certaines activités et évite la fragmentation des collectifs de travail suivant des clivages salariaux justifiés par des prétextes technologiques. Désormais, être affecté à certaines activités spécialisées dans le secteur des véhicules électriques ne sera plus à l’origine d’une sous-rémunération, ce qui n’est pas rien par rapport à un marché en pleine croissance. En effet, sur les 14 millions de véhicules particuliers vendus chaque année aux Etats-Unis, la part du parc électrique augmente rapidement et atteint désormais un volume annuel de 800 000 unités, représentant 6 % du volume total, près du double des ventes en 2021.

Enjeux climatiques et électoraux

Pour l’UAW, ces multiples victoires sur les Big Three représentent de véritables trophées de guerre qui devraient lui permettre de forcer la porte pour entrer chez les des constructeurs employant des travailleurs non syndiqués. L’égalisation des salaires du secteur électrique sur ceux du secteur thermique est une victoire qui devrait faciliter l’adhésion des travailleurs, encore très sceptiques par rapport à la transition écologique. Pour Shawn Fain, l’alliance « Green-Blue » (verte écologique et cols bleus) est essentielle : « La crise climatique n’est pas une rumeur fantaisiste et il est essentiel que la transition écologique se fasse en respectant les principes de justice sociale. On ne peut pas accepter que des green jobs [emplois verts] soient créés en imposant des sous-salaires sans garanties collectives. »

L’enjeu est bien sûr de taille, y compris sur le plan politique puisque Donald Trump s’oppose à l’électrification du parc automobile « car ce sont des jobs mal payés ». Pour contrer le populisme réactionnaire de Trump, l’UAW a choisi de ne pas se jeter dans les bras du démocrate Joe Biden, mais d’exiger d’abord des garanties sur les salaires et la représentation syndicale. Cette tactique peut sembler très modérée, mais elle n’est pas sans effet puisque Joe Biden s’est présenté à un piquet de grève. Il est évident qu’il aura besoin du soutien des travailleurs de l’automobile du Midwest pour l’emporter dans ces États frappés par la désindustrialisation et une paupérisation de la classe laborieuse qui se croyait appartenir à la classe moyenne…

Sachant que les usines de Tesla sont toutes exemptes de présence syndicale et sans couverture conventionnelle, et que la plupart des constructeurs étrangers sont dans le même cas, la victoire syndicale sur les Big Three est sans doute aussi une concession inspirée par un certain opportunisme de la part des grands constructeurs historiques: les parts de marché du trio General Motors, Ford et Chrysler totalisait 42 % contre 80 % il y a vingt ans… Pour les constructeurs états-uniens, il est essentiel de préserver leurs parts de marché et, pour atteindre cet objectif, ils ont tout intérêt à réduire l’écart de compétitivité face aux concurrents [4]. Ayant été contraints de concéder des hausses salariales substantielles et la fin du système dualiste, lil est évident que les Big 3 facilitent désormais les syndicats à entrer chez les concurrents pour empêcher ces derniers de profiter de leurs avantages compétitifs. C’est peut-être inhabituel mais fondamentalement, je ne vois pas pourquoi une tactique syndicale devrait hésiter à mettre en concurrence des concurrents… Dèslors, il n’y a aucune raison de ne pas croire  Shawn Fain lorsqu’il annonce que l’UAW retournera à la table des négociations en 2028 pour négocier avec les Big Five ou les Big Six au lieu de se cantonner aux Big Three. Arracher une victoire n’est pas rien et ouvrir une perspective de progrès social encore moins. Dans ce sens, la victoire de la grève dans l’automobile est un tournant qui ouvre aussi une perspective pour l’ensemble des travailleurs.

Vers un renouveau syndical ?

Vu d’Europe, cela semble encore anecdotique, mais l’UAW n’a pas seulement changé de direction et d’orientation mais s’est transformé son périmètre d’action et a réussi à obtenir une reconnaissance syndicale dans des secteurs et des métiers très éloignés de l’automobile, comme les employés du casino de Chicago, des travailleurs de l’aéronautique, de l’agroalimentaire et même des enseignants-chercheurs universitaires, qui représentent désormais 10 % des affiliés du syndicat. Comment cela-t-il été possible ? D’abord en menant des campagnes d’affiliation incessantes suivant la méthode de l’organizing (parfois même du deep organizing), ce qui est une étape incontournable pour négocier des conventions collectives et représenter les travailleurs sur les questions de conditions de travail. Il faut rappeler ici que l’employeur est obligé de reconnaître une section syndicale comme interlocutrice dès lors que 30 % des travailleurs s’affilient à un syndicat, quel qu’il soit, et qu’une majorité des votants confirme ce choix lors d’une consultation[5].

Pour conclure provisoirement

En Europe, on avait pris l’habitude de considérer les syndicats états-uniens comme impuissants sinon comme extrêmement modérés, prêts à toutes sortes de concessions. La montée d’un nouveau syndicalisme enseignant avec des victoires dans plusieurs États (voir l’article de Wim Benda sur les grèves victorieuses dans l’éducation) avait quelque peu relativisé cette image caricaturale, mais bon nombre d’analystes continuaient à penser que dans le secteur privé et concurrentiel, le management restait seul maître à bord. Certes, il y avait quelques percées syndicales, comme chez Amazon à Staten Island [6] mais, au-delà, la situation semblait toujours aussi désespérante.

À tort et la victoire historique dans l’automobile montre que la disponibilité pour l’action collective et le collectivisme existent bel et bien et qu’un syndicalisme offensif peut gagner des épreuves de force [7]. Le regain de popularité du syndicalisme que l’on voit apparaître dans de nombreux endroits après la pandémie et que certaines enquêtes sociologiques avaient su identifier, notamment au niveau générationnel est confirmé par les faits. En même temps, des tels changements ne s’opèrent pas spontanément, mais résultent d’un effort prolongé de réseaux militants enracinés socialement pour renouveler le syndicalisme. Ce qui implique non seulement une orientation plus offensive, mais aussi la mobilisation des travailleurs autour de revendications unifiantes par-delà les clivages statutaires et les inégalités (ethno-raciales et de genre) et last but not least, l’audace d’utiliser des tactiques de mobilisation en rupture avec le jeu ritualisé d’un dialogue social où les employeurs dictent ce qui est négociable ou pas.

Le cas des États-Unis montre que de tels basculements sont possibles, même avec un syndicat extrêmement bureaucratisé, voire corrompu. Cela ne signifie pas que ce soit toujours et partout la seule voie à emprunter. Au Mexique, General Motors a longtemps bénéficié du soutien de la Confédération des travailleurs mexicains de Miguel Trujillo López. Mais après des années de tentatives pour démocratiser le CTM, les 6 232 travailleurs de GM à Silao (Etat du Guanajuato) ont fini par voter à 76 % en faveur de la reconnaissance d’un nouveau syndicat, le Sindicato Independiente Nacional de los Trabajadores y Trabajadoras de la Industria Automotriz (Sinttia). Il faut dire que l’ancien syndicat avait signé pour la énième fois une convention collective qui n’apportait aucune amélioration salariale et acceptait l’imposition de gains de productivité par la seule intensification du travail. Lorsque le gouvernement Mexicain a ouvert en 2019, par une réforme du code du travail, la voie à la démocratisation de la représentation des travailleurs, les travailleurs de GM au Mexique n’ont pas hésité à former un nouveau syndicat devenu majoritaire ; un exemple qui a été suivi par d’autres chez Goodyear ou Saint Gobain [8].

Certes, il existe beaucoup de différences entre la situation aux Etats-Unis et celle que l’on connaît en France. Outre la dispersion des forces syndicales et l’absence de caisse de grève, les syndicats sont confrontés à une négociation de plus en plus refermée sur la conception managérialiste du « dialogue social ». Mais par-delà ces différences et les obstacles que l’on peut identifier, il y a certainement des une convergence en termes de combativité ouvrière et une conscience critique à l’égard du management…

Article republié du blog de la revue Les Mondes du Travail  (14 novembre 2023)

 

Notes

[1]. En pleine crise économique, les grévistes avaient décidé d’occuper les ateliers, empêchant le lock-out et la mobilisation de briseurs de grève. Il aura fallu plusieurs grèves «sit down» au cours de 1936-1937 avant que General Motors et Chrysler concèdent enfin la reconnaissance syndicale et la négociation avec un comité regroupant des délégués d’atelier. Ford a continué à refuser le fait syndical, parfois avec violence, en mobilisant les Pinkerton – véritable milice patronale – et fait tirer à la mitrailleuse sur les piquets de grève. Chez Ford, l’UAW obtiendra la reconnaissance syndicale qu’en 1941, après l’introduction d’une nouvelle réglementation imposée par l’administration de Roosevelt en 1937 et l’entrée en guerre des Etats-Unis que l’UAW.

[2] Pour une biographie de Walter Reuther, lire Nelson Lichtenstein (1996), The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, Basic Books, NY ; voir aussi la recension critique de Jane Slaughter, co-fondatrice avec Kim Moody du journal Labor Notes, protagoniste depuis 1979 du renouveau syndical aux Etats-Unis.

[3] Cette doctrine s’est formée à partir d’expériences pratiques au début du 20ème siècle dans les entreprises de plusieurs pays (Russie en 1905, Angleterre, Italie et Belgique en 1917-1922) où les syndicats exerçaient un droit de véto sur toutes les décisions du management (horaires, conditions de travail, organisation du travail) tout en exigeant un droit de regard sur la gestion de l’entreprise (« ouverture des livres de compte»). Le contrôle ouvrier a été intégré dans la doctrine officielle de plusieurs confédérations syndicales et de certains partis sociaux-démocrates dans la période de l’après-guerre. La Mitbestimmung ou co-détermination représente une variante plus modérée mais il est important de ne pas confondre le contrôle ouvrier avec la cogestion ou la participation à la gestion. Selon la doctrine originale, le syndicat doit garder toute son indépendance et considérer l’exercice d’un contrôle ouvrier comme une sorte de situation de double pouvoir qui forme en même temps une école préparant les travailleurs à l’autogestion ou la gestion ouvrière. Voir Réforme de l’entreprise ou contrôle ouvrier ? Débat public entre François Bloch-Lainé, Ernest Mandel et Gilbert Mathieu, in Cahiers du C.E.S., n° 70-71, préfacé par J.-M. Vincent, E.D.I., Paris ; voir aussi Hélène Hatzfeld (2020), «  Le “contrôle ouvrier” : diffusion et disparition d’un imaginaire », in Histoire Politique n°42 |  DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/histoirepolitique.691, Béllanger Jacques (1986), « Le contrôle ouvrier sur l’organisation du travail: Étude de cas en Grande-Bretagne », in Relations Industrielles / Industrial Relations, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1986), pp. 704-719,  https://www.jstor.org/stable/23073111

[4]. Au premier semestre 2021, General Motors était le premier constructeur automobile en termes de parts de marché aux Etats-Unis, avec 16,48 % du marché des voitures et des véhicules utilitaires. Toyota arrive en deuxième position, avec une part de marché de 15,01 %. La troisième place est occupée par Ford, avec une part de marché de 11,92 %, suivie de près par Stellantis (11,48 %) et Honda (10,02 %).

[5]. Si une majorité de travailleurs souhaitent former un syndicat, ils peuvent choisir un syndicat de l’une des deux manières suivantes : si au moins 30 % des travailleurs signent des cartes ou une pétition indiquant qu’ils veulent un syndicat, le NLRB organise une élection. Si la majorité des votants choisissent ce syndicat, le NLRB certifiera le syndicat comme votre représentant pour les négociations collectives. Une élection n’est pas le seul moyen pour un syndicat de devenir votre représentant. L’employeur peut reconnaître volontairement un syndicat sur la base de preuves – généralement des cartes d’autorisation syndicales signées – qu’une majorité d’employés souhaitent qu’il les représente. Une fois le syndicat accrédité ou reconnu, l’employeur est tenu de négocier les conditions d’emploi avec le représentant du syndicat.

[6]. Mometti, Felice. « Amazon aux Etats-Unis : de la défaite de Bessemer à la création d’un syndicat auto-organisé à New York », in Mouvements, vol. 110-111, n° 2-3, 2022, pp. 98-108. https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.110.0098

[7] Pour une présentation de la théorie des mobilisations et du “collectivisme”, voir John Kelly (1998), Rethinking Industrial Relations, Mobilisations, Collectivism and Long Waves, Routlegde, Londres. Pour une note de lecture de J. Kelly, Stephen Bouquin, « Quand le collectivisme refait surface » in Les Mondes du Travail, n°30, pp. 210-217.

[8]. Grâce à cette réforme, l’élection déterminant le degré de représentation était devenu obligatoire et avait eu lieu en présence d’observateurs du Bureau international du travail et d’Industry ALL, la fédération organisant sur le plan mondial les travailleurs de l’automobile. Depuis l’introduction de la nouvelle loi, les nouveaux syndicats ont gagné leur reconnaissance dans une série impressionnante de firmes multinationales. Voir « Democratic Unions can Become a Reality », article publié le 25 mai 2022 Industry All .

Quand le collectivisme refait surface. A propos de John Kelly «Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilizations, Collectivism and Long Waves»

Aux Etats-Unis, le syndicat de l’UAW (United Automobile Workers) a lancé un mouvement de grève dans les usines des trois constructeurs que sont Ford, GM et Stellantis ; une première depuis les années 1930. Au Royaume-Uni, près de 2 millions de « journées individuelles non travaillées » ont été comptabilisées en 2022 ; là où la moyenne des jours de travail perdues pour fait de grève ne dépassait pas les 200 000 au cours des dix dernières années. D’autres pays connaissent également une flambée des grèves et des mobilisations : France, Grèce, Belgique et même l’Allemagne qui avait pourtant la réputation d’être le paradis du dialogue social. Pour comprendre ce retour inattendu des grèves et des mobilisations, il faut parfois changer de lunettes ou adopter un angle de vue plus adéquat… Publié en 1998, en pleine période de déclin de la conflictualité sociale et du syndicalisme, John Kelly publie un ouvrage qui fera date : Rethinking Industrial Relations : Mobilizations, Collectivism and Long Waves. A rebours des idées reçues d’alors, les thèses qu’il défend s’avèrent aujourd’hui bien plus pertinentes et cohérentes que celles qu’évoquaient les chantres du postmodernisme, de la société post-industrielle, de la fin de la classe laborieuse et surtout de l’inéluctable déclin du syndicalisme. Ouvrage méconnu en France, il me semblait judicieux d’en faire une recension en pleine résonance avec le temps présent.

John Kelly est professeur en relations industrielles à l’université de Birbeck à Londres, une institution qui s’est spécialisé dans la formation continue pour adultes. Il fut auparavant, pendant près de vingt ans, professeur à la London School of Economics. Né de famille irlandaise à Derby, John Kelly a poursuivi des études universitaires à l’université de Sheffield où il a obtenu un doctorat en psychologie en 1979. Engagé syndicalement et membre actif du Parti Communiste Britannique jusqu’à sa dissolution en 1991, John Kelly s’est spécialisé dans l’étude du syndicalisme, des conflits de travail et l’analyse comparée des relations d’emploi. Lire la suite

La Valse des écrous. Travail, capital et action collective dans l’industrie automobile (1970-2004)

La Valse des écrous est la publication (Syllepse, 2006, 306 p).de ma thèse en sciences politique soutenue à Paris 8 en 1999

Les voitures encombrent les villes et les routes pendant que les groupes industriels mondiaux s’affrontent pour préserver ou accroître leurs parts de marché. La Valse des écrous présente les conditions réelles de cette concurrence au sein du secteur de l’automobile, depuis longtemps laboratoire d’innovations managériales et technologiques et qui garde une place de première importance dans l’activité économique. L’auteur envisage les liens entres les transformations du travail, l’accumulation du capital et l’action collective. Il réexamine les réalités contemporaines à parti des modes d’analyse de l’industrie automobile et passe en revue les débats sur la lean production et les modèles productifs. Il analyse la rationalisation productive et notamment la manière dont se mettent en place l’automatisation, le travail en groupe (teamwork), les organisations du temps de travail et la flexibilité. Autant de « nouveautés » sont le signe de fortes contradictions que la permanence d’oppositions et de résistances, latentes ou ouvertes, met en lumière. Malgré un rapport de force défavorable aux collectifs de travail, l’action collective des ouvriers de l’automobile continue à agir et à peser sur les décisions du management. Parmi les enquêtes et les études de terrain menées durant une dizaine d’années, Stephen Bouquin s’est plus particulièrement attaché à présenter les enjeux des transformations du travail chez Renault Véhicules Industriels dans la banlieue de Caen et chez Volkswagen en Belgique (Bruxelles).

Télécharger la première partie (Les modèles d’analyse de l’industrie automobile)

Introduction

Chapitre I. L’archipel perdu 

Chapitre 2. De la voie unique à la diversité des modèles

Chapitre 3. L’accumulation du capital aux frontières du marché

Télécharger la deuxième partie (Rationalisations et conflits)

Chapitre 4. Retour sur les luttes contre le travail taylorien

Chapitre 5. L’automation ou l’expulsion du travail vivant

Chapitre 6. Le travail en groupe, instrument d’implication-contrainte et bouclier social

Chapitre 7. L’aménagement et la réduction du temps de travail, nouveaux leviers de rentabilité

Chapitre 8. Micro-conflits autour de la sous-traitance et de l’intérim

Conclusion

Télécharger la troisième partie (Etudes de cas et conclusion générale)

Chapitre 9. RVI-Blainville entre résistances et reculs sociaux

Quelques mots sur l’économie du secteur et du groupe RVI

Division du travail, qualifications et innovation technologique

Un échec des tentatives d’implication participatives

Politiques salariales et actions revendicatives

Remarques finales

Chapitre 10. Volkswagen-Bruxelles et les avatars de la rationalisation

L’industrie automobile en Belgique

Une plate-forme de forage de profits

De l’atelier toylorien à la rationalisation permanente

La refondation du collectif de travail par la grève (février 1991)

De la suppression d’effectifs à la révolte contre l’intensification (1992-1994)

Un masterplan pour réformer les relations de travail (1995-1996)

Quand le travail en groupe devient un champ de mines pour le management (1994-1996)

La convention de réduction du temps de travail ou la pacification fragile (1997)

La crise productive de l’accumulation flexible (/997-1998)

Épilogue: normalisation syndicale et ou exacerbation des tensions sociales ?

Quelques éléments de conclusion

Chapitre 11. Conclusion générale

Un management anti-crise permanent ?

L’industrie automobile en fin de course 

Trajectoire longue et retours du passé se croisent

De l’entreprise organique à la société usine

Dissolution des solidarités par le management ?

Conflits sociaux et conjoncture économique

Les racines sociales de l’action collective

De nouvelles contradictions apparaissent

Domination, consentement et résistances

Defending ‘living labour’ and the commonization of nature as a way to avoid global ecological disaster.

(published in french in issue n°29 of journal Les Mondes du Travail, March 2023,  pp.187-210)

Stephen Bouquin (Professor in sociology, Paris-Saclay)

“Marx said that revolutions are the engine of history. Perhaps things are different. It may be that revolutions are the act by which humanity travelling in the train pulls the emergency brakes” (Walter Benjamin, Thesis XVIII on the Concept of History, quoted by Michael Löwy (2016)[1] .

“Even an entire society, a nation, or all existing societies simultaneously taken together, are not owners of the land. They are merely beneficiaries of it, and must bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations as boni patres familias [good fathers of families]” (Capital, vol. 1 ([1867]; London, 1976), p. 637.

 

Introduction

The ecological crisis has become increasingly important to the point it incorporates almost all other issues, be they the mode of governance, social inequalities, everyday life or simply economic organisation and this from top to bottom of society. But the theoretical understanding of this surge has yet to be sufficiently developed. Our article aims to contribute to a clarification of how to deal with the ‘ecological question’ from the standpoint of living beings and life and this both on scientific and practical terms.

What does the ‘ecological crisis’ is telling us about itself? This will be our introductory point. How should we think about the meaning of ‘nature’ and of the relationship to be established between nature and society? While dualistic approaches can be criticized for having been used to justify the domination of nature by mankind, should the alternative be a ‘monistic’ approach that merges nature and society, thereby treating them on equal levels? We do not think so, and in this second point we will stress the importance of an epistemological orientation based on critical naturalism that is both materialist and dialectical. In a third point, we will present a series of analyses that recognize the primary role of the capitalist system in the ecological crisis. This critique of the ‘Capitalocene’ gains from integrating that of patriarchy, which will be our fourth point that presents materialist ecofeminist approaches. In a fifth point, we will return to the category of ‘living labour’ as a both natural and social ‘corpo-real’ entity. Mobilizing living labour at the core of analysis is necessary to articulate the labour and the social question with the ecological question in view of formulating proposed actions aimed at moving towards an ‘economy of the commons’. In conclusion, we will briefly return to the urgency of the ecological crisis to emphasize the importance of a systemic shift and the construction of a common horizon.

1 – What is the ‘ecological crisis’ telling us about itself

One of the main difficulties in understanding the ecological crisis lies in the polysemy of the concepts used. Indeed, the notion of ecology – etymologically Oikos (habitat or house) and logos (science/discourse), i.e. the science of habitat – can mean many different and even opposing things. It was coined for the first time in the 19th century by the German biologist Ernst Haeckel, who gave the following definition in his book Die Generale Morphologie der Organismen (1866): ‘By ‘ecology’ we mean the science of the relationship of organisms with the external world, in which we can recognise in a broader sense the conditions of existence which may be favourable or unfavourable’ (quoted by Deléage, 2007: 63)[2]. For Haeckel, such definition, rather neutral at first glance, was entirely compatible with absolute reactionary views that favoured the cleansing of humanity in the name of a pseudo-scientific theory of the survival of the fittest[3]. Logically, Haeckel advocated eugenics with the mass killing of disabled or people or those declared psychological insane. He also advocated the cleansing of society through the infliction of a quick-acting, painless poison. Indeed, it is no surprise that Haeckel was very popular among the Nazi intelligentsia.

The American zoologist and anthropologist Madison Grant (1865-1937) is another figure whose ecological thinking was resolutely reactionary. Grant was inventor and promoter of the National Parks in the United States of America and believed that confiscating land from Native Americans and denying Afro-Americans any access to property was absolutely essential to the ‘preservation of the wild beauty of nature’… These historical facts remind us that ecology is not spontaneously progressive (nor reactionary) but that it can also be expressed in the manner of eco-fascism, eco-liberalism or eco-socialism…[4] Of course, this ideological heterogeneity of ecologism (or even environmentalism) in no way prevents the ecological crisis from vociferously occupying reality. Thanks to the work of many scientists (climatologists, glaciologists, wildlife biologists), the very existence of a crisis is now widely acknowledged[5]. In the 1970s, attention was focused primarily on the problems of pollution and so-called overpopulation of the earth (Meadows, 1972), which charged the ecological discourses with a neo-malthusianist spirit – a tendency that has far from disappeared, incidentally. It was only after Rio’s Summit in 1992, when the effects of climate change became tangible, that carbon dioxide emissions became an important issue for environmentalists.

Nowadays, the ecological crisis is mainly seen through the lens of the climate crisis. Large sections of population are becoming aware of this following the succession of heat waves, multi-year droughts, wildfires that are striking entire regions at an accelerated pace, while other regions or sometimes the same but at other moments, may face torrential rains, causing large-scale floods that sweep away entire villages or put cities under water in torrents of mud [6]. Less acknowledged is the fact that the ecological crisis has now reached such a scale that it triggers other disruptions that have their own dynamics. One of these is the slowing down of oceanic sea currents, which is disrupting the temperatures and rainfall in western Europe and the East coast of North America. Another illustration is the ‘albedo’ effect of the melting ice cap, which reduces the reflection of sunlight and accelerates global warming, the acidification of the whole parts of the sea and the mortification of terrestrial ecosystems, which are increasing the fall in biodiversity and provoking the sixth mass extinction [7] .

It should be recalled that the pandemic and the climate crisis are not separate, parallel phenomena, but an aggregate with various internal temporalities. Coronaviruses will not directly affect the climate, but pathogens can develop in connection with climate change… For example, it is known that drought and deforestation in South East Asia has caused wildlife to migrate massively – not only insects (mosquitoes, grasshoppers) but also bats, whose primary food source are made of insects. This caused bat species to migrate from Indonesia to more northern area’s as far as China or from North Africa towards Germany and Poland… This kind of migrations may of course bring together living species that were not used to cohabit same ecosystems, humans as well as other animals, what will increase the spill-over of pathogens. In addition to these aspects, we should also recall that circuits of industrial farming of animals are both vectors of market dependence and of use diffusion of pathogens. Critical microbiologist Rob Wallace demonstrated how gigantic industrial livestock farms increased the frequency of mutations, zoonoses and large-scale infections. Every year, bird flu and swine flu wreak havoc in thousands of factory farms, leading to eradication of massive live-stocks of animals. The biological risk management of havoc include massive use of antibiotics which has led to increasing resistance towards bacterial infections, heralding the advent of new diseases and risks of contaminations that can affect both animal and human populations on global scale.

In answer to the question of what the ecological crisis is telling us about itself, we can answer that it exposes the human causes (the Anthropocene) and that it invites us to consider the underlying global and systemic dynamics as well as to recognize that the path upon which we are could be a ‘runaway’ that will lead to globalized disaster if nothing is done while there is still time.

2 – Nature and society: the limits of dualism and monism

Should one refer to ‘nature’, the ‘natural environment’ or to ‘eco-spheres’? Or simply the ‘Planet Earth’ as a habitat for to all kinds of life? These recurring questions require sounding answers because this will help us to deal in a more systematic way with the unravelling ecological crisis.

For post-structuralists, who recognize only (or mainly) the performative character of discourse and representations in the making of the world, nature should be understood as a symbolic construction, a view of the mind. For others, there will always be an ontological difference between physical environments, the organisms that may inhabit them, and conscious and reflexive human activity. According to such a dualistic conception, which separates nature and society, human activity is thought as external to nature, which then can be seen as a ‘natural environment’, that certainly surrounds us but also one that can be mastered or domesticated. For a very long time, this dualism has legitimated a certain indifference towards the consequences of human action upon it. Such a dualistic vision can certainly be found in the writings of René Descartes, for whom the universe is made up of physical substances, while the human being is made up, first and foremost, by a spiritual and immaterial reality. Sociology has for long time followed this path with someone like Emile Durkheim claiming that nature and culture are distinct, including among human beings. Indeed, following Durkheim, woman are ‘natural beings’ somewhat removed from reason, while the man (in the masculine) is a product of culture. According to his logic, women are responsible for reproduction and the preservation of Domos, the home, while men are in charge of production, creation and governance. While some recent French sociologists (Lallemant, 2022) see reasons to relativize critique of Durkheim’s naturalization of women, others (Gardey and Löwy, 2002; Gardey, 2005) support the need of a radical critical examination of sexist naturalism within social sciences [8] .

More generally, it should be recalled that the dualistic conception of the human/nature relationship has been and remains the subject of recurrent criticism by the ecologist movement. However, this criticism is very often based on a ‘monistic’ conception, which tends to deny any interrelationship between humans and nature, which could also have the consequence of relativizing human responsibility in the preservation of the natural environment or worse, considering that nature is ‘taking revenge’ upon its main destroying factor (Larrère, 2011). Indeed, these monistic conceptions tend to absorb all distinctions between nature and culture, between environment and society, and basically proclaim that we must naturalise ourselves again…

While eco-fascism claims to have a monistic conception in which humans are entirely naturalized as having to live in harmony with natural laws, in reality it seeks to take the subjugation of nature and humans by other humans to a level never achieved before (Dubeau, 2022; François, 2022). Still, we should avoid unfair accusations and refuse to claim that any monistic vision of the human/nature relationship is necessarily reactionary. This is, in any case, what anthropological studies of Amerindian, Oceania and Southern African living communities have demonstrated (Sahlins, 1962; 2008; Graeber and Wengrow, 2021). In these communities, where egalitarian relations prevailed at a certain distance from patriarchy, social relations were organised in close symbiosis with the natural environment. The accumulation of surplus was actively thwarted (cf. the Potlatch, nomadic agriculture, the refusal to accumulate and hoard, etc.) and religious spiritualities, whether they are shamanic or animistic, reflect this integration into a ‘natural environment’ in which life is organized in close interdependence. This also explains why, both materially and symbolically, why these communities tended to preserve a balance between the social activity of humans and what is referred to as a ‘natural environment’. Such a monistic naturalist position can also be found in the radical environmentalist movement that identifies itself with deep ecology, that presents certain alternative experiences and mobilisations as an expression of nature itself (‘we are not defending nature, but we are nature defending itself’ as the motto of the Extinction Rebellion action network).

Sometimes this monism translates itself into an open refusal to even speak about nature. From this perspective, which can be found in particular in the work of the anthropologist Philippe Descola, nature does not exist ‘in itself’ and is nothing more than a metaphysical device that European civilisations have invented in order to emphasise a separation between human activity and the world around it; a world that has become a reservoir of resources, a domain to be exploited, a space for predation [9]. Since human activity is an integral part of the Earth’s vast ecosystem, Descola believes that the most urgent task is to seek after ways of ‘inhabiting’ the world that are no longer destructive of the ecosystem. However, in addressing the issue of change, monistic readings of the relationship between society and nature also reveal that they have not fully resolved the issue on a theoretical level. The different ways of inhabiting planet earth are certainly based on social customs and norms, but also on a mode of social organisation and, incidentally, a mode of production. Both intellectually and practically, we are faced with the existence of a social world that is organized according to a systemic logic, which brings us back not to nature but to society and to the relations between these two inseparable and interdependent realities.

Bruno Latour is undoubtedly the intellectual who has expressed an ongoing ambition to rethink the world and the relationship that humans have with their environment, whether it be made of artefacts or more broadly encompassing the whole of the earth’s ecosystem. For Latour, nature is not a victim to be protected, but ‘the one which possesses us’ (Latour and Schultz, 2022, p. 43). It is therefore necessary to refuse to think that humans can act from the outside on a nature from which they would be separated. It is in Politiques de la nature (1999) that Latour clarifies his position, close to certain developments in post-structural anthropology, and in particular that of Philippe Descola. His main proposal is to install nature as the primary subject of politics, to make it a leading political actor and to definitively remove it from its status as an object. He thus extends his earlier work sur as Laboratory Life (1979) or We have never been modern (1993) in which he placed human action within a network and the action of objects on the same level. Men and environment are one and human beings must adapt as much as their environment changes, while having a direct and indirect action on the human.

As R.H. Lossin states in the radical journal Salvage [10], Latour may seem convincing in his more general formulations such as the rejection of the separation between nature and culture, the critique of the main analytical categories of modernity or the recognition of what technology does to us rather than what we do with it, his approach is far from unequivocable. Indeed, his theoretical framework raises several fundamental criticisms. One of these is the fact that Latour sees the asymmetry of human/non-human relations as a kind of primary misunderstanding of reality. However, the opposite is true since this asymmetry is very real and highly problematic in the way it exists. By considering all aspects of life as a network of interacting objects, his theorization has become a kind of textbook of reification or Verdinglichtung of nature and ultimately offers nothing but empty materialism (Lohsin, 2020).

In the twilight of his life, perhaps because he was recognizing the limits of his earlier positions, Latour eventually pulled the ‘new geo-social class struggle’ out of his hat (Latour 2021, Latour and Schultz, 2022). What is at stake is a struggle of ideas based on a ‘class’ that is based upon sharing the same ‘cause of habitability’ of the earth [11]. In his last writings, Latour evoked the urgency of a ‘new climate regime’ in which the conditions of habitability would be the utmost priority. Still, we can ask ourselves if this the fundamentally answer to the problem that we are facing, i.e. capitalism. For Latour, this is not the issue, since anti-capitalism mean for him nothing more than a vague catchword that prevents us from thinking complexity, since the goal ‘is not to replace the capitalist system but to recover the Earth’[12]. As a matter of fact, Latour has constantly neglected a critique of capital and capitalism, and even when he did mention it, mainly in interviews, they become an umbrella notion designating big money and financialization.

Some may regret this avoidance of a critique of capitalism but maybe we should try to grasp also the reasons for these silences. If capital remained an analytical blind spot for Latour, it is not only for ideological reasons but above all for theoretical and conceptual ones. Since Latour understands reality as a collection of objects, he simply did not grasp the deep reality of capital, since the latter is not an object, nor a thing but a social relation or, to put it another way, a ‘real social abstraction’ that is not always visible as such nor observable[13].

To a certain extend we could say that the pandemic revealed in its own way the connection between nature and society. Andreas Malm made this point very clear: ‘Is the Covid 19 pandemic nature’s ‘revenge’? Latourians, posthumanists and other hybridists can be counted on to give the corona an anointing of agency. But the ontological difference between humans and non-humans remains: bats were not tired of the forest, pangolins did not choose to be sold, and the SARS-CoV-2 micro-organism did not develop a plan to infiltrate ventilation systems or aircrafts. Only humans think: there is oil in this swampy subsoil or if we raise more cattle, we can sell more…’ (Malm, 2020: 173)

These somewhat abrupt formulations are based on the assertion that nature and society must be thought of as interacting as well as interconnected with each other, as a contradictory unity composed of both relatively distinct and interdependent realities. This is also what French sociologist Jean-Marie Bröhm proposed when he devoted a book to an in-depth examination of the principles of dialectics (Brohm, 2003), framing historical materialism both as critical naturalism and social constructivism: ‘[it is] a unitary science insofar as it studies, not society and nature in their respective autonomy, in their ontological separation, but in their reciprocal interaction (…) For Marx and Engels, there is only one science, the one that studies the movement of society in its contradictory relations with nature – which both carries it along by offering it resources but also destroys it by overwhelming it with various catastrophes.’ (2003 : 140).

Nevertheless, according to Bröhm, it is necessary to recognize that this dialectical unity between nature and society is in the process of shattering: ‘(because) it is becoming a double destruction: first, the destruction of nature – of the environment, of the fauna and flora in their biodiversity – under the devastating expansionist effects of the capitalist mode of production; second, the gradual destruction of society as a result of the relentless exploitation of natural resources and the massive pollution that ensues’ (Bröhm, 2003: 141). Thus, for humanity, there is no other solution than to ‘protect the earth’ and to rehabilitate its own naturality, for itself and for future generations, which Marx summed up very well when he wrote: ‘From the point of view of a higher organisation of society, the right of ownership of certain individuals over parts of the globe will appear as absurd as the right of ownership of an individual over his neighbor’ (Marx, 1974: 159).

3 – Some thoughts about the fertility of an eco-marxist critique of the ‘Capitalocene’

For a long time, Marx and Engels were perceived as thinkers that favoured the unparalleled growth of the productive forces with the plenitude of abundance as the main means to achieve communism. It is not difficult to find in their writing arguments in favour of this perception, especially in the chapters that ends third book of Capital. Of, course, such perception is also nourished by the harmful experience of a bureaucratic USSR that was entirely oriented towards productivism and was almost as deaf towards social needs and use value as capitalism is blind, since it only recognize exchange value and profit. At the same time, one should not forget that Marx (or Engels) defended the assertion that both labour and are the only sources of all wealth, as can be read in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. However, recognizing the contribution of nature in the creation of wealth does not directly imply making a careful use of it, which justifies, according to eco-socialist thinkers such as Daniel Tanuro and Michael Löwy, a critical assessment of the too many silences of Marx and Engels on this question[14].

Other authors are less circumspect in their recognition of an ‘ecological Marx’. The most well-known of them is of course John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, who challenged in his book Marx the Ecologist (2011) a number of failings falsely attributed to Marx in relation to ecology, such as his failure to recognize the exploitation of nature, the existence of natural limits, or the variable character of nature. Foster was among the first that initiated a re-reading of Marx’s work that has identified some key concepts to better understand the problematic interrelationship between nature and society that is specific to the capitalist mode of production.

Following J.B. Foster, the ‘ecological Marx’ relied his understanding of the destructive and transforming character of capitalism on the critical assessment of second agricultural revolution made by Justus von Liebig. The German chemist was scandalized by the intensive use of chemical fertilizers, since this would deplete soil fertility, which would trigger the use of additional fertilizers such as guano and bones from the battlefields of Europe (containing potassium, nitrogen and phosphor). This brought von Liebig to extend the concept of metabolism (Stoffwechsel), previously limited to intra-corporeal biological processes, to all kind of natural systems. As an avid reader of scientific literature, Marx realized that soil fertility is not a pure natural phenomenon but socially produced under changing conditions, since natural realities (soil composition, rainfall, erosion, etc.) constantly interact with social conditions such as agricultural techniques. This is why Marx adopted the concept of metabolism to understand how nature is functioning in larger perspective and extended it to social processes, relating it at the same time to their natural environment.

Foster main thesis is that Marx elaborated the lineaments of an understanding that allows for the identification of the ecological crisis inherent in the capitalist regime, which he refers to as the Metabolic Rift taking place in the interdependent process of social metabolism and a metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself. The ‘universal metabolism of nature’, the ‘social metabolism’ and the ‘metabolic breakdown’ are of crucial importance in modeling the complex relationship between socio-productive systems, particularly that of capitalism, and the wider natural/ecological systems in which they are embedded: ‘This approach of the human-social relationship to nature, deeply interwoven with Marx’s critique of capitalist class-based society, provides historical materialism with a unique perspective on the contemporary ecological crisis and the challenge of transition.’ (Foster, Clark and York 2010: 207.)

While Foster was the first to put forward such a re-reading of a fully ecological Marx in an article published almost a quarter of a century ago in the American Sociological Review (1999), other authors, such as Jason W. Moore (2000, 2011), were quick to follow him, but differed on important points. For Jason W. Moore, the ‘metabolic rift’ did not take place at the beginning of the 19th century but much earlier, in the 17th century, when the crisis of feudal serfdom in England freed a component of the peasantry from the obligation to pay tribute or to perform work tasks for their lords. This was coupled with the privatisation of the commons (via enclosures) and the use of arable land as pasture necessary to sustain a massive production of wool that merchants exported to Europe in late Middle-Age. The colonisation of the New World and the development of sugar cane plantations provided a caloric-rich resource that compensated the scarcity of food provoked by the expansion of pastures. But such a ‘remedy’ created the need for disposable workforce which was responded into the development of the slave system in those colonies[15]. This explains, according to Jason W. Moore, why the ‘metabolic rift’ is connected to the imperial ambitions of the British crown, the colonisation and, more indirectly, of the massification of slave trade.

Geographer and economist David Harvey has not been silent on the ecological question (Harvey, 2015: 222-263) even if he tended to underestimate up till recently the irretrievable character of the ecological disaster. Harvey remains also quite vague about the nodal position of this metabolic rift. Instead of this, he propose to understand capitalism as an ecosystem in itself, involving both capital and nature that are produced and reproduced through systemic interrelated dynamics. Capital, as a specific (historical) form of human activity has not only exhausted nature but also (re)metabolizes it, with the logic of profit and the law of value as the principal organizing principles. Nature is thus not only exploited and exhausted but is also internalized in the circuit of accumulation (Harvey, 2015: 246.). This is quite obvious since we know that both seeds and plants can be genetically modified in order to expand the volume but also the corporate control over grain trade. Local self-sufficient agricultural production is replaced by a global trade that is integrated into the circuits of valorisation. What is common to John Bellamy Foster and David Harvey is that both are stating that capitalism ‘metabolises’ nature and is becoming itself a reality that is metabolised by nature, but in a contradictory way[16]. On a more strictly economic level, Harvey has linked global financialization of capital to the extractivist and predatory pressure of neoliberal capitalism, which he summarizes as ‘accumulation by dispossession’, analogous to the primitive accumulation of capital based on coercion and predation. Both the growth of fictious capital, speculative bubbles, the spiral of debt is pushing capital accumulation towards a headlong rush to find new and more sources of speculative assets, no matter if this means the frenetic and predatory acquisition of arable land, of minerals and, more broadly, of all kinds of potential natural resources buried in the subsoil or at the bottom of the oceans.

Critical understanding of the ‘Capitalocene’ shouldn’t remain superficial on his historical understanding of it. This is why the key role played by fossil fuels in the upcoming ecological disaster is also a crucial aspect. Swedish professor Andreas Malm of Lund University is a strong advocate of the concept of ‘fossil capitalism’. In Fossil Capital. Global Warming in the Age of Capital (2016), Malm presents a socio-economic historical analysis of the factors that led to the intensive and extensive use of fossil fuels. To him, the concept of the Anthropocene, while it has the merit of naming the problem, is entangled in a millennia-old narrative of humanity that is basically a mad pyromaniac arsonist. But if we want to understand global warming, it is not the archives of the human species that need to be investigated, but those of the British Empire, says Andreas Malm. He demonstrates that the steam engine was, in the second half of the 18th century, an essential tool for disciplining workers. Indeed, in the English textile industry, the machine developed by James Watt quickly supplanted the abundant and cheaper hydraulic power used by a vast dispersed number of small scaled manufacturing houses. Malm explains that in order to understand this paradoxical fact of mobilizing a much more expensive energy, one has to integrate the agency (the capacity to act) of ‘living labour’. With hydraulic power available in many places but of variable quantity, the location of the textile industry was necessarily decentralized and moderate in size, forcing entrepreneurs to bring to these rural areas cohorts of labour that were often recalcitrant in their commitment to work and demanding in terms of pay. The steam engine made it possible to expand textile factories and locate wherever specially in urban agglomerations, exactly where thousands of impoverished workers tried to make a living and a reserve army was ready to replace those that were reluctant. For Malm, ‘fossil capital’ allowed the limits of surplus extraction and profit to be pushed further, both on the side of living labour as on that of natural ecosystems (predation, coal mining). These insights have led him to elaborate a revised version of Marx’s cycle of capital accumulation, which he represented schematically as follows (see Figure 1).

After coal, it was the turn of oil and its by-products, extracted on an unprecedented scale and propelling hundreds of millions of thermal engines and mass consumption goods– cars, household appliances – which have led us on the track of a global ecological disaster.

In Corona, Climate and chronic emergency (2020) Andreas Malm revisited the links between the ecological crisis and the systemic logic of the Capitalocene. Malm explains that capital has no intention of destroying the complex cellular structures of wild nature and that it has no intentionality in its efforts to generate profits. No, capital ‘acts’ in this way because it simply has no other way to reproduce itself:

‘Fixation and absorption are in the DNA of capital. The moment these cease to accompany the process of accumulation, the reproduction of capital ceases to exist. Unlike other parasites, capital cannot simply vegetate in the fur or veins of other species for millions of years of co-evolutionary equilibrium. It can only subsist by expanding and, in this sense, it exhibits a kind of permanent pandemicity. Once capital escaped from its reservoir host, i.e. the British Isles, it began the enormous historical process of subsuming the wilderness of this planet, whether in the form of a palm oil plantation, a bauxite mine, a wet market or a chicken farm. All these entities and countless others represent the wilderness drawn into value chains. (Malm, 2020: 76)

Like a virus that multiplies and circulates, capital is a kind of meta-virus – ‘the godfather of all parasites’. Following David Harvey’s understanding of capitalism, Malm reminds us that the accumulation of capital is based on the permanent appropriation of space and time, which proceeds by a double compression, that of space and that of time. Indeed, capital constantly seeks to shorten the rotation cycle of its accumulation: the faster commodities will be sold, the faster an investment can be paid back and ultimately the greater the profits. Capital seeks also to cancel out space by linking territories and populations through trade, migration flows or technical devices in order to enlarge markets and to integrate them into a glow flow of commodities and accumulation. But that’s not all, the capitalism also requires the enlargement of wage labour and the reproduction of labour power, which remains an activity that is carried out almost exclusively by women in an unpaid way. This brings us examine in the following section patriarchy and the sexual division of labour.

4 – Domestication of nature and patriarchal domination: the Capitalocene through the prism of the ‘Patriarcocene’

Friedrich Engels, in his work on The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, succeeded in elaborating the lineaments of a theorization of the women as ‘the first oppressed class’. While the second feminist wave of the 1960s-1970s produced much more systematic elaborations, the term ecofeminism was first enunciated by Françoise d’Eaubonne in Le Féminisme ou la Mort (1974) to signify that the domination of nature and women are historically linked [17]. In the Anglo-Saxon world, thanks in particular to Carolyn Merchant, author of The Death of Nature (1980, 2021), ecofeminism developed quite rapidly in social sciences. Merchant considers that women’s identification to nature dates back well before the Neolithic revolution and was based on fertility imagery associating the earth with a beneficent and nurturing mother [18] . The colonisation of the New World and the slave trade represented a qualitative change also because it coincides with another regime of truth that is based on scientific rational claims.

Ecofeminist theory shows us how the ideology of the forces of production originated in a hetero-patriarcal, racialist and speciesist model of rationality. Following Valerie Plumwood (2012), an Australian philosopher influenced by Critical Theory.  [19], human existence has been associated in Western culture with productive labour, sociability and culture while separating them from forms of labour considered as secondary from forms of collective property such as the commons. This is also demonstrated in the fact that classical political economy defines reproductive labour as non-labour, i.e. as value-free activity even if it responds to social need while commons are seen as resources of value that have yet to be realized (see also Barca 2010).

Maria Mies is certainly a central intellectual figure in late 20th century ecofeminism. Mies argues in her Magnus Opus Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale (1986) that feminism must go beyond the critique of the sexual division of labour, incorporating into the framework of analysis the condition of the women in the periphery of the capitalist world-system in order to identify ‘the contradictory policies concerning women that have been, and still are, promoted by the brotherhood of militarists, capitalists, policy-makers, and scientists in their effort to maintain a model of growth’ (Mies, 1986: 3). Whereas classical political economy has conceptualized labour in opposition to nature and women, i.e. as a productive activity actively shaping the world by giving it value, Mies considers as labour any activity that participates in the production of life and which ‘must be called productive in the broad sense, the production of use values for the satisfaction of human needs’ (Mies, 1986: 47). Mies’ argument being that the production and reproduction of life, or subsistence labour, carried out mainly in unpaid ways by women, if not by slaves, peasants and colonized subjects, ‘constitutes the perennial basis on which capitalist productive labour can be built and exploited’ (Mies, 1986: 48). Since it was not remunerated, its capitalist appropriation could only be achieved in the last instance through violence or the intervention of coercive institutions. The sexual division of labour was based neither on biological nor economic determinants, but on the masculine monopolisation of (armed) violence which ‘constitutes the political power necessary for the establishment of lasting relations of exploitation between men and women, as well as between different classes and wage earners’ (ibid.: 4).

The foundations of capital accumulation in Europe were placed on a parallel process of conquest and exploitation of the colonies, slavery and the exploitation of women’s bodies and productive capacities. At the same time, European women of different social classes – including those involved in settlement colonialism – were subjected to a process of housewifization, limiting their existence to the function of a housewife. As a result, women were progressively excluded from political economy, which was linked to public space, and enclosed in “the ideal of the domesticated and privatised woman, preoccupied with love and consumption, dependent on a man who had become the male breadwinner’ (Mies, 1986: 103). However, this housewifization also mean that women represent the vast majority of the world’s reproductive and caring classes. Although the status of women is obviously divided by cleavages of class and racialization, it is also true that women can be seen as part of the global proletariat whose bodies and productive capacities have been appropriated by capital and the institutions that serve it.

As a matter of fact, the combination of ecofeminism with historical materialism makes it possible to articulate reproductive labour and any labour activity that consists of supporting life in its material and immaterial needs with a critique of the Capitalocene. The recognition of the nodal character of reproductive labour leads us towards a critique of capitalism that is instrumentalizing as well as commodifying life for ends other than life itself, whether it be the preservation of power relations or the imperative valorisation of capital. Today, it is clear that reproductive labour is increasingly submitted to commodification and rationalization, both processes by which it is incorporated into the circuits of capital accumulation. Capitalism thus mutilates the potential for improving life by transforming reproductive labour and care into instruments of accumulation and sources of profit. These processes exhaust both care-giving people (as workers or not) workers and the environment, extracting ever more surplus labour and energy and leaving workers exhausted in terms of their physical and mental resources. As Tithi Batthacharya (2019) aptly summarises: ‘The pursuit of profit is increasingly in conflict with the imperatives of life creation’.

5 – From the critique of real existing work to the defense of ‘living labour’

Following Roy Bashkar’s ‘critical realism’ [20], we will take as the starting point for our reflections labour and work as they actually exist and not as we would like them to be, as a ‘fetish’ or an anthropological reality understood in transhistorical terms. Moreover, privileging an analysis of work/labour based on a generic or ideal-typical form, whether it be artisanal or creative work, is not very fruitful from a heuristic viewpoint. Certainly, some forms of work can give rise to self-realization, but these situations remain quite exceptional or are nowadays suffering social degradation (socio-economic insecurity, debt bondage, dependence towards the market). Public service work is not immune to these regressive trends; consider for example the effects of New Public Management, digitalisation or austerity policies. Moreover, basing the analysis on work and labour as it objectively exists and not as it ideally should be, allows us to revisit the issue from a conceptual point of view, which is necessary to clarify what ‘ecologization’ of work might mean on a practical level.

It should be recalled that an impressive number of factual analyses quite close to this ‘critical realistic approach’ are to be found in Engels’ and Marx’s writings. Friedrich Engels, in his Letters from Wuppertal (1839), gives an extensive account of the living and working conditions of the textile workers in Barmen, a small town in Rhineland-Westphalia which was also his birthplace:

‘Labour is carried out in low rooms where one breathes more coal fumes and dust instead of oxygen. Workers are starting to labour, in most cases, at the age of six, which can only deprive children of all strength and joy of life. (…) The weavers, who have their own loom in their house, work from dusk till dawn or even into the night, straining their backs and drying out their spinal cords in front of a hot stove. (…) If one can find robust people among the craftsmen, like the leather workers born in the region, three years of this life are enough to ruin them physically and mentally and three out of five died from alcohol abuse. All this would not have assumed such horrible proportions if the factories were not exploited so recklessly by the owners (…). Terrible poverty prevails among the lower classes, especially among the workers in Wuppertal; syphilis and lung diseases are present in almost every family. In Elberfeld alone, out of 2,500 children of school age, 1,200 are deprived of education and grow up in the factories – simply so that the manufacturer does not have to pay adult workers, whose place they take, which would double the wages that are paid to a child.’

A few years later, Engels systematized his exercise of sociological investigation before publishing The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845). Numerous detailed descriptions – based in particular on medical reports – mention the excess infant mortality, diseases and deformities linked to exposure to chlorine, arsenic or lead. Karl Marx, greatly impressed by the investigation of his companion Engels, adopted a similar approach, which explains why so many detailed descriptions of working and living conditions can be found in Capital:

‘All the sensory organs are injured by artificially high temperatures, by the dust-laden atmosphere, by the deafening noise, not to mention the dangers to life and limb posed by closely aligned machines; dangers which, with the regularity of the seasons, produce their list of dead and wounded on the battlefield of industry. The economic use of the means of production, ripened and forced as in a greenhouse by the factory system, is transformed in the hands of capital into a systematic robbery of what is necessary for the life of the worker while at work, that is, of space, light, air, and protection from the dangerous or unhealthy concomitants of the production process; not to speak of the robbery of resources indispensable to life itself’ (Capital, Vol 1, op cit., pp. 552-553).

Marx also examined in detail food issues by considering that capitalist entrepreneurs systematically imposed undernourishment on workers. The few concessions made to the subsistence needs of the workers had no moral basis but were solely motivated by the need to obtain a higher productivity and because the situation of the labour market pushed the entrepreneurs to do so…

Today, more than 170 years after Engels’ and Marx’s workers’ inquiries, living and working conditions are sometimes strikingly similar. Whether in Latin America, Africa or Asia, hundreds of millions of people live in shanty towns without access to drinking water or public facilities. Labouring in the Maquiladoras, in the Foxconn factories in China or the cobalt mines in Africa, also bears a resemblance to the condition of the working class in 19th century England. Today, nearly 150 million children are constrained to work, a number that has been steadily increasing over the past twenty years [21]. The pandemic has only made the situation worse, adding an estimated 25 million children to the cohorts already mobilized for picking, toiling, extracting rare metal s or waste sorting. Bond labour is also expanding on global level. According to minimalist estimates, more than 70 million people are engaged around the world in forced labour in agriculture, industry and construction, not including forced marriages [22]. Finally, it should be noted that bond labour is by no means limited to the Global South but is also developing in OECD countries, particularly in tourism, catering and agricultural sectors, and even in garment sweatshops that can be found in Northern Italy or around Leicester in the UK [23] .

In the industrialized countries of the North, people may not die anymore because a mine shaft collapse or explode, but rather from a stroke or a heart attack… Death from overwork, known as Karoshi, is a phenomenon that is growing alarmingly, and not only in Japan. According to the WHO and ILO (Pega and others, 2018), overwork is estimated to cause 745,000 deaths per year globally, an increase of 20-25% from estimations made in 2005. The 6,800 deaths related to appalling working conditions on construction sites for the World Cup in Qatar demonstrate that these estimates are far from being unreal.

Real existing labour is actually getting worse, according to a large survey in 41 countries [24]. Intensive, deadline-driven or fast-paced work affects 30% of workers in the EU and almost 50% in the US, Turkey or Latin America [25]. The emotional burden of workloads is increasing in recent years, as 35-40% of respondents say, and flexibility remains a non-negotiable constraint for 40-55%. Long working weeks of 48 hours or more are imposed on an average of 20% of the workforce in the European Union; upon a quarter in the United States, and vary between 50 and 65% in countries like Turkey and South Korea. This is no surprise, but it remains a major injustice, as much as the fact that women earn significantly less than men (25 to 30% less depending on the country) while they are working more hours overall, which is also a consequence of the precariousness and informality that affects women more frequently (35 to 45% on average in the 41 countries studied). Overall, 30 to 50% of jobs are of ‘low’ or ‘very low quality’ [26] .

Exposure to physical risks is also very common. More than half of the workers or employees in many regions and countries covered by the survey are exposed to repetitive hand and arm movements, which is the most reported physical hazard. One-fifth of the employees are frequently exposed to high temperatures in the workplace.

The survey also highlights the importance of unpaid reproductive work assumed mostly by women, including in Europe. This reproductive work, including care, demands a considerable amount of time, which can vary from 20 to 40 extra hours per week on top of paid work, when children are young or pre-adolescent. For men, on the other hand, their involvement in reproductive work varies between 9 and 15 hours per week, depending on age and the number of children (Eurofound, 2019: 41).

The methodology of these international surveys is not very homogenous which mean that the robustness of results is varying from country to another. Still, this should not distract us from the fact that real existing labour coincide with a degraded social life that very often rhymes with drudgery and suffering… [27]

What is empirically true also requires theoretical and conceptual clearness. In his early writings, such as the Manuscripts of 1844, Marx focuses on Homo Faber: the human being transforms nature and the world through work/labour and transforms himself through the execution of that process. However, in his later writings, such as the Grundrisse and especially in Capital, Marx clarifies his critical understanding of labour. A first clarification was done through the distinction between abstract and concrete labour. In its concrete form, labour refers to the production of goods (and services) understood from the point of view of their use value, whereas in its abstract form, this same labour produces exchange values by submitting the concrete labouring activity to the logic of quantification and to the injunction of performance and output. The main problem is not alienation or coercion as such the ‘domination of abstract labour over concrete labour’ (Vincent, 1986; Bouquin, 2006; Postone 2011). This domination of abstract labour over concrete labour is in fact what defines wage labour, even if its intensity can vary and even if there are particularly unbearable situations and others that can be accommodated to.

By mobilizing the concept of labour-power as specific value-form of labour that is sold to the capitalist, Marx recognizes the asymmetrical and antagonistic nature of the wage relation. This social relation mobilises the worker who possesses only his/her labour-power to obtain an income and the employer holding the means of production which gives a certain capacity in organizing and controlling the execution of labour. This asymmetrical relationship is also the basis for surplus value extraction, i.e. the private appropriation of a fraction of the wealth created by living labour by the owners of the means of production [28] . This ‘economic’ relationship of exploitation also implies a socio-political dimension of ‘subsumption’ that is at the origin of the sense of alienation, the loss of control over one’s life, and not only in the workplace. These aspects, which have been extensively studied by André Gorz and other critical thinkers, became visible again, whether through the extent of burn-out phenomena or the return of a social critique of work, which is reflected in the ‘Great Resignation’, quiet quitting and the quest for meaningful autonomous activities outside the sphere of heteronomous wage labour.

In his Grundrisse as well as in Capital, Marx also refers to ‘living labour’ in opposition to ‘dead labour’, the latter meaning the labour provided by machines and automated devices. The concept of ‘living labour’ is an analytical category that refers to workers, both in their labouring activity and as human being. Living labour is thus an individual and collective ‘corpo-real’ reality that recognizes its socio-biological nature. In the capitalist system, this ‘corpo-real’ dimension is expressed primarily in a negative way: through unhealthy housing, the imperative constraint of mobility or the mutilation of daily life, not to mention the tendency towards unhealthy food that occurs more at the bottom of the social ladder and the overexposure of toxicity and pollution of certain occupations, professions or social activities. In the metropolitan areas of capitalism, and certainly in countries with a welfare state, strong trade unions and public services have made it possible to mitigate the most deleterious effects of capitalism on living conditions. The concept of ‘living labour’ therefore refers not only to the living character of labour power but also to the ‘social fabric’ that makes workers capable of labouring day after day because they have been able to reproduce this capacity to some extent.

While the concept of ‘living labour seems to be gaining some ground in France (Cukier, 2017; Harribey, 2020), in other countries like Germany, it was mobilized since quite a long time within the framework of an explicit ecological analysis. This is illustrated in particular by Oskar Negt’s work on working time and the social organisation of time as an ecological issue in itself. Indeed, for Oskar Negt, heteronomous working time is seen as antagonistic to life [29] . Defending ‘lebentige arbeit’ or living labour means taking up the cause of time of life and acting towards a drastic reduction of working time; in other words, acting in favour of an extension of control over time both on individual and collective level. Logically, the pressure to work longer and harder is inherently mortifying, whereas the will to free oneself from the obligation to work may be driven by the vital impulse of living a real life, i.e. not subjugated to working and labouring. Following this approach, we can also say that the massive and obstinate mobilisations in France against the extension of the retirement age are driven by a relative unconscious ecological aspiration of living labour.

Collective mobilisations and workers resistance, and even manifestations of misbehaviour (Ackroyd and Thompson, 2022), demonstrate that this living labour is always endowed with agency. In other words, living labour is anything but an inert mass that can be manipulated at will, but represents an active and subjective reality, that will never be completely repressed and subsumed (Barrington Moore, 1986; Ackroyd and Thompson, 2022; Bouquin, 2007). This also makes it possible to understand why living labour always remain to a certain extend reluctant, why social conflict sometimes make an unexpected comeback and remains a social condition with a latent potential for collective action (strike but not only) which remains, let us not forget, the first source of leverage for social change.

The agency of living labour is not only the expression of tensions between abstract and concrete labour, between management and employees but is fed by a fundamental contradiction between life and capital, embodied by the logic of valorisation that is imposed upon living labour. The Covid pandemic was a moment when this contradiction came back on the front stage: either life had to be privileged by bringing the economy to a halt, or profits had to be prioritized by the pursuit of economic activity at the expense of a much higher death toll. The pandemic was also a moment of existential catharsis on a mass scale, which had the effect of nourishing critical reflexivity that questions the idea of pursuing a working life that doesn’t make much sense except the fact one can lose its life in order to gain an income to live it. This ‘existential’ experience may also explain why we have seen since 2021 a disruptive return of social conflicts and a comeback of critical views upon work and labour.

To a large extent, we can say that defending living labour and decent living conditions constitutes an ecological struggle ‘in itself’[30]. Of course, it would be futile to think that greening or the ‘ecologization’ of living labour is enough to solve the ecological crisis. Indeed, everyone can easily imagine ‘ecological labour’, i.e. with high job quality and healthy working conditions, that nevertheless corresponds to an activity that is harmful to the environment. Symmetrically, one can also identify ecological activities like waste sorting or recycling in combination with non-ecological (unhealthy) working conditions for the workers involved in it. By extending the equation, we may also identify configurations where both labour and the productive activities would be ecological, was well as the opposite, where neither labour nor the productive activity would be ecological or green.

To solve this equation in a way that it is not destructive for the environment nor for the workers, it is imperative to look beyond work delivered by living labour and to integrate into the analysis the ‘dead labour’ that Marx evoked to designate capital, since this leads to directly to questioning production and the purposes that govern it. This is precisely one of Franck Fischbach’s central propositions in Après la production. Travail, nature et capital (2019): ‘What capital manages to make productive is always the result of a certain form of ‘labour’ (travail), bringing into play natural forces that go far beyond the mere human force of labour (travail)’. Indeed, labour refers not only to human involvement in the production of goods or services but also to the ‘labour of capital’, which relies on the ‘labour of nature’. As Fischbach reminds us, ‘the first characteristic of capital is its capacity to make productive for itself the widest possible range of natural forces, whether human or non-human.’ (Fischbach, 2019: 33). The second characteristic is that it cannot do so without destroying these same natural forces because ‘it cannot make natural forces productive for it without turning production into destruction and it cannot make human labour power or the naturally fertile and fruitful force of a soil productive without exhausting them. (…)’ (ibidem). The reason for this is not only located on the side of the immanent pursuit of an accumulation without limits but also in the fact that ‘the capitalist process of production, as a process of valorisation of capital, is always actualised as a process of consumption: it makes natural and social forces productive only by appropriating them, and appropriates them only by consuming and destroying them in the more or less long term.’ (ibid.).

Therefore, unconditionally defending living labour necessarily results in surpassing an economy that is under the control of capital in ‘the advent of an economy of living labour and a reasonable and democratic organisation of the common good’ (Negt, 2007: 190).

This notion of the common good and more broadly of the commons represents, in my opinion, a sufficiently open and precise intellectual and programmatic resource that allows reflection and action to be steered in the right direction. For Jean-Marie Harribey (2020): ‘Put simply, the common is what humans do together, the commons is what they have together’ (p. 262). This proposal is based on a materialist vision according to which the decision to make a ‘common good’, whether material or immaterial, is a matter of choice. The status of ‘commons’ links the object (the real substrate) to the human being who shares its use and towards the institutions that manage and preserve it. That is why commons should be kept aside of the market and the rights to access them must be guaranteed (Harribey, 2020: 11). The resources that Harribey proposes to pool in common are first water, energy, education, health and housing. But the ecological crisis demands commons to be extended to include nature and the whole earth. In order for these commons to be truly accessible to all on an equal basis, they must be excluded from private ownership and the process of valorisation and marketized exchange. Kohei Saito’s argument for degrowth communism (Saito, 2020 and 2023) goes in the same direction by considering the commons as the basis for the idea of a ‘commonisation’ of social organisation: ‘My definition of communism is therefore very simple: communism is a society based on the commons. Capitalism has destroyed the commons with primitive accumulation, the commodification of land, water and everything else. It is a system dominated by the logic of commodification. My vision of communism is the negation of the negation of the commons: we can de-commodify public transport services, public housing, whatever you want, but we can also run them in a more democratic way – not in the way of a few bureaucrats regulating and controlling everything.’[31]

6 – Concluding remarks

Faced with approaching disasters, the temptation to formulate ideological responses is great. But discussions on how to name an overall systemic alternative tend to be endless. Moreover, they can only be concluded in a practical way, when mobilisations and struggles develop on a wider level and when the urgent measures to be taken begin to take shape. Pending such developments, we will limit our remarks here to recall the main elements already stated in the course of what has preceded:

(1). The ecological crisis is human-made, global, systemic and is close to reaching a limit beyond which our planet will become uninhabitable for large parts of humanity. According to the latest projections, the time remaining to avoid a global disaster with a runaway dynamic varies between 15 and 25 years at the most;

(2). Nature does exist in a contradictory interdependent relationship with society. The same applies to society in relation to the ‘natural environment’. Moreover, we can observe a combined movement of humanisation of nature and naturalisation of humans as living beings dependent on this natural environment (biosphere, ecosphere and ecosystems);

(3). The disasters that lie ahead are rooted in fossil capitalism and the systemic imperative of profitability, which are at the root of a destructive and regressive combined re-metabolization of nature and society.

(4) The extension of the logic of valorisation upon life and reproductive labour leads to its integration into the field of social activities dominated by the market and abstract labour.

(5) Even if living labour is dominated by dead labour, capital remains dependent on the availability of living labour in order to continue to extract surplus value and to pursue the process of valorisation and accumulation. Defending ‘living labour’ is therefore an ecological struggle in itself. By reasoning this way, we articulate social and ecological struggles and integrate production and its purposes into reflection and action. The production of goods and services and its related consumption are a matter of choice: either everything is done to support and enhance the cycle of accumulation and profitability or priority is given to the satisfaction of social needs and the preservation of a common good that is a habitable and liveable earth for all.

6). To avoid disaster, it is absolutely necessary to move into the direction of an ‘emergency exit’, a post-capitalist systemic bifurcation. To reach such a goal, we must not only identify urgent measures to be taken, but also draw up a critical assessment of certain remedies that are either illusory (a technical fix like carbon capture and storage), too limited or fragmented (the carbon market), or very difficult to generalize at the present stage (prefigurative experiments) or, last but not least simply dysfunctional (so called ‘sustainable consumption’ and greenwashing).

The threat of irreparable disaster and the risk of a loss of capacity for action are real, which also raises the question of the time left over. The fatalism of the ‘collapsologists’ [32] is not only dangerous – because it feeds nihilistic or reactionary reflexes like survivalism – but it ignores the fact that time can accelerate under the impetus of a massive and global civic and social ecological mobilisation, which also explains why what takes years to happen sometimes take place in a few weeks or even days. Of course, in order to set such an acceleration in motion, humanity must manifest itself as a collective subject (actor), fighting for its common life, as a subject that defends the perpetuation of its natural conditions of existence by transforming society and its relationship with nature as much as preserving the natural conditions of life.

As Theodor W. Adorno wrote a few decades ago: ‘[It remains to be seen] whether humanity is capable of preventing catastrophe. The forms of global societal constitutions of humanity threaten its own survival, if a self-conscious global subject does not develop and intervene. The possibility of progress, of avoiding the most extreme and total disaster, has migrated to this one global subject. Everything that implies progress must crystallize around it.’ (Adorno, 2005 : 144).

 

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Footnotes

[1]. Michael Löwy, « Walter Benjamin, précurseur de l’éco-socialisme », Cahiers d’histoire. Revue d’Histoire Critique, 130 | 2016, 33-39.

[2]. Haeckel goes on to explain that existence is determined by the inorganic nature to which each organism must submit, i.e. the physical and chemical characteristics of the habitat, the climate, the biochemical characteristics, the quality of the water, the nature of the soil, etc. Under the name of conditions of existence, we understand the whole of the relations of organisms with each other, either favourable or unfavourable.

[3]. The survival of the fittest as a biological principle applied to humans comes from Hubert Spencer, who extended Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution to the societal scale. Pierre Kropotkin strongly relativised the relevance of Darwin’s theory of evolution applied to humans and defended an approach of humans as social and collective beings whose survival depends on mutual help, which marked their evolution by favouring the development of communication and language.

[4]. See Antoine Dubiau (2022)

[5]. One can doubt the relevance of the notion of ‘crisis’ when it becomes structural, but it keeps all its meaning according to a pragmatic definition (‘sudden event or long evolution which reveals structural weaknesses, inherent to a system’) which is less the case according to a lexical definition (‘set of pathological phenomena manifesting themselves in a sudden and intense way during a limited period)

[6]. As a reminder, the massive disruptive rains of the summer of 2022 caused landslides and mud torrents in Pakistan, destroying the homes of 7 million people and killing over 50,000.

[7]. For a general overview published on a official EU platforms, see the statements made by prof. Georgina Mace, head of the Centre for Biodiversity and Environmental Research, London University, https://ec.europa.eu/research-and-innovation/en/horizon-magazine/sixth-mass-extinction-could-destroy-life-we-know-it-biodiversity-expert

[8]. The racialization of humanity refers to a biological division of human beings. Based on scientific claims, it considered certain human populations as inferior or incapable of accessing civilization. The essential thing is, of course, to continue to recognize that gender, race and class are above all social and political constructions.

[9]. See the interview with Philippe Descola, https://reporterre.net/Philippe-Descola-La-nature-ca-n-existe-pas  From his in-depth study of the Jivaros of Amazonia, Descola deduces that there are several ways of inhabiting the earth and relating to the so-called natural environment. When the Jivaro Indians anthropize the Amazonian rain forest on a symbolic as well as a practical level, they do so by seeking to preserve a homeostatic balance (biodiversity, variety of fauna and flora) (Descola, 1986).

[10] R.H. Lossin (2020), ’Neoliberalism for polite company. Bruno Latours pseudo-materialist coup’, in Salvage n°7 Towards the proletarocene, Online https://salvage.zone/neoliberalism-for-polite-company-bruno-latours-pseudo-materialist-coup/

[11]. Latour believes that it has become imperative to oppose the economisation of the world and that it is necessary to draw on the experiences of the radical ecologist occupations like Notre Dame des Landes against a new airport or the way of life of the inhabitants of the Rain forest, which, far from being archaic, represent the only way to avoid disasters in the decades to come. Interview in French with Bruno Latour “Everyone feels betrayed, we understand that this model is no longer possible”.

[12]. See interview with Bruno Latour. https://basta.media/Bruno-Latour-nouvelle-lutte-des-classes-ecologie-climat-anticapitalisme-alternatives

[13]. Capital is a monetary wealth that manifests itself in a specific way historically. It is a wealth that grows through the process of exchange and circulation, giving rise to a mark-up. The exchange process Commodity – Money – Commodity has been transformed into Money – Commodity – Money+ (marked up). Capital is therefore not a thing but a social relation, allowing its growth through the labour process and the realisation of profits through the sale of commodities. Capital changes its appearance throughout the cycle of accumulation but the measure of its value remains monetary.

[14]. In Green Capitalism. Why it can’t work (2010 for the French edition, English in 2014) Tanuro argues, for example, that Marx did not fully appreciate the importance of ‘the passage of a stock fuel like coal, a product of the fossilization of the solar flux and therefore exhaustible on a time scale’ (Tanuro, 2010: 272).

[15]. The triangular trade developed from the 17th century onwards around sugar from the sugar cane plantations in Brazil and the Caribbean. In the British colonies of the northern United States, it was mainly tobacco that was the starting point for a plantation economy using forced labour. See James Walvin on the history of sugar (2019).

[16]. Not only should we evoke, as Marx did, the double movement of the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation of man, but we should also take into consideration an analogous process encompassing both capital and its relation to its environment. The Capitalocene transforms the environment into a big business (greenwashing is an active business, a source of profit) and ‘captures’ the dialectic of change (‘one only transforms the world by transforming oneself, and vice versa’) in order to use it for its own purposes. Green capitalism does exist and it is perfectly possible for capital to continue to circulate, making profits in the midst of catastrophes and disasters. To absorb these shocks (which are both endogenous and exogenous), capital accelerates its cycle of accumulation, and adopts strategies that will end up being problematic for capital itself (debt, inflation).

[17]. Françoise D’Eaubonne Le féminisme ou la mort, Paris, 1974, (p. 221). For a presentation of Françoise d’Eaubonne, in French see https://reporterre.net/Francoise-d-Eaubonne-pionniere-de-l-ecofeminisme-et-adepte-du-sabotage

[18]. This symbolism could also function as a binding ethical norm since personifying nature also limited its exploitation. But with the emergence of a class-divided society and the state, it becomes increasingly difficult to ethically limit the process of patriarchal colonization of women while religious monotheisms support socio-state systems based on patriarchy, slavery and tribute.

[19]. For a short présentation in french, see Pierre Ansay, “Valerie Plumwood, le crocodile, l’éco-féminisme et le care” in Politique, la revue https://www.revuepolitique.be/val-plumwood-le-crocodile-lecofeminisme-et-le-care/

[20]. The elaborations of the philosopher of science Roy Bashkar in defence of critical realism invite us to rethink scientific reasoning without falling into positivism (science produces absolute truths) or post-modern relativism (where reality is primarily discursive and all discourses can claim to be true). Following Roy Baskar’s theory of critical realism (CRT), it is imperative to distinguish between the ‘real’ world and the ‘observable’ world. The ‘real’ cannot be fully observed and exists independently of perceptions and discourses. At the same time, the world as we know and understand it is constructed from our perspectives and experiences, through what is ‘observable’ and experienced. Reality contains also unobservable but no less real processes causing observable events. The social world can therefore only be understood by recognising the existence of structures, logics and contradictions that generate these events. In French, see Regis Meissonier (2022) https://doi.org/10.3917/ems.livia.2022.01.0147

[21]. See joint report of ILO Unicef Global on Child Labour – 2020 Report (https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—ipec/documents/publication/wcms_800278.pdf Child labour is much more than a source of supplementary income. In Bangladesh, children as young as 6 years old work 60 to 100 hours a week in textile workshops.

[22]. See “Estimations mondiales de l’esclavage moderne : travail forcé et mariage forcé – Résumé analytique”, BIT Genève https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang–fr/index.htm

[23]. On forced labour in textile sector in Leicester, see https://www.euronews.com/green/2020/07/09/inside-the-leicester-sweatshops-accused-of-modern-slavery

[24]. The “Working conditions in global perspective” survey was conducted in 2017-2019 in 41 countries representing 1.2 billion people. The countries covered are the European Union (EU28), China and South Korea, Turkey, the United States, and a number of Latin American countries. See https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2019/working-conditions-in-a-global-perspective

[25]. The proportion of employees with two or more distinct workload or work pace constraints increases from 57% for those working 20-29 hours to 59% for those working 30-35 hours, then 67% (35-40 hours) to 76% for those working 45-50 hours.

[26]. The seven determinants of “job quality” are 1) the physical environment (noise, posture, temperatures, vibrations); 2). The social environment (management style, union presence, peer support); 3). Work intensity (quantitative demands, pace determinants and interdependence); 4). Skills and discretion (decision latitude, organizational participation, training); 5). Working time (duration; atypical working hours, working time arrangements, undergone versus chosen flexibility); 6). Future prospects (career and promotion, socio-professional security, occurrence of downsizing or dismissals); 7). The amount of salary and remuneration.

[27] It is exactly for this reason that we wrote in 2005 in the editorial project of the French journal Les Mondes du Travail  (www.lesmondesdutravail.net ) that ‘the centrality of work remains both indisputable and highly problematic.

[28]. Marx K., Capital. A Critique of Political Economy – Book One. The development of capitalist production. Section III: The production of absolute surplus-value. Chapter X: The working day.

[29]. See Alexander Neumann in French (2015 and 2020) as well as in German (2010).

[30]. This was also the meaning of a brief post about death toll and karoshi claiming that defending decent working conditions and living labour in general is an ecological struggle in itself (Bouquin, 2019)

[31]. See interview with Kohei Saito published on website of radical ecological zine Terrestres.org  https://www.terrestres.org/2023/03/17/marx-au-soleil-levant-le-succes-dun-communisme-decroissant/

[32]. For a critique of collapsologists, see Daniel Tanuro (2020) and Jérémie Cravatte (2019), L’effondrement, parlons-en. Les limites de la collapsologie, 2019, 48p. Miméo. www.barricade.be

 

 

Pour éviter le désastre : défendre le « travail vivant » et le bien commun

« Marx disait que les révolutions sont la locomotive de l’histoire. Peut-être que les choses se présentent autrement. Il se peut que les révolutions soient l’acte par lequel l’humanité qui voyage dans le train tire les freins d’urgence » (Walter Benjamin, Thèse XVIII sur le concept de l’histoire, cité par Michael Löwy (2016)

D’année en année, la question écologique prend de l’ampleur jusqu’au point d’envahir toutes les autres questions, que ce soit le mode de gouvernance, la pandémie, les inégalités sociales ou l’économie tout simplement. Mais la compréhension théorique de cette déferlante n’est pas toujours au rendez-vous, loin s’en faut. Notre article a pour objectif de contribuer à une clarification aussi urgente du point de vue scientifique que pratique. Qu’est-ce que la « crise écologique » nous dit d’elle-même ? Ce sera l’objet de notre premier point introductif. Comment penser ce que l’on désigne par « nature » et quel rapport établir entre celle-ci et la société ? Si les approches dualistes sont critiquables parce qu’elles ont servi de justification de la domination de la nature, faut-il pour autant privilégier une approche « moniste » qui fusionne nature et société ? Nous ne le pensons pas et soulignons dans ce second point l’importance d’une orientation épistémologique fondé sur un naturalisme critique à la fois matérialiste et dialectique. Nous présenterons dans un troisième point une série d’analyses qui reconnaissent le rôle premier du « capitalocène » dans la crise écologique. Mais cette critique du « capitalocène » gagne à intégrer celle du patriarcat, ce que nous ferons dans un quatrième point qui présente les approches écoféministes matérialistes. Nous reviendrons dans un cinquième point sur la catégorie du « travail vivant » comme une entité « corpo-réelle », à la fois naturelle et sociale, ce qui permet par la même occasion d’articuler la question laborieuse et sociale avec la question écologique et oriente tant le regard que l’action vers une économie du bien commun. En conclusion, nous reviendrons brièvement sur l’urgence de la crise écologique pour souligner l’importance d’une bifurcation systémique et la construction d’un horizon commun. (…)

Stéphen Bouquin, « Pour éviter le désastre: défendre le “travail vivant” et le bien commun » Publié in Les Mondes du Travail, n°29, mars 2023, pp. 187-210. 

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Dal malcontento estivo a un lungo inverno di rivolta sociale? Alcune note sul ritorno degli scioperi in Gran Bretagna

Stephen Bouquin*

[Versione aggiornata il 14 novembre]

Gran Bretagna [1] ha assistito a un’ondata di scioperi come non se ne vedevano da decenni. Gli scioperi delle ferrovie, della logistica, del terminal portuale di Felixstowe e della Royal Mail si svolgono in un contesto economico e sociale caratterizzato da profitti record, crisi politica, inflazione alle stelle e recessione imminente. L’ondata di scioperi spontanei in una dozzina di magazzini Amazon è stata forse il momento più inaspettato di questa “estate del malcontento”. [2] .

In questo articolo, vogliamo portare all’attenzione il ritorno dello sciopero come fatto sociale importante, e questo in un Paese che ha vissuto un lungo periodo di “pacificazione sociale forzata”. Dopo aver delineato brevemente gli elementi di contesto nella prima sezione, descriveremo i principali conflitti nella seconda sezione. Svilupperemo poi alcune riflessioni sul proseguimento delle mobilitazioni per lo sciopero nei prossimi mesi. Il quarto punto affronta la questione della fine di un lungo periodo di pacificazione del conflitto sociale, considerando la possibilità di cicli lunghi nell’attività di sciopero basati sul cambiamento delle coordinate strutturali e organizzative che ne determinano l’intensità. Infine, concludiamo tracciando una serie di osservazioni generali.

1 – Singolarità britanniche sotto stress

Nel Regno Unito, le relazioni industriali sono volontarie e scarsamente regolamentate, anche se, al contrario, gli scioperi sono altamente regolamentati. Non esistono organismi di rappresentanza dei lavoratori, per cui si parla di “canale unico”. [3] . Il legislatore ha riconosciuto il fatto sindacale all’interno dell’azienda molto presto (1872), concedendo allo stesso tempo il diritto di organizzare un picchetto pacifico (1875). Nel 1906, i sindacati hanno ottenuto il diritto di sciopero senza essere condannati per danni. Il Trade Unions Council (TUC) è un prodotto diretto del Cartismo, nato nel 1838. [4] . Inizialmente riuniva 180 sindacati di categoria o professionali. A differenza di altri Paesi in cui predominavano le tradizioni rivoluzionarie, il TUC assunse la guida dell’azione politica fondando nel 1900 il Labour Representation Committee, che a sua volta fondò il Labour Party. La rappresentanza politica era un complemento necessario all’azione sindacale essenzialmente “economica”. Nel periodo tra le due guerre si verificarono numerosi conflitti sociali, culminati in un unico sciopero generale nel 1926. Dopo la Seconda guerra mondiale, i sindacati e il Partito Laburista riuscirono a migliorare notevolmente le condizioni di vita della classe operaia. Oltre alla creazione di un sistema di sicurezza sociale universale sotto l’egida di William S. Beveridge, con servizi sanitari accessibili a tutti e finanziati dalla fiscalità, il Paese ha vissuto due decenni di relativa piena occupazione (per gli uomini) con un potente polo industriale pubblico e un’offerta ampliata di servizi sociali (in particolare in termini di alloggi).

In Gran Bretagna la formazione dei salari è altamente decentralizzata. Dal 1945 al 1986, è stata organizzata sulla base di trattative salariali all’interno dei Wages Councils, che coprivano mestieri e professioni su base territoriale con una rappresentanza nominata di datori di lavoro e lavoratori. I Wages Councils hanno elaborato una scala indicativa di tariffe orarie, soglie minime in base all’anzianità e alla qualifica (Dobb, 1952).

Dopo la loro abolizione nel 1986, la contrattazione salariale ha perso gran parte della sua importanza. Allo stesso tempo, in alcuni casi (trasporti, energia), è stata mantenuta a livello settoriale per evitare salari eccessivamente alti o di dumping. Nel periodo recente (2000-2020), nel settore privato, solo il 20% degli aumenti salariali è stato il prodotto della contrattazione collettiva, rispetto al 45% nel settore pubblico. La creazione di un salario minimo orario (1998) – del tutto eccezionale vista la tradizione britannica – è stata giustificata dall’entità dell’impoverimento dei lavoratori, con quasi il 25% dei dipendenti in condizioni di povertà.

Dal 2010 al 2020, gli aumenti salariali sono stati molto moderati, costantemente inferiori al tasso di crescita annuale del PIL. In questo decennio, la retribuzione settimanale mediana (in termini reali) è aumentata solo dello 0,6%, mentre la retribuzione settimanale media è diminuita del 2,4% in termini reali se si prende come riferimento l’ultimo decennio. L’importante aumento nel 2021 è principalmente il risultato della fine del sistema di licenziamento dopo diversi periodi di lockdown.

Fig 1 – Variazione annuale dei salari reali (adeguati all’inflazione)

Lo scorso 2022 aprile, il Times si chiedeva se il Paese avrebbe vissuto un’estate di malcontento. Questo segnalava che alcuni cenacoli del potere stavano già iniziando a prendere coscienza dell’esasperazione sociale. Il numero di conflitti sociali aveva iniziato ad aumentare dal 2020, durante la pandemia. Inizialmente segnati da questioni sanitarie, gli scioperi hanno rapidamente messo sul tavolo la questione dei salari. Lo scorso maggio si sono registrati almeno 300 conflitti industriali dall’inizio dell’anno; un numero sei volte superiore alla media annuale del periodo 2008-2018, che esprime una vera e propria rottura con il lungo periodo di atonia del conflitto sociale.

I salari sono al centro di questi scioperi per un motivo molto semplice. Nell’aprile del 2022, l’Istituto di Management Chartered [5] ha rivelato che la metà delle aziende non aveva previsto alcun aumento salariale, mentre nell’altra metà l’aumento non sarebbe stato superiore al 3%, meno della metà del tasso di inflazione di allora. Secondo la stessa indagine, nel settore pubblico – dove il tasso di sindacalizzazione è del 50% rispetto al 14% del settore privato – l’aumento salariale non supererà il 2% nel 2022.

La Gran Bretagna ha vissuto un lungo periodo di stagnazione salariale a partire dal 2008, durante la crisi finanziaria. Ma questo periodo è stato anche caratterizzato da una bassa inflazione, in media tra l’1,5% e il 2%, che è cambiata bruscamente alla fine del 2021. Inizialmente, nell’autunno del 2021, l’aumento dei prezzi è stato il risultato di una ripresa economica relativamente forte dai confini della pandemia. L’anno 2021 è stato anche caratterizzato da una forte perturbazione del trasporto stradale, in particolare a causa della carenza di autisti di camion, in parte legata alla Brexit. In questo contesto, i prezzi sono aumentati costantemente e l’inflazione ha raggiunto il 5-6% già alla fine del 2021. L’interruzione delle catene globali del valore, ulteriormente amplificata dal contesto insulare dell’economia britannica, ha fatto salire l’inflazione al 7-8%. Poi, nel giugno di quest’anno, in seguito all’aumento dei prezzi dell’elettricità e del gas legato alla guerra in Ucraina, l’inflazione ha superato la soglia del 10%.

L’impennata dei prezzi ha coinciso con ripetuti annunci di profitti straordinari per l’anno 2021. I margini di profitto delle società quotate in borsa (FTSE 350) hanno superato del 73% i livelli pre-pandemia nel 2019. I profitti di queste società sono aumentati dell’11,74% nei sei mesi da ottobre 2021 a marzo 2022. Nello stesso periodo, i redditi da lavoro sono aumentati solo del 2,61% e sono diminuiti dello 0,8% se si tiene conto dell’inflazione. Questa recente impennata dei profitti rappresenta il 58% dell’inflazione degli ultimi sei mesi, rispetto al solo 8,3% del costo del lavoro. Unite ritiene che si tratti di un eccesso di profitti generato dall’aumento dei prezzi e delle rendite di monopolio. [6] . Non si tratta quindi solo di compagnie petrolifere o di poche “mele marce”. Anche escludendo le compagnie energetiche, gli utili delle società del FTSE 350 sono aumentati del 42% tra il 2019 e il 2021.

La combinazione di queste tre realtà – moderazione salariale, profitti (in eccesso) e inflazione – è diventata un cocktail esplosivo. Di fronte alle critiche, anche da parte del suo stesso schieramento, Boris Johnson ha deciso di concedere a ogni famiglia un buono energetico di 400 sterline, finanziato da una tassa sui “profitti in eccesso” dei produttori di energia. [7] . La misura, piuttosto “radicale” per un conservatore neoliberista, ha risvegliato la coscienza sociale delle classi lavoratrici. Alla fine di luglio sono stati annunciati ulteriori aumenti dei prezzi, che hanno fatto lievitare la bolletta energetica annuale di 3.000-4.000 sterline. In un Paese in cui molti lavoratori possiedono case fatiscenti o affittano alloggi sociali, l’aumento dei prezzi dell’energia rappresenterebbe un disastro sociale. L’economista Jonathan Bradshaw dell’Università di York sostiene che un buono da 400 sterline non impedirà all’80% delle famiglie di cadere nella “fuel poverty”, definita come il 10% del reddito disponibile speso per l’energia. [8] .

Di fronte a questa realtà, diversi sindacati si sono impegnati in procedure di consultazione, che la legge britannica rendeva necessarie per indire azioni di sciopero.  Come sintomo dell’esasperazione sociale, i tassi di partecipazione a queste consultazioni superavano sistematicamente l’80%, mentre il voto a favore dello sciopero raggiungeva talvolta il 90% o il 95%, riflettendo una reale determinazione ad agire per ottenere aumenti salariali. Vale la pena notare che l’esistenza di un fondo per gli scioperi è certamente utile in caso di controversie. I dipendenti che guadagnano più di 30.000 sterline possono ottenere fino a 50 sterline al giorno, mentre per i lavoratori a basso reddito che guadagnano meno di 30.000 sterline lorde, l’importo può arrivare a 75 sterline al giorno. La densità sindacale nel settore privato è scesa sotto il 30% nell’ultimo decennio, ma nelle grandi aziende e nei servizi pubblici rimane al 50%.

  1. Gli scioperi sono tornati

Qui presentiamo i conflitti emblematici nei settori delle ferrovie, della logistica, dei servizi postali e dei portuali. Si sono svolti anche altri conflitti più locali. Ma questi conflitti, altrettanto partecipati di quelli nazionali, non contengono questioni nazionali che rendano il ritorno dello sciopero un tema a sé stante.

Quando lo sciopero delle ferrovie fa scattare l’allarme

I ferrovieri sono stati i primi a intraprendere uno sciopero nazionale che ha interessato l’intero settore ferroviario. Non avendo sperimentato scioperi dal 1989, il trasporto ferroviario aveva tutte le caratteristiche di un eden manageriale. Privatizzato nel 1990-1991 con una quindicina di operatori nazionali distinti, il settore è frammentato anche dall’esternalizzazione di un gran numero di servizi tecnici e commerciali. Ma questa realtà frammentata non ha impedito al sindacato RMT di battersi per una contrattazione centralizzata o nazionale sulle questioni salariali. Con 50.000 iscritti o aderenti, l’RMT rimane un sindacato piuttosto “militante” con una presenza sul territorio, compresi gli appaltatori esterni come i servizi di pulizia. Si è disaffiliato dal Labour quando quest’ultimo ha intrapreso un approccio di “terza via” simile al social-liberismo. Ad esso si affianca il sindacato ASLEF, che conta 22.000 iscritti.[9] , che organizza i macchinisti di treni e metropolitane, e il TSSA, un’associazione di categoria indipendente non affiliata al TUC, che organizza il personale di alcuni fornitori di servizi regionali e che si è aperto al settore del trasporto turistico[10] .

Alla fine di maggio 2022, ASLEF e RMT si sono rifiutati di accettare un aumento del 3%, che è molto inferiore a un tasso di inflazione del 9-10%. Per i sindacati, un aumento del 7% è la condizione necessaria per aprire le trattative. In risposta a questo rifiuto, Network Rail ha accettato un aumento salariale del 5%, ma a condizione di accettare una riorganizzazione dei servizi e un aumento dell’orario di lavoro. L’RMT e l’ASLEF hanno rifiutato questo “accordo di favore” e hanno iniziato i preparativi per un’azione di sciopero. Dopo un processo di consultazione molto partecipato, con un’affluenza molto alta del 78% e il 90% dei votanti a favore dell’azione di sciopero, la RMT e l’ASLEF hanno iniziato a preparare lo sciopero. [11] , più di 60.000 dipendenti del settore hanno interrotto il lavoro, prima il 21 giugno, seguita da una seconda giornata di sciopero il 27 luglio, una terza il 20 agosto e infine sabato 1° ottobre, in un primo sciopero congiunto con altri settori.

Gli scioperi ferroviari hanno ricevuto il sostegno di ampi settori dell’opinione pubblica. [12] . Un sondaggio condotto su 2.000 persone [13] alla fine di luglio ha rilevato che il 63% è contrario alla perdita di posti di lavoro e sostiene gli scioperi. La stessa percentuale ritiene che i lavoratori delle ferrovie debbano ricevere un aumento di stipendio “che tenga conto del costo della vita”, mentre il 59% ritiene che i lavoratori delle ferrovie abbiano il diritto di scioperare quando i negoziati falliscono. Più in generale, l’85% degli intervistati ritiene che i profitti dell’industria ferroviaria debbano essere investiti per proteggere i posti di lavoro e migliorare la qualità del servizio. L’opinione pubblica rimane ampiamente favorevole alle azioni di sciopero, in linea con il sostegno alla rinazionalizzazione del settore che è stato prevalente nell’ultimo decennio.

Ogni giorno di sciopero tutti i servizi sono stati paralizzati, anche a Londra. Nel tentativo di dividere il movimento, i datori di lavoro hanno dichiarato di essere disposti a concedere un aumento salariale dell’8%, ma solo per alcuni mestieri. Mick Lynch, intervistato da Skynews il 1° ottobre, ha dichiarato che è inaccettabile che alcuni mestieri vengano discriminati di fronte all’aumento dell’inflazione, che colpisce tutti e supera ormai il 10%. Quel giorno, dopo 15 giorni di lutto per la morte della Regina Elisabetta II, si è svolto un nuovo sciopero nazionale e da allora sono state annunciate altre azioni. Il movimento sociale è quindi ancora in corso e non sta perdendo slancio.

Gli scioperi ferroviari, altamente simbolici, illustrano il ritorno in primo piano dell’azione sindacale. Segnalano il ritorno dello sciopero come forma di lotta. La loro esemplarità simbolica è verificata dal fatto che i lavoratori di altre aziende hanno seguito l’esempio, anche in aziende senza presenza sindacale come Amazon.

Vento di rivolta su Amazon

All’inizio di agosto, il gigante della logistica ha registrato un’ondata di scioperi spontanei che hanno interessato una dozzina di siti, principalmente magazzini di smistamento e raccolta ordini (Fullfilment centres). Tutto è iniziato la mattina del 3 agosto nel deposito LCY2 di Tilbury, a sud di Londra. Dopo aver ricevuto l’informazione che la retribuzione oraria sarebbe stata aumentata solo di 35 penny [14] , circa 600 lavoratori sono usciti e si sono riuniti nel capannone. Nei giorni successivi si sono svolti scioperi a Rugeley, Coventry, Swindon, Rugby, Doncaster, Bristol, Dartford, Belvedere, Hemel Hempstead e Chesterfield.

Questi scioperi a gatto selvaggio si sono distinti per il loro carattere maggioritario e spontaneo e hanno rappresentato un evento sociale che non si vedeva dagli anni ’70 (Darlington& Lyddon, 2001). [15] . Sebbene le azioni fossero sostenute da Unite e dalla GMB, in pratica erano più che altro auto-organizzate da reti informali di colleghi. Le azioni hanno assunto un’ampia varietà di forme, che vanno dall’interruzione del lavoro rimanendo alla propria postazione al rallentamento del ritmo (sciopero del rallentamento) o all’occupazione delle baie di carico o della mensa (sciopero del sit-in).

Tutte queste azioni riguardano la questione dei salari. Amazon è un’azienda che si rifiuta di parlare con un rappresentante sindacale, lasciando che il dipartimento delle risorse umane agisca da solo su questo tema. Un scioperante testimonia che la rabbia covava da tempo:

Normalmente gli aumenti salariali vengono notificati ad aprile. A luglio non c’era ancora nessuna informazione, il che ha aumentato l’impazienza. L’annuncio di un aumento di 35 penny è stato visto come una doccia fredda, poiché tutti si aspettavano un vero aumento di stipendio. Prima molto basso, vicino al minimo legale di 8,50 sterline, lo stipendio iniziale era stato aumentato l’anno scorso a 10,50 sterline, se non a 11,45 sterline a seconda dell’area di impiego. Si badi bene, questa decisione non è stata ispirata da alcun senso di generosità; Amazon stava solo cercando di diventare più attraente nel mercato del lavoro. Di recente, dopo la pandemia, Amazon ha avuto le maggiori difficoltà a reclutare 25.000 lavoratori… Internamente, questo aumento del salario di assunzione alimentava la speranza che tutte le categorie avrebbero ottenuto un adeguamento al rialzo. In un contesto di inflazione ma anche di profitti record – 210 milioni di sterline, un aumento del 20% rispetto al 2020 – e al netto delle imposte, è ovvio che il rifiuto della direzione di concedere un aumento reale era destinato a suscitare il malcontento sociale. Il malcontento si è diffuso a macchia d’olio dal 3 al 12 agosto, con scioperi e scioperanti in quasi tutti i centri di distribuzione”.

Diversi scioperanti hanno sottolineato la loro indifferenza alle minacce della direzione. Il loro rifiuto di cedere alle intimidazioni, di rispondere alle ingiunzioni di tornare al lavoro, anche quando viene sventolata una trattenuta sul salario in caso di sciopero aperto, cioè per l’intera giornata lavorativa interrotta, sembra essere stata una reazione ampiamente condivisa:

Abbiamo deciso di andarcene solo quella mattina. La direzione era completamente all’oscuro di tutto. All’inizio hanno minacciato di trattenere i nostri salari, ma noi abbiamo resistito e siamo rimasti in mensa tutto il giorno. Abbiamo chiesto spiegazioni al rappresentante della direzione. Perché ci stanno dando un’elemosina quando hanno aumentato il nostro salario iniziale di 2 sterline? Perché non hanno potuto aumentare i nostri salari al livello dell’inflazione, quando i soldi scorrevano. Ma la direzione di Amazon nel Regno Unito è rimasta in silenzio e i dirigenti locali non sapevano che cosa fare… Erano completamente sconcertati. Alla fine, dopo diversi giorni di stallo, la direzione ha concesso un aumento di 50 pence l’ora, annunciando un adeguamento dei salari nei prossimi mesi; questo ha fatto ripartire il lavoro”.

Il sindacato GMB sta dando seguito a questi scioperi con una campagna per un salario iniziale di 15 sterline l’ora e un aumento salariale adeguato all’inflazione. Questa posizione offensiva riflette il desiderio del sindacato di utilizzare gli scioperi per ottenere lo status di interlocutore sociale che Amazon ha sempre rifiutato. [16] . Ma secondo Callum Cant, autore di Riding for Deliveroo. Resistance in the New Economy (2019) e uno dei maggiori esperti del settore logistico, Amazon cercherà certamente di ristabilire la sua presa manageriale e farà di tutto per tenere i sindacati fuori dai magazzini. Tuttavia, per lo specialista, è inevitabile che i lavoratori continuino a “prendere coscienza della loro forza”.

I portuali incrociano le braccia

Il 21 agosto è toccato ai portuali di Felixstowe entrare nella mischia. Situato vicino a Ipswich, Felixstowe è il più grande terminal portuale e rappresenta la metà dell’attività portuale annuale del Paese. Il primo sciopero è durato 8 giorni e ha mobilitato i 1.900 lavoratori portuali, tutti i mestieri messi insieme: operatori di ponte, gruisti, movimentatori, tecnici, ecc. Durante la consultazione che ha preceduto lo sciopero, 9 lavoratori su 10 si sono espressi a favore di un’interruzione del lavoro, paralizzando l’intera attività portuale.

Il proprietario del terminal di Felixstowe è CK Hutchison Holding, di Li Ka-Shin, l’uomo d’affari più ricco di Hong Kong e il 32° uomo più ricco del mondo, i cui conti sono domiciliati in paradisi fiscali. CK Hutchison è il principale operatore di terminal portuali al mondo, con 52 terminal in 26 Paesi e un fatturato di 30 miliardi di dollari. Ancora una volta, la questione dei salari è al centro del conflitto. Non essendo stati aumentati per un decennio, mentre la divisione britannica ha annunciato profitti record – 95 milioni di dollari nel 2021, rispetto ai 64 milioni del 2020 – i portuali hanno dato sfogo alla loro rabbia.

A seguito di questo sciopero, il primo dal 1989, la direzione della compagnia portuale propone un aumento di stipendio del 7% con un bonus una tantum di 500 sterline. Ma per il sindacato Unite, l’aumento dovrebbe essere almeno del 10% e in linea con l’inflazione, a differenza di quanto concesso nel periodo 2010-2020, un periodo di bassa inflazione, è vero. Secondo Sharon Graham, “il terminale di CK Hutchison sta realizzando profitti tali che sarebbe possibile aumentare i salari del 50% senza portare i conti in rosso. Non è irragionevole chiedere un aumento del 10%”.

All’inizio di settembre, di fronte al rifiuto del sindacato di accettare un aumento inferiore all’inflazione, il direttore del terminal portuale ha deciso di chiudere la porta ai negoziati. Da allora, la direzione ha condotto una campagna mediatica contro il sindacato Unite e i portuali, sottolineando l’alto salario di un portuale – circa 50.000 sterline all’anno – e spiegando che gli scioperi causeranno un aumento dei prezzi.

Per i rappresentanti di Unite, i salari sono stati congelati per un decennio, mentre gli aumenti dei prezzi sono il risultato di tariffe più elevate applicate dagli armatori che hanno visto triplicare i loro profitti entro il 2021. La disorganizzazione del trasporto marittimo colpisce in particolare le isole britanniche e dal 2021 solo una nave container su cinque è arrivata in orario. Per i sindacalisti di Unite, dare la colpa dell’aumento dei prezzi allo sciopero dei portuali è uno scherzo di cattivo gusto: “Siamo passati dal just in time al just in case, che non fa altro che rendere i prezzi più cari con ritardi qui e penali là”.

È forse il caso di ricordare che l’intero flusso globale di merci è interessato da una caotica disorganizzazione: o le fabbriche chiudono in Cina, o non ci sono più navi portacontainer disponibili, o vengono dirottate perché non ci sono fasce orarie per scaricare i container in meno di 48 ore. Felixstowe è spesso l’ultimo terminal prima di partire per l’Asia a vuoto. In caso di congestione, le navi scaricano i loro container ad Anversa o Rotterdam piuttosto che aspettare al largo. Questi container devono poi essere trasportati attraverso la Manica, allungando la catena di approvvigionamento e facendo lievitare il prezzo finale. Il settore della vendita al dettaglio ha aumentato la propria capacità di stoccaggio per evitare le scorte. Ma ordinando più merce, non ha fatto altro che aumentare il caos e far lievitare ulteriormente i prezzi.

Il rifiuto del sindacato di accettare un aumento inferiore all’inflazione trasforma lo sciopero dei portuali in un banco di prova. Alla fine di settembre, è stata la volta dei portuali di Liverpool a scioperare per una settimana. Il 29 settembre, i portuali di Felixstowe intrapresero una seconda settimana di sciopero, sostenuti dai portuali di Southampton che si rifiutarono di scaricare le merci dirottate da Liverpool o Felixstowe.

Per il ministro del Tesoro Kwasi Kwarteng, gli scioperi dei portuali sono una forma di terrorismo sociale “che deve essere impedita con ogni mezzo”. Sulla stessa linea, Liz Truss, il nuovo capo del governo recentemente entrato a Downing Street, ha dichiarato di ritenere che la legge del 1973 che vieta l’uso di lavoratori temporanei durante gli scioperi debba essere abrogata al più presto. Le sue recenti dichiarazioni esprimono la volontà di attaccare nuovamente il diritto di sciopero con una panoplia di misure restrittive come l’estensione del periodo di preavviso da 2 a 4 settimane, la limitazione nel tempo della validità di un voto a favore di uno sciopero o l’aumento delle soglie di validità delle consultazioni.

Poste e telecomunicazioni si uniscono agli scioperi

Infine, alla fine di agosto, è stata la volta dei servizi postali ad aderire allo sciopero. La direzione della Royal Mail, privatizzata nel 2013 e ora quotata in borsa, era disposta ad accettare un aumento salariale del 5%. Ma per Dave Ward del Communication Workers Union (CWU), questa proposta non è seria, soprattutto perché combina un aumento lineare del 2% con un assegno di 500 sterline. Per il CWU, è possibile solo un recupero dell’inflazione. Alla fine di luglio, la consultazione ha coinvolto il 77% dei lavoratori, il 96,7% dei quali ha votato a favore dello sciopero. Lo sciopero è stato annunciato in due fasi. Il primo giorno di sciopero, il 31 agosto, ha riguardato solo i 125.000 lavoratori della Royal Mail. A questo è seguito uno sciopero “settoriale” l’8 e il 9 settembre che ha coinvolto 40.000 dipendenti di British Telecom. Lo sciopero del 31 agosto è stato molto partecipato, con oltre 2.000 picchetti.

Secondo le opinioni dei sindacalisti che ho intervistato, lo sciopero è stato seguito anche da alcuni manager di prima linea. Va notato che gli uffici postali sono, per la maggior parte, gestiti come punti vendita al dettaglio o negozi di alimentari che hanno un franchising per le attività legate alla posta. Il grosso dell’attività – per di più redditizia, visto che la Royal Mail ha realizzato 170 milioni di sterline di profitti netti nel 2021 – si concentra nella raccolta, nello smistamento e nella distribuzione di lettere e pacchi. A questo proposito, è chiaro che la Royal Mail ha seguito la stessa traiettoria di molti altri servizi postali che combinano la razionalizzazione neo-tayloriana con una cronica carenza di personale e di attrezzature. Questo spiega anche perché sullo sfondo della questione salariale troviamo l’esperienza del deterioramento delle condizioni di lavoro:

Ci è stato tolto l’orario fisso, che aggiunge lavoro che non sarà mai pagato. Ora ci viene chiesto di venire la domenica, con le festività. [Ho iniziato a lavorare alla Royal Mail tre anni e mezzo fa e posso dire che il carico di lavoro è in continuo aumento. I nostri giri sono sempre più lunghi. Poiché alcuni finiscono prima, a livello di direzione distrettuale ci dicono che dobbiamo fare di più. Questo tipo di manager non è mai stato un “postino”. Non capiscono che viviamo a Luton, Bromley o Bedfordshire… molto lontano da Londra, con più di un’ora e mezza di viaggio. Inevitabilmente, saltiamo la pausa pranzo, che ci permette di finire prima e di arrivare a casa verso le 17-18, sapendo che ci alziamo anche alle 4 del mattino! I calcoli del percorso sono assurdi. In estate abbiamo sempre avuto meno pacchi rispetto a novembre e dicembre, ma a loro non interessa. Basano i giri invernali sui volumi estivi. Una vera e propria fregatura. Inoltre, le nostre attrezzature sono in pessimo stato: non ci sono abbastanza carrelli e dobbiamo arrangiarci. Ci si arrangia e si armeggia. Un collega riempie il furgone fino all’orlo e lascia che alcuni pacchi vengano consegnati in un negozio di alimentari affiliato alla rete. Da lì, un altro collega lo sostituisce e lo include nel suo giro. Il giorno dopo, ci si scambia il giro tra chi va a piedi e chi guida. È normale, non c’è motivo per cui alcune persone debbano avere più difficoltà di altre. La direzione lo sa bene e chiude un occhio. Infatti, molti di loro sono in sciopero con…”.

Come nel settore ferroviario, la direzione sta cercando di scambiare un aumento salariale con l’imposizione di una “modernizzazione delle operazioni”. Ma per la CWU, collegare le due cose è fuori questione “perché significherebbe riprendersi con una mano ciò che è stato concesso con l’altra”. Per Dave Ward, “un aumento del 10% sarebbe molto ragionevole se si considera che la Royal Mail ha realizzato oltre 650 milioni di sterline di profitti nel 2021 e quasi 500 milioni di sterline sono stati distribuiti agli azionisti e al top management”. [17] .

3 – Verso un inverno di rivolta sociale?

La morte della Regina ha certamente messo in pausa le tensioni sociali per qualche settimana. Tuttavia, l’ondata di scioperi non accenna a diminuire. Quindi, se l’estate è ormai alle spalle, c’è anche da chiedersi quale sarà l’esito dello sciopero. La dirigenza farà concessioni o arriverà alla resa dei conti?

È impossibile rispondere a questa domanda se non dicendo, con molta flemma, che non è stato deciso nulla… È vero che il settore pubblico è rimasto piuttosto ai margini fino ad ora. L’Unison, il principale sindacato del settore, sostiene l’orientamento di centro-sinistra del Labour guidato da Keir Starmer, che si dice pronto a governare “con ragione”. A livello di NHS, Unison ha messo ai voti la proposta manageriale di un aumento di solo il 4,5%. Ma questa proposta è stata respinta a stragrande maggioranza e il sindacato è stato costretto a consultare i lavoratori su un’azione di sciopero prima del 27 ottobre. Negli enti locali e nelle scuole pubbliche, le proposte di aumento salariale sembrano essere più significative e potrebbero comportare un importo forfettario di 2.000 sterline e un giorno di ferie in più, il che equivarrebbe a un aumento del 10% per i salari più bassi e del 6-8% per quelli medi e alti. Anche in questo caso, il sindacato ha messo ai voti la proposta di aumento senza prendere posizione.

Nel frattempo, il governo di Liz Truss ha annunciato una drastica riduzione del numero di dipendenti pubblici (90.000 su un totale di 600.000), facendo infuriare il PCS (Public Civil Servants Union), che ha immediatamente avviato le consultazioni per una serie di scioperi a novembre. Nel settore dell’istruzione, anche l’University and College Union (UCU) ha mobilitato i suoi membri, ottenendo già un preavviso di sciopero favorevole in 22 università e college per il mese di ottobre.

È vero che finora nessun conflitto importante ha portato a una vittoria del campo sindacale. Allo stesso tempo, alcune vertenze importanti ma più locali dimostrano che le vittorie sono tutt’altro che irraggiungibili. A Coventry, ad esempio, i netturbini della città hanno ottenuto un aumento salariale del 12,9% dopo sei mesi di sciopero. Lo stesso vale per Thurrock. Sono state vinte numerose vertenze emblematiche su questioni diverse dalla retribuzione. Tra gli esempi vi sono il personale ospedaliero londinese che lotta per essere integrato nella forza lavoro interna; gli autisti degli autobus di Manchester e i lavoratori della British Airways all’aeroporto di Heathrow che lottano contro il sistema “Fire and Rehire”; i lavoratori dell’azienda produttrice di una serie di prodotti e servizi. Ci sono anche i lavoratori del produttore di pallet CHEP, che dopo uno storico sciopero di 20 settimane hanno ottenuto un aumento salariale del 9%.

Recentemente, i portuali di Liverpool e Unite sono riusciti a ottenere un accordo con l’autorità portuale di Peel con un aumento salariale tra il 14,5 e il 18%. Questo dimostra che quando l’equilibrio delle forze cambia a favore dei lavoratori, i datori di lavoro sono pronti a scavare nelle loro tasche.

L’accumulo molecolare – nel senso che rimane “invisibile” finché non esprime il suo impatto dirompente – di vittorie parziali può anche portare i datori di lavoro a irrigidire la loro posizione. Dal loro punto di vista, ogni concessione è pericolosa perché può incoraggiare anche altri a scioperare. Ma non fare concessioni rafforzerà inevitabilmente la posizione della parte sindacale. Per Mick Lynch, segretario generale dell’RMT, i lavoratori hanno visto il loro potere d’acquisto dissolversi mentre i profitti hanno raggiunto nuove vette: Abbiamo visto i salari ristagnare e ora stiamo assistendo a un declino perché i salari non tengono il passo dell’inflazione. Se accettiamo questa situazione, ci ritroveremo con una miseria che ci farà sprofondare nella povertà. Non è possibile!  Per il leader dell’RMT, è ora che la classe operaia passi all’offensiva: “Siamo pronti, soprattutto perché il mercato del lavoro ci sta dando una spinta, dato che i datori di lavoro non trovano più nessuno che lavori in condizioni insopportabili per salari miserabili”. (discorso del 17 agosto all’incontro di lancio di Enough is enough).

Alla domanda se stiamo assistendo alla morte del progetto thatcheriano o semplicemente a un ritorno del conflitto sociale, Lynch ha risposto: “Beh, non so se il Thatcherismo finirà, perché per finirlo bisogna mettere in piedi qualcos’altro. (…) L’unico modo per porvi fine è mettere in atto un sistema, o una serie di riforme, ed è per questo che penso che la leadership laburista sotto Keir Starmer abbia un’opportunità. Allo stesso tempo, il Partito laburista non riflette le aspirazioni sociali al cambiamento. Penso che siano troppo cauti. Penso che siano stati educati in un modo che li rende timorosi del radicalismo”.[18]

In assenza di un adeguato sostegno politico, settori del movimento sindacale hanno deciso di lanciare una campagna unitaria Enough is enough che sta riscuotendo un crescente successo nel Paese. Enough is enough” è stata lanciata dai settori più combattivi del mondo sindacale, in alleanza con le associazioni edilizie, i giovani e la sinistra del Labour, con l’idea che “loro agiscono nel loro interesse di classe, è ora che lo facciamo anche noi”. Per Zarah Sultana, deputata laburista di Coventry, “la crisi attuale è una crisi del costo della vita, è una crisi sociale per il lavoro, non una crisi per il capitale che continua a raccogliere profitti e distribuire milioni di dividendi. [È una crisi non perché non c’è abbastanza ricchezza, ma perché la ricchezza è monopolizzata da una piccola minoranza” (intervento all’incontro del 17 agosto 2022).

Enough is Enough” si batte per la convergenza delle lotte salariali in azioni di sciopero intersettoriali e sociali, con un riferimento esplicito all’unico sciopero generale britannico del 1926. La piattaforma difende l’adozione di misure di emergenza per proteggere il potere d’acquisto di fronte alla spirale inflazionistica (congelamento dei prezzi, adeguamento dei salari all’inflazione) e sostiene una tassa sui profitti in eccesso nel settore energetico. Con la continua pressione sociale, la leadership del TUC ha recentemente adottato una posizione a favore di azioni di sciopero coordinate, un fatto eccezionale per questa confederazione sindacale.

Sabato 1er ottobre, il primo giorno di sciopero congiunto di ferrovieri, postini e portuali è stato un successo. Un evento raro nel Regno Unito, che ha dato luogo a numerose manifestazioni di piazza. Altre giornate di sciopero sono già state annunciate per ottobre e novembre. È molto probabile che il settore pubblico o la sanità si uniscano al movimento, il che potrebbe destabilizzare il nuovo governo appena insediato e portare a elezioni anticipate. La leadership laburista sta adottando una posizione moderata, che in alcuni ambienti ricorda l’era di Antony Blair, alias “Tory”, ma la sinistra laburista e quella sindacale si stanno mobilitando per spingere verso misure di emergenza, spingendo gli editoriali del Guardian di centro-sinistra, del Times e del Telegraph di destra a dire che i sindacati sono ancora una volta “la principale forza di opposizione” nel Paese.

Questa opposizione sociale potrebbe trarre vantaggio da un governo diviso e un po’ caotico. Di recente, la crisi del Partito Conservatore ha preso una piega drammatica quando Liz Truss, appena salita al potere, ha approvato un bilancio che riduce le tasse sui gruppi più ricchi di 45 miliardi di sterline. Tuttavia, lo stesso governo ha deciso di fissare un tetto massimo per le bollette energetiche a 2.500 sterline all’anno, una misura che si prevede costerà tra i 70 e i 140 miliardi di sterline a seconda dell’andamento dei prezzi di base. Anche per il FMI, una simile politica è del tutto incoerente. Anche i mercati finanziari hanno disapprovato il pacchetto, provocando immediatamente una caduta della valuta britannica, che ha messo in pericolo i fondi pensione che traggono una parte considerevole del loro reddito dagli investimenti finanziari. Di fronte al rischio di un crollo del mercato azionario – simile a quello causato dal fallimento di Lehman Brothers nel 2008 – il governo è stato costretto a fare marcia indietro. Da parte sua, la Banca d’Inghilterra persiste nella sua politica anti-inflazionistica aumentando i tassi di riferimento, seguendo l’esempio della FED e della BCE. Questo non può che rendere il credito più costoso e causare il fallimento di un gran numero di aziende. La crisi energetica è lungi dall’essere risolta, anche perché la guerra in Ucraina è in fase di stallo. Anche se la misura di emergenza del tetto alle bollette è riuscita a fermare temporaneamente l’aumento dell’inflazione, se questa rimarrà al 10% ancora a lungo, è chiaro che l’impoverimento di interi strati della forza lavoro non resterà senza conseguenze.

Tuttavia, sul fronte politico, al momento in cui scriviamo, permane il caos. A metà ottobre, il ministro delle Finanze Kwasi Kwarteng è stato licenziato e sostituito da Jeremy Hunt, che ha cercato di saltare successivamente a Downing Street, l’unico modo per evitare elezioni anticipate. Purtroppo per lui, i Tories hanno eletto Rishi Sunak, un multimiliardario, come leader per assumere questa scomoda posizione.

La combinazione di mobilitazioni sociali e scioperi da un lato e caos politico dall’altro forma un vero e proprio cocktail esplosivo, al punto che l’Economist ha titolato la sua edizione del 18 ottobre come Welcome in Britaly. Il disordine all’interno della classe dirigente sta guadagnando terreno, poiché diventa difficile combinare il populismo di destra con la ragione economica neoliberista. 

4 – Almeno la fine di un lungo inverno sociale

Lo sciopero dei minatori del 1984-85 si è tradotto in una sconfitta storica per il movimento sindacale britannico. Questa sconfitta non solo ha demoralizzato i settori più combattivi del movimento sindacale, ma ha anche cambiato l’equilibrio generale del potere, facilitato da una feroce restrizione del diritto di sciopero attraverso una lunga lista di procedure restrittive. [19]. Queste restrizioni sono state recentemente rafforzate quando il governo di David Cameron ha imposto una soglia minima del 50% dell’elettorato e del 70% dei voti a favore delle azioni di sciopero nel 2016.

Questo cambiamento epocale potrebbe essere sintetizzato dicendo che il neoliberismo è riuscito a imporre una “pacificazione sociale forzata” e questo si può vedere nel crollo del numero di giornate individuali non lavorate (IDNW) dovute agli scioperi. Infatti, dopo aver raggiunto un picco di 30 milioni di giornate alla fine degli anni ’70, l’attività di sciopero è scesa a 5 milioni nel 1985, per poi ridursi a 150.000-300.000 IDNW all’anno negli anni ’90 e 2000. Ritroviamo questa nozione di pacificazione coercitiva nell’analisi di Dave Lyddon (2007, 2015), per il quale il neoliberismo esprime il costante desiderio di reprimere l’azione sindacale.

Il numero di giorni di sciopero per 1.000 dipendenti, che è un indicatore della densità sociale dell’attività di sciopero, conferma questo dato. Nel Regno Unito, dall’inizio degli anni 2000, la soglia di 50 giorni lavorativi persi per 1.000 dipendenti è stata superata molto raramente. A titolo di confronto, in altri Paesi come Belgio, Francia e Spagna, in anni di scioperi intersettoriali, si registrano picchi di 300-500 giorni di lavoro persi per 1.000 dipendenti, mentre in anni di “calma sociale” l’attività di sciopero si mantiene intorno agli 80-100 giorni di lavoro persi. Non è quindi esagerato affermare che il modello di governance neoliberale è riuscito a rendere l’attività di sciopero residuale e marginale.

Tuttavia, va sottolineato che i dati statistici britannici contano solo gli scioperi di oltre 20 dipendenti che durano almeno un’intera giornata. Ciò lascia da parte le interruzioni del lavoro, che storicamente rappresentano una modalità di azione privilegiata, al punto che questi micro-scioperi sono stati considerati una singolarità delle relazioni industriali britanniche.

A questo punto, è difficile prevedere cosa accadrà in seguito. D’altra parte, è possibile misurare il cambiamento d’epoca e dire che i conflitti sociali sono usciti da un lungo periodo di letargo. Il numero di giornate individuali non lavorate ha già superato i 2 milioni, il che dimostra che gli scioperi non sono più un tabù per i sindacati e che sono pronti a impegnarsi in conflitti sociali come quelli che abbiamo visto in passato.

Resta da vedere se il lungo ciclo di sconfitte e battute d’arresto sociali lascerà il posto a un nuovo ciclo offensivo con un accumulo di conquiste sociali. Questo ci riporta al dibattito dei primi anni Ottanta sull’esistenza di onde lunghe nella lotta di classe e sulla loro relazione con le onde lunghe nell’accumulazione del capitale. Il concetto di onde lunghe è stato introdotto da Nikolaj Kondratieff negli anni ’30 e rielaborato dall’economista marxista Ernest Mandel (Mandel, 1980; Kleinkecht, Mandel & Wallerstein, 1992). Essa postula l’esistenza di sequenze di lunghi periodi di rialzo e ribasso nel ciclo di accumulazione. Alla fine degli anni Settanta, alcuni hanno iniziato a cercare collegamenti tra le onde lunghe e le tendenze della conflittualità che potrebbero avere una relazione indiretta ma reale.

Anche se questo approccio è stato criticato da alcuni per la sua impossibile validazione empirica (Beverly Silver, 1980; 1991), altri, come John Kelly (1998), si sono ispirati ad esso per evidenziare che la conflittualità non solo mantiene una sorta di “dipendenza dal percorso”, ma che esistono anche realtà più strutturali che facilitano o ostacolano l’attività scioperante e, più in generale, gli scioperi. Naturalmente, queste determinanti strutturali si trovano tanto nell’infrastruttura (i rapporti sociali di produzione, il mercato del lavoro) quanto nella sovrastruttura (le regole e le norme, l’egemonia ideologica o la vitalità del movimento sindacale). Tralascerò la controversia sull’onda lunga perché richiede un’indagine adeguata in campo economico e in particolare sull’evoluzione della redditività. D’altra parte, seguendo le intuizioni di John Kelly, è certo che alcune coordinate infra e sovrastrutturali influenzano l’ampiezza e l’intensità degli scioperi e dei conflitti.

Nel caso della Gran Bretagna, il calo della disoccupazione al 3,5% gioca certamente a favore del ritorno del conflitto sociale. Certo, non si tratta ancora di “piena occupazione” (con molta precarietà), ma la domanda di lavoro si sta avvicinando all’offerta di lavoro, il che cambia la situazione dal punto di vista dei lavoratori. Per il CIDP, un centro di ricerca sulle risorse umane [20], in un recente rapporto, le aziende stanno incontrando crescenti difficoltà di assunzione. Secondo l’ultimo barometro dei dipartimenti delle risorse umane della scorsa primavera, sei aziende su dieci stanno affrontando difficoltà prolungate e sarebbero disposte ad aumentare il salario di assunzione per facilitare il reclutamento e rendere il lavoro più attraente.

Va notato che il calo della disoccupazione non è tanto il risultato della creazione netta di posti di lavoro quanto di un doppio cambiamento strutturale, ovvero l’invecchiamento della popolazione e la Brexit. Il primo è comune ad altri Paesi OCSE. La generazione del baby boom, nata tra il 1946 e il 1968, ha iniziato ad andare in pensione, lasciando un numero crescente di posti di lavoro vacanti. Secondo uno studio realizzato nel 2018 dal CEDEFOP (il Centro europeo per lo studio delle competenze e delle qualifiche), 9 posti di lavoro vacanti su 10 in Europa sono ora legati al pensionamento. L’ultimo rapporto sul Regno Unito lancia l’allarme sul rapido aumento del fabbisogno di manodopera. Secondo i calcoli del demografo Ilias Leanos, nel prossimo decennio sarà necessario assumere oltre 15 milioni di persone entro il 2030 nel solo Regno Unito. Anche se questa cifra è una sovrastima del fabbisogno di assunzioni (data la recessione in arrivo), la portata del bisogno è enorme, così come non è lontano dall’evocare un rinnovamento di oltre la metà della popolazione attiva. [21] !  Va inoltre notato che in questo insieme di posti vacanti, la metà riguarda lavoratori semi- o non qualificati. Da un paio d’anni, la carenza di manodopera si fa sentire pesantemente a tutti i livelli di competenza, il che migliora l’equilibrio sociale complessivo a favore dei lavoratori.

Un recente studio dell’Università di Oxford ha rilevato che la Brexit sta giocando un ruolo significativo nell’aumento della carenza di manodopera. [22] . Secondo gli autori dello studio, il sistema di immigrazione post-Brexit ha introdotto l’obbligo di visto per i cittadini dell’UE che in precedenza potevano svolgere qualsiasi lavoro. Ad oggi, a questa offerta di lavoro non è corrisposto l’accesso al mercato del lavoro per i cittadini extracomunitari. Di conseguenza, i lavori a basso salario che si basavano in larga misura sui lavoratori dell’UE non sono più ammissibili ai visti di lavoro. [23] . Indirettamente, la Brexit ha contribuito all’inaridimento del bacino di reclutamento per una serie di lavori nella fascia bassa e media dello spettro di competenze.

Oltre a questi aspetti strutturali legati allo stato del mercato del lavoro, stiamo assistendo anche a un ritorno al “collettivismo”. Questo concetto farà sorridere alcuni – ma non ha nulla a che vedere con il modello sovietico – e porta solo a non limitare l’analisi a un aumento dell’individualismo. Anche se la nozione di collettivismo è assente dalla maggior parte dell’analisi sociologica francofona delle relazioni industriali [24], non è priva di rilevanza poiché ci permette di interrogarci sulla disponibilità a un impegno collettivo, sia esso l’iscrizione al sindacato o l’impegno allo sciopero. Per John Kelly (Rethinking Industrial relations, 1998), il “collettivismo” fa parte della teoria della mobilitazione e si basa su un sentimento di ingiustizia condiviso e sulla convinzione che sia possibile migliorare la propria condizione sociale su base collettiva. Non si tratta quindi di agire solo nell’interesse di se stessi, ma di esprimere anche la consapevolezza che agire insieme può dare risultati migliori rispetto all’essere un “free rider”, anche in modo olsoniano.

A questo proposito, diversi fatti indicano che il collettivismo si riferisce a un processo molecolare di solidarietà reciproca che precede il conflitto sociale. Gli scioperi spontanei di Amazon – che fanno parte di una vertenza non sindacalizzata – indicano che da tempo si stava accumulando un profondo risentimento. Il risentimento e la rabbia sono alimentati da un senso di ingiustizia che si diffonde e finisce per esprimersi in un’interruzione del lavoro.

Oltre a questa specificità dello sciopero selvaggio, è importante sottolineare come la composizione sociale molto eterogenea della classe operaia non abbia in alcun modo ostacolato la mobilitazione. Nel centro Amazon Fullfilment di Tilbury, la maggioranza dei lavoratori ha meno di quarant’anni, un terzo sono donne e più della metà sono “non bianchi” o di origine straniera. La ‘varietà di esperienze e condizioni soggettive’ non ha impedito il coagularsi della rabbia verso l’azione collettiva. Non è sempre così e quindi vale la pena di sottolinearlo. Anche altri settori in sciopero, come le poste o le ferrovie, sono caratterizzati da diversità in termini di genere e identità culturale. Tuttavia, gli scioperi dimostrano, con il loro carattere di maggioranza assoluta, che l’eterogeneità non è più un ostacolo.

Mick Lynch lo conferma a modo suo quando spiega che le questioni di identità, genere, razzializzazione o orientamento sessuale possono essere “articolate alla lotta di classe”. Quest’ultima rimane un fattore unificante, ma a condizione che si combattano anche il razzismo e il sessismo (intervista a Jacobin).  In altre parole, le identità strutturate intorno alle lotte contro specifiche oppressioni hanno un posto nel movimento sindacale. Questo accade da molto tempo, dato che i sindacati britannici hanno applicato il principio dell’auto-organizzazione per gruppi specifici come i neri e le persone di colore, gli asiatici, le donne e le persone LGBT sin dagli anni ’90. È comprensibile che un terzo dei membri della RMT nella metropolitana di Londra appartenga a minoranze razziali. Più in generale, secondo le statistiche governative, la percentuale di dipendenti sindacalizzati è più alta tra i lavoratori “neri e britannici di colore” (26,9%), seguiti dai lavoratori classificati come “misti” (24,1%) e “bianchi” (24%). Nel complesso, il TUC conta più donne che uomini.

Il collettivismo si esprime anche nelle “zone grigie” del mercato del lavoro, dalla parte dei lavoratori ambulanti, con l’emergere di azioni proto-sindacali da parte dei lavoratori delle piattaforme che hanno iniziato a formare una moltitudine di collettivi d’azione. A volte questi collettivi diventano parte di nuovi sindacati, come l’Independent Workers Union of Great Britain, fondata nel 2012 da un collettivo di lavoratori delle pulizie tutti di origine latinoamericana. Gli studi sociologici (Gandini, 2018; Cini, 2022) su queste mobilitazioni osservano una serie di caratteristiche comuni: il rifiuto del cottimo e dello status di lavoratore autonomo, il desiderio di beneficiare della protezione sociale e le dinamiche di mobilitazione basate sulla comunità. La maggior parte di queste strutture collettive combina la mobilitazione e l’azione legale o giudiziaria, ottenendo un’importante vittoria che comincia a costituire un precedente.

La decisione della Corte Suprema del Regno Unito del febbraio 2021 ritiene che gli autisti di Uber debbano essere trattati come lavoratori e non come contraenti indipendenti. Questa decisione unanime dovrebbe avere un impatto significativo sulle aziende della piattaforma, in quanto gli autisti hanno diritto a prestazioni quali il pagamento delle ferie, il salario minimo e una pensione integrativa. Il motivo è semplice: Uber impone tariffe e percorsi senza alcuna negoziazione e impone un regime disciplinare agli autisti in base alle loro valutazioni. Il tribunale, respingendo la prassi consolidata di Uber di trattare i suoi autisti come contraenti indipendenti, ha anche stabilito che gli oltre 70.000 autisti dell’azienda nel Regno Unito dovranno essere pagati per le ore in cui sono collegati all’app Uber, indipendentemente dalla domanda di trasporto.

Dopo questa sentenza, sono stati portati in tribunale diversi casi simili (idraulici di Pimlico, addetti alle consegne di CitySprint ed Excel Services, addetti alle consegne di Bolt) e tutti hanno portato alla conferma della sentenza nel caso degli autisti di Uber. [25] . In termini di status, è interessante notare che le mobilitazioni che combinano azione diretta e azione legale stanno facendo progressi verso il riconoscimento dello status ibrido di “lavoratori limb (b)”, che non sono né freelance né lavoratori autonomi né dipendenti e integrati nella forza lavoro nel senso classico del termine, ma lavoratori dipendenti a cui l’azienda deve pagare il salario orario minimo finché sono collegati dalla loro applicazione, oltre alla protezione sociale e ai giorni di riposo [26] .

In definitiva, è certamente ancora troppo presto per convalidare l’ipotesi di un nuovo ciclo di lotte offensive, ma gli esempi di mobilitazioni si moltiplicano e i varchi si aprono qua e là. Il calo della disoccupazione dovrebbe continuare per ragioni strutturali e la rinascita del collettivismo sta contribuendo a rivitalizzare l’azione sindacale.

5 – Riflessioni conclusive

In primo luogo, è chiaro che il potere d’acquisto, già dimezzato dopo la pandemia, è diventato una questione centrale per i lavoratori di tutti i settori. Il decennio 2009-2019 è stato caratterizzato da una stagnazione salariale, che non è più accettabile in un contesto inflazionistico. La razionalizzazione del processo lavorativo ha portato a un deterioramento delle condizioni di lavoro, che a sua volta ha alimentato la sensazione che lo sforzo debba continuare ad aumentare anche se è sempre meno ben pagato. Il forte calo del potere d’acquisto nella primavera del 2022 è solo un’altra goccia in un vaso che stava per traboccare. Quando il senso di ingiustizia latente è ampiamente condiviso, non ci vuole molto – come l’annuncio di profitti record – perché si trasformi in uno spirito di rivolta. La convinzione che lo sciopero sia necessario è diventata in breve tempo un’idea ampiamente condivisa.

La seconda constatazione è che gli ostacoli normativi all’azione di sciopero sono tutt’altro che insormontabili. Tuttavia, per riuscire a superare la soglia di approvazione, il sindacato deve necessariamente convincere la maggioranza dei lavoratori che l’azione di sciopero è giustificata e che può apportare miglioramenti sostanziali. Per riuscire in una campagna di questo tipo – comunemente chiamata “campagna di sciopero” – è necessario mobilitare l’intero apparato sindacale, i rappresentanti, pubblicare volantini, inviare e-mail e infine inviare sms a tutti i lavoratori. È significativo che sindacati combattivi come CWU, RMT, Unite o PCS lo stiano facendo tanto quanto i sindacati più moderati (Unison, GMB). Ciò indica che la “base” sindacale e, più in generale, i lavoratori sono esasperati dalla perdita di potere d’acquisto dopo un lungo periodo di moderazione salariale. I dirigenti sindacali sono in sintonia con questo sentimento e comprendono che una situazione del genere è insostenibile. Ma in quanto sindacalisti, sentono anche che il movimento sindacale può prendersi una rivincita dopo anni, se non decenni, di sconfitte e concessioni. Questo è ciò che dice Mick Lynch quando annuncia che la classe operaia è tornata.

In terzo luogo, i sindacati, anche se limitati nel loro raggio d’azione, rimangono istituzioni potenti. Negli anni ’70 i sindacati contavano quasi 13 milioni di iscritti. Dagli anni ’80 in poi, hanno perso costantemente iscritti fino a raggiungere i 6,5 milioni, ma dal 2015 almeno 100.000 lavoratori hanno deciso di iscriversi ogni anno. La maggior parte di questi nuovi iscritti sono donne, giovani, persone di recente immigrazione, neri, asiatici e di colore. Ciò riflette la consapevolezza collettiva che il sindacato è uno strumento indispensabile per difendere i propri diritti e interessi. Allo stesso tempo, questo processo riflette la ricomposizione sociale della classe operaia. Se il Labour ha molti problemi a mobilitare il suo elettorato tradizionale, i sindacati hanno mantenuto una base molto ampia, costituendo così l’istituzione centrale di una classe operaia che, in settori importanti, esprime nuovamente la propria esistenza “per se stessa”, in particolare attraverso questi conflitti.

In quarto luogo, il dialogo sociale non è molto istituzionalizzato, il che pone al centro del campo di gioco i sindacati stessi, o addirittura i lavoratori stessi (Amazon), piuttosto che gli organi istituzionali e la distribuzione dei mandati, come invece avviene in Francia. Come è stato sottolineato all’inizio di questo articolo, il modello britannico di contrattazione collettiva non favorisce in alcun modo il “dialogo sociale”. Dato che le relazioni tra datori di lavoro e sindacati si svolgono quasi su base volontaria, con il cosiddetto sistema del “canale unico”, non c’è molta produzione normativa o contrattuale. Di conseguenza, la copertura dei contratti collettivi è dolorosamente bassa, pari al 30%, tra i livelli più bassi dei Paesi occidentali. Anche quando un sindacato è riconosciuto e svolge il ruolo previsto altrove dalle istituzioni di rappresentanza dei lavoratori, il datore di lavoro può accettare o meno di negoziare. Questo “vuoto” istituzionale può anche alimentare il conflitto sociale, in quanto il rifiuto dei datori di lavoro di concedere miglioramenti, a sua volta, può rafforzare la sensazione di ingiustizia e rendere i lavoratori ricettivi all’idea di una vertenza aperta. L’informazione e la consultazione avvengono a discrezione del datore di lavoro. Questa situazione deleteria ha portato il movimento sindacale a riorganizzarsi, a condurre campagne di tesseramento ispirate al modello americano di “organizzazione”. [27] . A livello di sindacati membri del TUC, diversi sindacati si sono riuniti sotto la bandiera di Unite e del GMB. [28] (settore pubblico e privato), mentre diversi sindacati si sono fusi insieme nel settore pubblico (Unison). La leader di Unite, Sharon Graham, sta adottando un approccio molto più antagonista alle relazioni industriali, organizzando anche coalizioni intersettoriali a livello locale.

Il fatto che il conflitto sociale stia tornando in modo così massiccio e tumultuoso dopo quattro decenni di pacificazione forzata non spiega ancora questo fenomeno. Per progredire in questa direzione, dovremo anche tracciare un bilancio approfondito del neoliberismo britannico e mettere in discussione la persistenza di un antagonismo strutturale tra capitale e lavoro. Lo farò in due prossimi articoli: il primo sugli splendori e le miserie del neoliberismo; il secondo sulla profondità delle divisioni e degli antagonismi di classe.

 

Siti web con informazioni di base

Notes From Below (con molti resoconti di prima mano)

Tribune Magazine

Socialist Worker

Socialist Appeal

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  • Mandel, Ernest (1995), Onde lunghe dello sviluppo capitalistico: Un’interpretazione marxista, Verso, 184p.
  • Milkman, Ruth; Bloom Joshua; Narro, Victor (2010), Working for Justice: The L.A. Model of Organizing and Advocacy, Cornell University press, 312p.
  • Ravier, Jean-Pierre (1981), Les syndicats britanniques sous les gouvernements travaillistes (1945-1970), Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 278p.
  • Segrestin, Denis (1980), “Les communautés pertinentes de l’action collective : canevas pour l’étude des fondements sociaux des conflits du travail en France “, in Revue française de sociologie, Année 1980, n°21-2, pp. 171-202
  • Silver, Beverly J. (1991), “De klassenstrijd en de kondratieff”, in Vlaams Marxistisch Tijdschrijft, 25ème année, n°1, pp. 42-66.
  • Sumption, Madeleine ; Forde, Chris ; Alberti, Gabriella & Walsh, Peter (2022), How is the End of Free Movement Affecting the Low-wage Labour Force in the UK?, The Migration Observatory COMPAS (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society), University of Oxford.
  • Thompson, Edward Palmer (1980) The Making of the English Working Class Londra: Victor Gollancz (1963); terza edizione.
  • Woodcock, Jamie (2021), The Fight Against Platform Capitalism: An Inquiry into the Global Struggles of the Gig Economy, University of Westminster Press, Londra, 126p.

 

Note

[1] La Gran Bretagna comprende Inghilterra, Scozia e Galles; il Regno Unito include anche l’Irlanda del Nord. Poiché le azioni di sciopero in Irlanda del Nord sono state meno numerose, preferisco chiamarla Gran Bretagna. Allo stesso tempo, dal punto di vista politico, l’entità principale rimane il Regno Unito.

[2] Questa espressione riecheggia l’inverno del malcontento del 1978-1979, durante il quale un’ondata di scioperi aveva messo in difficoltà il governo laburista. Cfr. Marc Lenormand, L'” hiver du mécontentement ” de 1978-1979 : du mythe politique à la crise interne du mouvement travailliste, in Revue française de civilisation britannique, XXII- hors-série | 2017, https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1683

[3] In altri Paesi con un “sistema duale”, come la Germania, ci sono sia gli IORP, come il Betriebsrät (consiglio di fabbrica, simile al CE, ora CSE), sia i Vertrauwensleute (persone di fiducia), eletti su una lista sindacale. Questo è noto come “doppio canale di rappresentanza”.

[4]Il Chartismo è un’espressione politica del nascente movimento operaio sviluppatosi a metà del XIX secolo in seguito all’adozione della Carta del Popolo. L’imposizione di un sistema elettorale censitario aveva escluso la classe operaia dalla democrazia parlamentare. La Carta del Popolo fu adottata nel 1838 e chiedeva il suffragio universale maschile, la delimitazione equa dei collegi elettorali, l’abolizione della proprietà come condizione di eleggibilità, elezioni parlamentari annuali e il voto segreto. Il movimento rimase attivo fino al 1848 e diede vita a casse di mutuo soccorso, cooperative e al primo movimento sindacale. EP Thompson; Jacques Carré, La Grande-Bretagne au 19ème siècle, Parigi, 1997, 160 p.

[5] I datori di lavoro e i dipendenti si trovano di fronte a una “grande compressione dei costi” perché il sostegno del governo non riesce a sollevare una pressione sufficiente, dicono i dirigenti, 22 aprile, cfr. www.managers.org

[6] Unite Investiga: Il profitto delle imprese e la crisi del costo della vita. Rapporto commissionato da Sharon Graham, giugno 2022, mimeo, 28p.

[7] La nozione di profitti in eccesso si riferisce ai profitti che si aggiungono a quelli già realizzati, per cause esterne al mercato, come ad esempio una guerra. Ma non c’è consenso su questa definizione. Da parte mia, preferisco le nozioni di profitto e di rendita (rendita grazie a posizioni dominanti sul mercato o rendita speculativa).

[8] Jonathan Bradshaw, Università di York, “Fuel Poverty: Estimates for the UK”, disponibile qui; si veda anche https://www.york.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/2022/research/fuel-poverty-uk/.

[9] https://aslef.org.uk/

[10] Associazione del personale retribuito dei trasporti, https://www.tssa.org.uk/

[11] Il 71% dei lavoratori ha partecipato al voto e di questi l’89% si è espresso a favore dello sciopero. https://www.rmt.org.uk/news/rmt-declares-overwhelming-mandate-for-national-strike-action-on/

[12] Si veda in particolare https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/uk-news/mick-lynch-rmt-rail-strike-poll-b2113181.html

[13] https://www.rmt.org.uk/news/rmt-on-opinium-poll/ La maggioranza dei giovani e degli utenti dei trasporti li sostiene, ma gli anziani (over 50) o i residenti delle aree rurali tendono ad opporsi. Sebbene quasi il 70% degli elettori laburisti si esprima a favore degli scioperi ferroviari, Keir Starmer, leader laburista di centro-sinistra succeduto a Jeremy Corbyn, ritiene che il Partito laburista debba rimanere neutrale prima di tutto, il che gli consente di invitare i parlamentari laburisti a non partecipare ai picchetti. Si veda Katherine Swindells, “Where does public opinion stand on the rail strikes?, Younger are far more likely than older people to support striking train workers”, in New Statesman https://www.newstatesman.com/chart-of-the-day/2022/07/public-opinion-stand-on-rail-strikes.

[14] Ci vogliono 100 penny per fare una sterlina.

[15] In inglese, questi scioperi spontanei sono chiamati wildcat strikes, in riferimento alle azioni di sciopero non annunciate dagli attivisti dell’Industrial Workers of the World, un’organizzazione sindacale rivoluzionaria degli Stati Uniti. Questi scioperi avevano lo scopo di interrompere la produzione per protestare contro le decisioni dei dirigenti. In questo caso, si tratta di scioperi che non seguono le normali procedure che portano allo sciopero (consultazione e preavviso).

[16] Nel 2001, Amazon ha deciso di contrastare una campagna per il riconoscimento del sindacato cacciando alcuni membri del sindacato e concedendo un aumento di stipendio del 10%. Di conseguenza, il sindacato ha ricevuto decine di lettere di dimissioni e ha subito una dolorosa battuta d’arresto, con l’80% dei lavoratori che ha votato contro il riconoscimento del sindacato.

[17] Per una panoramica dei risultati per il 2021, si veda https://www.internationaldistributionsservices.com/media/11687/royal-mail-plc-fy-2021-22-results-19-5-22.pdf.

[18] Cfr. Jacobin, 10 giugno 2022, https://jacobin.com/2022/10/mick-lynch-profile-rmt-general-secretary-strikes )

[19]. Mathilde Bertrand, Cornelius Crowley, Thierry Labica, C’est ici que notre défaite a commencé. La grève des mineurs britanniques(1984-1985), ed. Syllepse, 2016.

[20] https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/latest-research

[21] Ilias Leanos, Cedefop, Skills forecast United Kingdom, cfr. https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/files/cedefop_skills_forecast_2018_-_united_kingdom_0.pdf Oltre all’analisi più globale del mercato del lavoro post-pandemia https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/news/baby-boomers-retiring-wake-pandemic

[22] https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/how-is-the-end-of-free-movement-affecting-the-low-wage-labour-force-in-the-uk/

[23] Madeleine Sumption, Chris Forde, Gabriella Alberti e Peter Walsh (2022), How is the End of Free Movement Affecting the Low-wage Labour Force in the UK? first report, 15 AUG 2022, The Migration Observatory COMPAS (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society), University of Oxford.

[24] – In Francia, questo “collettivismo” è dato per scontato, oppure è assente, sulla base di un’analisi che constata l’atomizzazione dei collettivi di lavoro, l’onnipresenza del consenso e della servitù, della docilità e della fedeltà. Esiste tuttavia la possibilità di pensare le cose in modo più dialettico, mobilitando, ad esempio, la nozione di resistenza sul lavoro o quella di “comunità rilevanti di azione collettiva” proposta da Denis Segrestin (1980). Si veda S. Bouquin (2020), Bellanger e Thuderoz (2012) o, sul tema dell’azione collettiva, D. Segrestin (1980).

[25] https://scesolicitors.co.uk/news/update-on-gig-economy-case-law-and-developments

[26] Ai sensi dell’articolo 230 dell’Employment Relations Act 1996, un lavoratore è definito come un individuo che ha stipulato o sta lavorando in base a (a) un contratto di lavoro o (b) qualsiasi altro contratto, esplicito o implicito, orale o scritto, con il quale l’individuo si impegna personalmente a svolgere o eseguire lavori o servizi per un’altra parte del contratto il cui status non è, in virtù del contratto, quello di un cliente di una professione o di un’attività commerciale svolta dall’individuo. Le persone che non sono dipendenti, ma che soddisfano i requisiti del paragrafo (b) di cui sopra, sono a volte indicate come lavoratori di categoria (b). Vedi anche https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/19/uber-drivers-workers-uk-supreme-court-rules-rights

[27] L’organizing è una nuova pratica sindacale emersa negli Stati Uniti all’inizio degli anni Duemila, che mira a conquistare settori di lavoratori di un’azienda con un voto a maggioranza a favore del riconoscimento del ruolo di interlocutore. Oggi è criticato per il suo approccio molto istituzionalista, e alcuni lo contrappongono al modello del deep organizing, che si riferisce all’azione in profondità basata sulla costituzione di reti semiclandestine, ispirata in particolare all’IWW. Si veda Milkman R., Bloom J., Narro V. (2010), Working for Justice: The L.A. Model of Organizing and Advocacy.

[28] Unite the Union, nato dalla fusione di Amicus e TGWU, organizza un maggior numero di lavoratori nei settori dell’industria, della logistica e delle costruzioni. Ha 1,2 milioni di iscritti; il GMB, ex sindacato generale, municipale, dei calderai e degli alleati, ha 640.000 iscritti impiegati nell’industria, nella vendita al dettaglio, nella sicurezza, nelle scuole, nella distribuzione, nei servizi pubblici, nei servizi sociali, nel Servizio sanitario nazionale (NHS), nei servizi di ambulanza e nelle amministrazioni locali.

 

Strikes in France: Between strong social eruptions and a weak tradition of collective bargaining

In both international literature and in popular belief, France retains the image of a country in which a high level of social conflict1 has always existed. Can France be said to be the country of strikes and social conflict, or even class struggle par excellence? Many might be temped to answer in the affirmative. At the outset we need to underline that this representation is fed by a history of large-scale mobilizations of the population onto the streets to demonstrate against government measures in ‘social explosions’ which are all the more remarkable given the historically low level of unionization. This representation is at times nourished even in trade union circles, which bemoan the existence of a ‘culture of conflict and opposition’ and envy other European, in particular Scandinavian, countries for their ‘culture of social dialogue’. This vision strikes us, however, as a departure from reality. We will therefore begin by reminding our readers of certain aspects that are often neglected in the standard representations. This will enable us to better analyse the particularities of the French situation in terms both of trade union activity and of strikes. We will then look more closely at the evolution of strike activity and, beyond this, of social conflict. Finally we will conclude by examining the present situation and possible future trends.

The book chapter (pdf) can be downloaded here 

“Strikes around the World (1968-2005). Case-studies from 15 countries” was edited by Sjaak van der Velden, Heiner Dribbush, Dave Lyddon and Kurt Vandeaele, published in 2007 by Aksant (Amsterdam)

Coupe du monde: quand surexploitation, pétrodollars et grand spectacle font bon ménage

Le coup d’envoi a été donné. Plus d’un million de supporters sont attendus pour assister aux matchs de l’édition 2022 de la Coupe du monde. Des centaines de vols sont programmés chaque jour. Tous ces supporters résideront dans des hôtels flambant neufs et prendront place dans des stades entièrement climatisés, construits par des centaines de milliers de travailleurs migrants.

En 2010, la Fifa a décidé, par un vote de 14 voix contre 8, d’attribuer au Qatar l’organisation de la Coupe du monde de football 2022. Cette décision – que l’ancien dirigeant de la Fifa Sepp Blatter regrette – a été arrachée grâce à une opération de corruption de grande envergure. En 2011, Jack Warner, vice-président de la Fifa, a publié des preuves que le Qatar avait versé 5 millions de dollars à des dirigeants de la Fifa, en échange de leur soutien à la candidature de Doha. Le média Qatari Al Jazeera aurait fait don de 880 millions de dollars à la Fifa.

 Les médias ont amplement commenté l’impact écologique désastreux, les stades air-conditionnés les pelouses arrosées avec de l’eau désalinisée (10 000 litres par terrain par jour), sans oublier les centaines de vols quotidien, les millions de mettre cube de béton et d’hectolitres de gasoil utilisés pour ériger les infrastructures. Que le Qatar soit un pays notoirement répressif à l’égard des droits des femmes, des LGBTQ+ ou tout simplement des droits syndicaux est également dénoncé à juste titre. Mais le coût social et humain de cette coupe de monde est sans commune mesure.

L’enfer du travail forcé

Depuis plusieurs années, le Qatar est au centre d’une polémique à propos de la maltraitance des travailleurs migrants. Si les conditions de travail sont déplorables et les salaires misérables, ce sont surtout les 6 500 décès, un chiffre absolument ahurissant, qui fait scandale.

Sept nouveaux stades ont été construits, ainsi qu’un nouvel aéroport, plusieurs lignes de métro, un système routier et plus d’une centaine d’hôtels. En réalité, c’est une ville entièrement nouvelle qui a été édifiée de toutes pièces en quelques années. Le coût de l’opération dépasse les 200 milliards de dollars, là où la Coupe du monde en Russie (2018) avait coûté 18 milliards de dollars et celle du Brésil, 19 milliards de dollars.

Pour organiser cette Coupe du monde, il fallait bien construire des infrastructures capables d’accueillir, pour quelques semaines, plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes. Or le Qatar, qui est un petit pays (11 600 km2), ne compte que 350 000 habitants mais près de 3 millions d’étrangers, essentiellement des travailleurs migrants. Parmi eux, plus d’un million a travaillé dans le secteur du bâtiment et environ 200 000 sont à l’œuvre comme travailleuses domestiques.

La plupart des travailleurs migrants sont originaires du Bangladesh, du Népal, de l’Inde ainsi que du Kenya et des Philippines. Selon une enquête publiée par The Guardian (21/02/2021) au moins 6 500 travailleurs y sont décédés au cours des dix dernières années, soit une moyenne de 12 morts par semaine[1]. Ces chiffres sont basés sur les décès répertoriés par les ambassades des principaux pays pourvoyeurs de main-d’œuvre. Plusieurs ambassades, dont celle du Kenya et des Philippines, ont refusé de transmettre des informations, ce qui suggère que le nombre de décès serait certainement supérieur…

Le Bureau international du travail (BIT) et la Confédération européenne des syndicats (CES) indiquaient que, en 2021, plus de 50 travailleurs sont décédés et plus de 30 000 ont été blessés au cours d’accidents survenus pendant leur travail. Pour le gouvernement qatari, seuls 34 travailleurs seraient morts sur les chantiers. C’est possible, mais les chiffres officiels n’intègrent ni les décès par infarctus, ni les suicides, ni ceux liés aux conditions de vie. La vague de travailleurs qui se sont suicidés une fois qu’ils ont constaté qu’il leur était impossible d’envoyer de l’argent à leur famille reste hors champ. Pour obtenir une place sur un chantier au Qatar, les travailleurs doivent soudoyer les recruteurs et verser de 2 000 à 4 000 dollars. Après leur arrivée au Qatar, leur maigre salaire est réduit de moitié par les recruteurs qui remboursent le prêt concédé aux candidats. On a relevé également plusieurs incendies dans les dortoirs ayant entraîné la mort par asphyxie. Dans un autre cas, des pluies torrentielles ont provoqué des inondations et l’électrocution des résidants. En Inde, des familles de défunts ont formé des collectifs pour éclaircir les raisons du décès des membres de leur famille.

Citons un cas emblématique : Madhu Bollapally, 43 ans, a laissé sa femme Latha et son fils Rajesh, 13 ans, en Inde, pour un emploi au Qatar en 2013. Ils ne l’ont jamais revu. Une nuit de fin 2019, lorsque son colocataire est rentré dans le dortoir, il a trouvé le corps de Bollapally sur le sol. Comme des milliers d’autres décès soudains et inexpliqués, son décès a été enregistré comme étant dû à une insuffisance cardiaque pour causes naturelles. Bien qu’il ait travaillé pour son employeur pendant six ans, sa femme et son fils n’ont reçu que 114 000 roupies (1 120 livres sterling) en compensation et en salaire non versé. Rajesh n’a aucune idée de la raison du décès de son père. « Il n’avait aucun problème de santé, a-t-il déclaré. Il n’y avait rien d’anormal chez lui. » (The Guardian, 21/02/2021.)

Selon les données obtenues par l’équipe de journalistes, 69 % des décès des travailleurs indiens, népalais et bangladais sont classés comme naturels. Chez les travailleurs Indiens, ce taux atteint 80 %. En 2016, une enquête d’Amnesty International[2] révélait que des centaines de milliers de travailleurs continuaient à travailler dans des conditions extrêmes : 10 heures par jour même à 45 °C à l’ombre, sans nécessairement être pourvus de façon suffisante en eau potable. A la suite de ces divulgations, le gouvernement a décidé d’interdire le travail en extérieur de 11 h 30 à 15 h pendant les mois de juin à août. Mais cela n’empêchait nullement la poursuite du travail à l’intérieur, avec des températures toujours très élevées [3].

Faut-il s’étonner que les décès par infarctus, considérés comme « naturels », frappent des jeunes travailleurs de moins de 30 ans ? Selon l’OMS, le seuil maximal de WGBT (wet-bulb globe temperature, indice tenant compte de l’humidité et de la température de l’air) serait de 28 °C. Au-delà de ce seuil, le corps humain est sévèrement menacé par un stress thermique lorsque les durées d’exposition dépassent 15 minutes toutes les heures.

Même si le Qatar a ratifié les six conventions de base du BIT, comme l’interdiction du travail forcé et l’obligation de mettre en place un service d’inspection du travail, la réalité est toute autre. Jusqu’en 2020, les travailleurs avaient besoin d’une autorisation de leur employeur pour pouvoir quitter le pays ou changer d’employeur. A l’instar d’autres pays du golfe Persique, le Qatar appliquait jusqu’il y a très récemment le système kafala. La « kafala » rend l’employeur « responsable » du travailleur étranger recruté (suprême ironie, il est considéré comme son « parrain »). C’est donc l’employeur qui détermine les entrées et sorties du territoire, qui garde le passeport et qui assure la fourniture d’un logement pour lequel il est autorisé à retenir des frais d’entretien.

En 2020, l’ONG Human Right Watch publiait un rapport d’enquête sur les conditions de travail du pays. Autour de Doha, des centaines de milliers de travailleurs migrants ont vécu dans des baraquements sans isolation, avec la possibilité de prendre seulement deux douches par semaine, en travaillant 6 jours sur 7, en général 12 heures par jour. Attirés par la promesse d’être payés 350 dollars par mois, en réalité ils n’en touchent que 250, après déduction des frais d’entretien que l’employeur avance.

« Les conclusions de ce rapport montrent que dans tout le Qatar, les employeurs, ainsi que les sociétés pourvoyeuses de main-d’œuvre, retardent, retiennent ou déduisent arbitrairement les salaires des travailleurs. Les employeurs retiennent souvent le paiement des heures supplémentaires garanties par contrat et les indemnités de fin de service, et ils violent régulièrement leurs contrats avec les travailleurs migrants en toute impunité. Dans les cas les plus graves, les travailleurs ont confié à Human Rights Watch que les employeurs avaient tout simplement cessé de leur verser leur salaire, et qu’ils avaient alors du mal à se nourrir. Traduire les employeurs et leurs entreprises devant le les comités de résolution des conflits du travail [mis sur pied en 2018, NDLR] est difficile, coûteux, long, inefficace et peut souvent entraîner des représailles. Les travailleurs décrivent l’action en justice comme un ‘catch 22’, – un dilemme car ils seront endettés qu’ils introduisent une procédure ou pas. »

Plus de 18 millions de travailleurs migrants des pays du Golfe seraient encore soumis au système Kafala. A la suite de résolutions votées au Parlement européen, des missions d’enquête de la Commission des droits de l’homme de l’ONU, le Qatar a néanmoins commencé à modifier ses réglementations en matière de droit du travail[4]. Mais procéder ainsi au moment où les chantiers s’achèvent relève avant tout d’une grande hypocrisie.

Ainsi, depuis 2021, les travailleurs ont théoriquement le droit d’adhérer à un syndicat, sauf qu’il n’en existe pas. Lorsqu’ils quittent leur employeur au cours de la première année après leur recrutement, l’employeur suivant a l’obligation de rembourser les frais de formation au précédent. Fait unique dans le golfe Persique, le Qatar a introduit un salaire minimal de 1 000 riyals (274 dollars), une somme dérisoire quand on sait qu’un grand nombre de travailleurs migrants financent leur recrutement, et qu’il leur faut au minimum un an pour rembourser les sommes dues. De fait, la fixation contrainte de la main-d’œuvre demeure la norme en vigueur. Ce régime de travail forcé s’appuie également sur le système de « dortoirs » tandis que le retard systématiquement dans les arriérés de paiement des salaires permet de d’enfermer les travailleurs dans la servitude.

Les pétrodollars ont trouvé leur paradis artificiel

Faut-il le rappeler, le foot est un business qui rapporte tellement d’argent que le nombre de clubs rachetés par des investisseurs du golfe Persique, des oligarques (avant la guerre en Ukraine) ou des multimillionnaires se comptent désormais par dizaines en Europe. Pour le Qatar, la Coupe du monde est une bénédiction qui ne peut que consolider les sommes astronomiques investies dans le secteur du football. Outre le PSG et le FB Barcelone, propriété de la famille Qatari Nasser Al-Khelaïfi, il ne faut pas oublier le Manchester City, Newcastle, Aston Villa et Sheffield qui sont tombés dans l’escarcelle d’investisseurs d’Arabie saoudite, des Émirats arabes unis ou d’Égypte.

En dépit d’une perte totale des recettes de la vente de places pour les matchs de la saison 2020-2021, le marché européen du football a connu une croissance de 10 % de ses recettes et atteint désormais la somme astronomique de 27,6 milliards d’euros. Dans son rapport annuel sur les finances du foot, Deloitte observe que, au cours de la saison 2020-2021, malgré la fermeture des stades, le revenu moyen par club de Premier League a dépassé, pour la quatrième fois, le montant de l’année précédente. Avec un chiffre d’affaires total de 5 milliards de livres sterling, en hausse de plus de 2 400 % par rapport à la moyenne des années 1990, le foot est un business qui coûte peu par rapport à ce qu’il rapporte. Et les perspectives sont radieuses puisque les revenus des clubs de Premier League devraient dépasser les 6 milliards de livres sterling lors de la saison 2022-2023, notamment grâce aux nouveaux accords de diffusion et au retour à des stades complets.

Le football féminin commence à peine à se développer et suscite déjà un engouement du côté des investisseurs. Les prévisions pour la Coupe du monde sont tout aussi mirobolantes. Elle devrait rapporter au minimum 5 milliards de dollars, dont 3 milliards rien qu’en de droits de retransmission. Le solde devrait être pourvu grâce aux revenus publicitaires et à la vente des billets d’entrée. Il faut savoir qu’une place sur les gradins à l’arrière coûte déjà 250 euros tandis que qu’une place pour la finale vaut près du triple. Faites le calcul vous-même : 32 matchs avec une assistance moyenne de 40 000 spectateurs multipliés par 250 euros…

Le sport-spectacle, quintessence de l’aliénation ?

Il est n’est sans doute pas inutile d’opérer un retour aux sources de la critique du sport comme phénomène politique, idéologique et économique. Sur ce plan, on peut difficilement laisser de côté la contribution de Jean-Marie Brohm, sociologue émérite de l’université de Montpellier. Pour Brohm, le sport-spectacle est à la fois une arme idéologique, un mode de gouvernance politique et une activité extrêmement profitable sur le plan économique. Au niveau idéologique, le sport permet de reconstituer le corps sur des bases capitalistes : en travaillant les gestes, les mouvements, l’agilité et la dextérité, le sport mobilise les corps et les esprits dans une logique compétitive, en valorisant l’excellence, par l’entraînement, le renoncement. Quelle que soit la discipline sportive, la compétition devient le mode de sélection et de hiérarchisation, du local au global. Pour Brohm, le sport-spectacle capitaliste se représente comme un « apaiseur social », comme un « intégrateur social » qui réduirait la violence et canaliserait les pulsions sexuelles alors qu’en réalité, il exacerbe le culte de la performance. Sur le plan politique, le sport de masse est devenu un outil d’encadrement et de mobilisation des ferveurs et des passions, une source d’identification nationale et un exutoire des frustrations sociales. Last but not least, le sport de masse que le football incarne de la manière la plus complète, est un spectacle qui mobilise des « foules solitaires » qui permettent une accumulation capitalistique absolument disproportionnée par rapport à son utilité sociale réelle.

Il est indéniable que cette critique du sport capitaliste va jusqu’à la racine des choses. En même temps, elle me semble aussi très élitiste et beaucoup trop fonctionnaliste. A l’origine, le football était cette « religion laïque du prolétariat » comme le disait l’historien marxiste Eric Hobsbawn. Pour Albert Camus, « tout ce que je sais avec certitude à propos de la moralité et des obligations, je le dois au football… ». Quant à Antonio Gramsci, dans un court article de 1918 publié dans Avanti, il considérait que « le football incarne un modèle de société individualiste qui exige l’initiative, la compétition et le conflit. Mais il est également régulé par la règle non écrite du fair-play. Paysage ouvert, libre circulation de l’air, poumons sains, muscles forts, toujours tendus vers l’action. (…). »

Certes, ces points de vue datent et depuis les années 1990, la marchandisation et la commercialisation ont dénaturé le football, les championnats européens et bien sûr les coupes du monde. Depuis l’arrêt Bosman (1995), le nombre de joueurs étrangers n’est plus limités, ce qui a démultiplié les transferts et accru les montants qui les accompagnent. La starification et les paris sportifs ont accompagné un accroissement continu des droits de retransmission qui ont à leur tour généré des revenus exorbitants. Rappelons qu’à l’origine, le football n’était rien d’autre qu’une activité sportive ludique, un loisir ouvrier au même titre que la course cycliste. Il s’agit aussi d’un sport collectif, à l’inverse de l’athlétisme, du tennis ou du golf… Rien d’étonnant qu’au début de la professionnalisation, un joueur gagnait rarement plus que deux fois le salaire d’un ouvrier…

Même si le football s’est « gentrifié », massifié, globalisé et qu’il est devenu une activité extrêmement lucrative pour les investisseurs, un grand nombre de clubs sportifs gardent une identité classiste, avec des clubs de supporters marqués à l’extrême gauche, parfois protagonistes dans les choix de gestion du club. Il suffit de penser aux clubs tels que FC Livourne, le Borussia Dortmund, Standard de Liège, Sankt Pauli Hambourg, Celtic Glasgow, Liverpool, Beşiktaş d’Istambul, Hapeol de Tel Aviv ou l’AEK d’Athènes. Les ultras de ces clubs se manifestent comme syndicalistes, pro-accueil des réfugiés, opposés au sexisme à l’homophobie, antiracistes, propalestiniens, favorables au boycott de la coupe du monde et prennent parfois la défense de manifestants contre la répression policière, …  Comme aliénation, il y a pire… Mais ce sont aussi des réalités minoritaires. Assister à un match de première ligue est devenu un passe-temps très onéreux. Au Royaume-Uni, le prix moyen d’un billet dans les tribunes de clubs comme Manchester United ou Liverpool a connu augmentation de 750% ou 1 100 % depuis les années 1990. Ne parlons pas des déplacements ou de la participation à des tournois. De ce point de vue-là, il n’y a aucun doute : excepté les noyaux durs d’inconditionnels, les supporters de football qui assistent au match n’appartiennent que marginalement au monde ouvrier et populaire…

Dans l’ombre des stars, le « footballeriat » des travailleurs sportifs

Dans l’histoire du football, l’ascension du club de foot de Göteborg est assez singulière et révélatrice que le documentaire « Les derniers prolétaires du foot » raconte avec brio. Göteborg est un club amateur qui connait une ascension en première ligue dans les années 1970. Formé par des amateurs, tous ouvriers (plombiers, cuisiniers, soudeurs, chaudronniers, mécaniciens) et syndicalistes, le FC Göteborg perce en coupe en d’Europe et gagne en 1982 la finale de l’UEFA contre Hambourg par 3 – 0. En 1986, Göteborg joue la demi-finale contre le FC Barcelone et gagne à nouveau par 3 – 0 à domicile. Lors du match retour, l’arbitrage aurait été des plus injuste et après avoir gagné par 3-0, les tirs au but donnent le Barça le ticket pour la finale de l’UEFA.

Depuis lors, le monde du foot a bien changé. Les montants drainés par les retransmissions dépassent les milliards d’euros dans chaque pays. Le mercato mobilise chaque année des sommes astronomiques : 900 millions rien qu’en Angleterre, 650 millions en Espagne et 300 à 500 millions en Italie, Allemagne ou en France. Les rémunérations des joueurs brassent également des centaines de millions d’euros, tout comme les recettes publicitaires, qui, de la marque des crampons aux maillots des joueurs, dépassent les millions aussi.

Avec une massification des retransmissions à l’échelle mondiale, seuls quelques championnats attirent les gros investisseurs, laissant dans l’ombre et l’oubli les compétitions dans les pays périphériques ou les ligues de deuxième ou de troisième division. Cela signifie aussi que dans l’ombre des stars qui ramassent des millions à la seconde errent des dizaines de milliers de joueurs qui se forment dès le plus jeune âge, qui s’entraînent, sacrifient leur vie de famille dans l’espoir d’entrer un jour dans le panthéon des joueurs multimillionaires.

Pour le sociologue et ancien joueur de football Pierre-Cédric Tia, il y a lieu de parler d’un « footballeriat » comme espace social à la fois objectif et subjectif où évoluent les ex-apprentis, des joueurs forgés par une persévérance vocationnelle, portant en bandoulière un ethos sportif qui proscrit tout abandon[5]. Même si 90 % des apprentis ne seront jamais des joueurs professionnels, ils continuent « à y croire » pendant des années, en supportant la précarité et l’incertitude quant à leur destin sportif. De ce point de vue-là, on peut dire que le marché des travailleurs sportifs est une sorte de modèle idéal-typique du marché du travail tout court où la précarité est souvent vécue et acceptée comme un mal nécessaire avant la rédemption par l’ascension sociale. Celle-ci n’est qu’une illusion puisque seul une infime minorité finira par entrer dans le cercle restreint des stars. De ce point de vue-là, on peut dire aussi que le « footballeriat » est un prolétariat qui s’ignore. Ce qui n’est pas forcément le cas de ceux qui ont construit les stades où de celles qui nettoient les chambres d’hôtel…

 

Références

  • Brohm, J-M (1992), Sociologie politique du sport, 1976, deuxième édition, Presses Universitaires de Nancy.
  • Lire ici un entretien avec J-M. Brohm 
  •  Tia, Pierre-Cédric (2019), « Les paradoxes de l’excellence : enquête sociologique dans le footballariat hexagonal », Thèse de doctorat en Sociologie, sous la direction de Stephen Bouquin, Soutenue le 02-12-2019, à l’Université Paris-Saclay

 

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/revealed-migrant-worker-deaths-qatar-fifa-world-cup-2022

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35931031

[3] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/oct/02/revealed-hundreds-of-migrant-workers-dying-of-heat-stress-in-qatar-each-year

[4] https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/24/qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms

[5] voire aussi Pierre-Cédric Tia, « Rebondir après « l’échec » en centre de formation : analyse séquentielle des trajectoires socioprofessionnelles d’ex-apprentis footballeurs », in Temporalités [En ligne], 25 | 2017, mis en ligne le 21 septembre 2017, consulté le 22 novembre 2022. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/temporalites/3702 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/temporalites.3702 et  https://www.liberation.fr/sports/2019/08/12/le-football-ne-suspend-que-temporairement-les-inegalites-sociales_1744971

The summer of discontent or the tumultuous return of strikes in Great Britain

Great-Britain [1] has seen a wave of strikes the likes of which it has not seen for decades. Strikes at the railways, logistics, the Felixstowe port terminal and the Royal Mail are taking place against an economic and social backdrop of record profits, a political crisis, soaring inflation and an upcoming recession. The wave of spontaneous strikes in a dozen Amazon warehouses was perhaps the most unexpected moment of this ‘Summer of discontent’ [2] .

In this article, we want to bring to the attention to the return of the strike as a major social fact, and this in a country that has experienced a long period of “forced social pacification”. Having briefly outlined the contextual elements in the first section, we will describe the main conflicts in the second section. We will then develop some thoughts about the continuation of strike mobilisations in the coming months. The fourth point deals with the question of the end of a long period of pacification of social conflict, by considering the possibility of long cycles in strike activity based on the change in structural and organizational coordinates that determine its intensity. Finally, we will conclude by drawing up a series of general observations.

1 – British singularities under stress

In the United Kingdom, industrial relations are voluntary and poorly regulated, although, conversely, strikes are highly regulated. There are no employee representative bodies, which is why the term ’Single channel’ is used [3] . The legislator recognized the trade union fact within the company very early on (1872), while at the same time granting the right to organise a peaceful picket (1875). In 1906, trade unions were given the right to strike without being liable to a conviction for damages. The Trade Unions Council (TUC) is a direct product of Chartism, which was born in 1838 [4] . Initially, it brought together 180 trade or professional unions. Unlike other countries where revolutionary traditions predominated, the TUC took the lead in political action by founding the Labour Representation Committee in 1900, which in turn founded the Labour Party. Political representation was a necessary complement to the essentially ‘economic’ trade union action. During the inter-war period there was a great deal of social conflict, culminating in a single general strike in 1926. After the Second World War, the trade unions and the Labour Party succeeded in making major improvements to the living conditions of the working class. In addition to the creation of a universal social security system under the aegis of William S. Beveridge, with health services accessible to all, financed from taxation, the country experienced two decades of relative full employment (for men) with a powerful public industrial pole and an expanded offer of social services (particularly in terms of housing).

Wage formation is highly decentralized in Great Britain. From 1945 to 1986, it was organized on the basis of wage negotiations within the Wages Councils, which covered trades and professions on a territorial basis with appointed representation of employers and employees. The Wages Councils drew up an indicative scale of hourly rates, minimum thresholds according to seniority and qualification (Dobb, 1952).

After their abolition in 1986, wage bargaining lost much of its importance. At the same time, in some cases (transport, energy), it has been maintained at sectoral level to avoid excessively high or dumping wages. Over the recent period (2000-2020), in the private sector, only 20% of wage increases were the product of collective bargaining, compared with 45% in the public sector. The creation of an hourly minimum wage (1998) – quite exceptional given the British tradition – was justified by the extent of the impoverishment of workers, with almost 25% of employees in poverty.

From 2010 to 2020, wage increases have been very moderate, consistently falling below the annual growth rate of GDP. Over this decade, median weekly earnings (in real terms) increased by only 0.6%, while average weekly earnings fell by 2.4% in real terms if the past decade is taken as a benchmark. The important increase in 2021 is mainly the result of furlough system ending after several periods of lockdown.

Annual change in real wages (adjusted for inflation) / source ONS UK

Last April, the Times asked whether the country would experience a summer of discontent. This signaled that some in the cenacles of power were already beginning to become aware of social exasperation. The number of social conflicts had begun to increase since 2020, during the pandemic. Initially marked by health issues, the strikes very quickly put the question of wages on the table. Last May, there were at least 300 industrial disputes since the beginning of the year; a number six times higher than the annual average for the period 2008-2018, which expresses a real break with the long period of atony in social conflict.

Wages are at the heart of these strikes for a very simple reason. In April 2022, the Chartered Management Institute [5] revealed that half of all companies had not planned any pay rises, while in the other half the increase would be no more than 3%, less than half the rate of inflation at that time. According to the same survey, in the public sector – where the unionization rate is 50% compared to 14% in the private sector – the wage increase would not exceed 2% in 2022.

Britain has had a long period of wage stagnation starting in 2008 during the financial crisis. But this period was also characterized by low inflation averaging between 1.5% and 2%, and this changed abruptly at the end of 2021. Initially, in the fall of 2021, the price increase was the result of a relatively sharp economic recovery from the confines of the pandemic. The year 2021 was also marked by a major disruption in road transport, notably due to a shortage of lorry drivers, partly linked to Brexit. In this context, prices were rising steadily and inflation was already reaching 5-6% by the end of 2021. The disruption of global value chains, further amplified by the insular context of the UK economy, pushed inflation up to 7-8%. Then, in June this year, following the rise in electricity and gas prices linked to the war in Ukraine, inflation crossed the 10% threshold.

The price surge coincided with repeated announcements of extraordinary profits for the year 2021. Profit margins for listed companies (FTSE 350) were 73% higher than pre-pandemic levels in 2019. Profits for these companies jumped by 11.74% in the six months from October 2021 to March 2022. Over the same period, labour incomes rose by only 2.61%; and fell by 0.8% after accounting for inflation. This recent surge in profits accounts for 58% of the inflation in the last six months, compared to only 8.3% for labour costs. Unite sees this as excess profits generated from higher prices and monopoly rents [6] . So it is not just about oil companies or a few ‘rotten apples’. Even excluding energy companies, the profits of FTSE 350 companies increased by 42% between 2019 and 2021.

The combination of the three realities – wage moderation, (excess) profits and inflation – has become an explosive cocktail. Faced with criticism, including from his own camp, Boris Johnson decided to grant each household an energy voucher of £400, financed by a tax on the ‘excess profits’ of energy producers [7] . The measure, quite ‘radical’ for a neoliberal conservative, awakened the social conscience of the working classes. At the end of July, further price increases were announced, raising the annual energy bill by £3,000 to £4,000. In a country where many working people either own run-down homes or rent social housing, higher energy prices would spell social disaster. Economist Jonathan Bradshaw of the University of York says that a £400 voucher will not prevent 80% of households from falling into ‘fuel poverty’, defined as 10% of disposable income spent on energy [8] .

Faced with this reality, several unions engaged in consultation procedures, which British law made necessary in order to call for strike action.  As a symptom of social exasperation, participation rates in these consultations systematically exceeded 80%, while the vote in favor of strike action sometimes reached 90% or 95%, reflecting a real determination to take action to obtain wage increases. It is worth noting that the existence of a strike fund is certainly helpful when disputes arise. Employees earning more than £30,000 can get up to £50 a day, while for low earners earning less than £30,000 gross, the amount can be as much as £75 a day. Union density in the private sector has fallen below 30% over the past decade, but in large companies and public services it remains at 50%.

2. Strikes are back

Here we present the emblematic conflicts in rail, logistics, postal services and dockers. Other, more local conflicts also took place. But these conflicts, which are just as well attended as the national strike conflicts, do not contain national issues that make the return of the strike a separate issue.

When the rail strike sets the ball rolling

The railworkers were the first to embark on a nationwide strike affecting the entire rail sector. Having not experienced strikes since 1989, rail transport had all the characteristics of a managerial Eden. Privatized in 1990-1991 with some fifteen separate national operators, the sector is also fragmented by the outsourcing of a large number of technical and commercial services. But this fragmented reality has not prevented the RMT union from campaigning for centralized or national bargaining on pay issues. With 50,000 members or adherents, the RMT remains a rather ‘militant’ union with a presence on the ground, including external contractors such as cleaning services. It disaffiliated from Labour when the latter embarked on a ‘third way’ approach similar to social liberalism. Alongside it is the 22,000-strong ASLEF union[9] , which organises train and underground train drivers, and the TSSA, an independent trade association not affiliated to the TUC, which organises staff of some regional service providers and which has opened up to the tourist transport sector[10] .

At the end of May 2022, ASLEF and RMT refused to accept an increase of 3%, which is much lower than an inflation rate of 9-10%. For the unions, a 7% increase was the necessary condition for opening negotiations. In response to this refusal, Network Rail agreed to a 5% pay rise, but this was conditional on accepting a reorganization of services and an increase in working hours. RMT and ASLEF rejected this ‘sweetheart deal’ and began preparations for strike action. After a well-attended consultation process, with a very high turnout of 78% and 90% of voters in favor of strike action [11] , more than 60,000 employees in the sector stopped work, first on 21 June, followed by a second strike day on 27 July, a third on 20 August and finally on Saturday 1st of October, in a first joint strike with other sectors.

The rail strikes have received support from large sections of the public [12] . A poll of 2,000 people [13] at the end of July found that 63% are against job losses and do support strikes. The same percentage believe that rail workers should receive a pay rise ‘that takes into account the cost of living’, while 59% believe that rail workers have the right to strike when negotiations fail. More broadly, 85% of respondents believe that the profits of the rail industry should be invested in protecting jobs and improving service quality. Public opinion remains broadly supportive of strike action, which is consistent with the support for re-nationalization of the sector that has been prevalent for the past decade.

On each day of the strike, all services were paralyzed, including in London. In an attempt to divide the movement, employers said they were prepared to concede an 8% pay rise, but only for certain trades. Mick Lynch, interviewed on Skynews on the 1st of October, said it was unacceptable that some trades were being discriminated against in the face of rising inflation, which was affecting everyone and was now in excess of 10%. On that day, after 15 days of mourning following the death of Queen Elizabeth II, a new national strike took place and other actions have been announced since then. The social movement is therefore still ongoing and far from losing momentum.

The highly symbolic rail strikes illustrate the return of trade union action to the forefront. They signal the return of the strike as a form of struggle. Their symbolic exemplarity is verified by the fact that workers in other companies have followed suit, even in companies without a union presence such as Amazon.

Wind of revolt at Amazon

At the beginning of August, the logistics giant experienced a wave of spontaneous strikes affecting a dozen sites, mainly sorting and order-picking warehouses (Fullfilment centres). It all started on the morning of 3 August at the LCY2 depot in Tilbury, south London. After receiving information that the hourly wage would only be increased by 35 pennies [14] , about 600 workers walked out and gathered in the hall. Over the next few days, walkouts took place in Rugeley, as well as Coventry, Swindon, Rugby, Doncaster, Bristol, Dartford, Belvedere, Hemel Hempstead and Chesterfield.

These wildcat strikes were distinctive in that they were both majoritarian and spontaneous, and represented a social event not seen since the 1970s (Darlington& Lyddon, 2001) [15] . Although the actions were supported by Unite and the GMB, in practice they were more self-organized by informal networks of colleagues. The actions took a wide variety of forms, ranging from stopping work while remaining at one’s workstation to slowing down the pace (slow down strike) or occupying loading bays or the canteen (sit-down strike).

All these actions are about the issue of wages. Amazon is a company that refuses to talk to a union representative, leaving the human resources department to act alone on this issue. A striker testifies that the anger has been brewing for some time:

‘Normally, salary increases are notified in April. In July, there was still no information, which added to the impatience. The announcement of a 35 penny increase was seen as a cold shower as everyone was expecting a real pay rise. Previously very low, close to the legal minimum of £8.50, the starting salary had been increased last year to £10.50, if not £11.45 depending on the employment area. Mind you, this decision was not inspired by any sense of generosity; Amazon was just trying to become more attractive in the job market. Recently, after the pandemic, Amazon had had the greatest difficulty in recruiting 25,000 workers… Internally, this increase in the hiring salary fed the hope that all categories would get an upward adjustment. In a context of inflation but also of record profits – £210 million, a 20% increase on 2020 – and net of tax, it is obvious that management’s refusal to grant a real increase was bound to provoke social discontent. This spread like wildfire from 3 to 12 August, with strikes and walkouts taking place in almost all fulfilment centres’.

Several strikers stressed their indifference to management’s threats. Their refusal to give in to intimidation, to respond to injunctions to return to work, even when he is waving a deduction from wages in case of an open strike, i.e. the entire interrupted working day, seems to have been a widely shared reaction:

‘We only decided that morning that we were going to walk out. The management was completely clueless. They first threatened to withhold our wages, but we held out and stayed in the canteen all day. We asked the management representative for an explanation. Why are they giving us a handout when they have increased our starting wages by £2? Why couldn’t they raise our wages to the level of inflation, when the money was flowing. But Amazon’s UK management remained silent and the local managers didn’t know what to do… They were completely baffled. In the end, after several days of stalling, management conceded a 50 pence per hour increase while announcing a wage adjustment in the coming months; this got the work going again.’

The GMB union is following up these strikes with a campaign for a starting wage of £15 an hour and an inflation adjusted pay rise. This offensive stance reflects the union’s desire to use the walkouts to gain the status of social interlocutor that Amazon has always refused [16] . But according to Callum Cant, author of Riding for Deliveroo. Resistance in the New Economy (2019) and a leading expert on the logistics sector, Amazon will certainly try to re-establish its managerial grip and do everything it can to keep the unions out of the warehouses. However, for the specialist, it is inevitable that workers will continue to ‘become aware of their strength’.

Dockers cross their arms

On 21st of August, it was the turn of the dockers at Felixstowe to enter the fray. Located near Ipswich, Felixstowe is the largest port terminal and accounts for half of the country’s annual port activity. The first strike lasted 8 days and mobilized the 1,900 dockworkers, all trades combined: bridge operators, crane operators, handlers, technicians, etc. During the consultation prior to the strike, 9 out of 10 workers were in favor of a work stoppage, paralyzing the entire port activity.

The owner of the Felixstowe terminal is CK Hutchison Holding, Li Ka-Shin, Hong Kong’s richest businessman and the 32nd richest man in the world, whose accounts are domiciled in tax havens. CK Hutchison is the world’s leading port terminal operator, owning 52 terminals in 26 countries with a turnover of $30 billion. Once again, the issue of wages is at the centre of the conflict. Having not been increased for a decade, while the British division has announced record profits – $95 million in 2021, compared to $64 million in 2020 – the dockers have given vent to their anger.

Following this strike, the first since 1989, the port company’s management is proposing a 7% pay rise with a one-off bonus of £500. But for the Unite union, the increase should be at least 10% and in line with inflation, in contrast to what was conceded during the 2010-2020 period, a period of low inflation it is true. According to Sharon Graham, ‘CK Hutchison’s terminal is making such a profit that it would be possible to increase wages by 50% without putting the accounts in the red. It is not unreasonable to demand a 10% increase.’

In early September, faced with the union’s refusal to accept a below-inflation increase, the port terminal manager decided to close the door on negotiations. Since then, the management has been waging a media campaign against the Unite union and the dockers, pointing to the high salary of a docker – around £50,000 a year – while explaining that strikes will cause prices to rise.

For Unite’s representatives, wages have been frozen for a decade while price increases are the result of higher rates charged by shipowners who have seen their profits triple by 2021. The disorganization of maritime transport particularly affects the British Isles and since 2021, only one in five container ships has arrived on time. For the Unite trade unionists, blaming the price increase on the dockers’ strike is a bad joke: ‘We’ve gone from just in time to just in case, which only makes prices more expensive with delays here and penalties there.’

It should perhaps be recalled here that the entire global flow of goods is affected by chaotic disorganization: either factories are shut down in China, or there are no more container ships available, or they are diverted because there are no time slots to unload containers in less than 48 hours. Felixstowe is often the last terminal before leaving for Asia empty. In case of congestion, ships unload their containers in Antwerp or Rotterdam rather than waiting offshore. These containers then have to be transported across the Channel, lengthening the supply chain and pushing up the final price. The retail sector has increased its storage capacity to avoid stock-outs. But by ordering more goods, it has only added to the chaos and pushed prices even higher.

The union’s refusal to accept a below-inflation increase turns the dockers’ strike into a test case. At the end of September, it was the turn of Liverpool dockers to strike for a week. On 29 September, the Felixstowe dockers embarked on a second week of strike action, supported by the Southampton dockers who refused to unload goods diverted from Liverpool or Felixstowe.

For Treasury Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng, the dockers’ strikes are a form of social terrorism ‘which must be prevented by all means’. In the same vein, Liz Truss, the new head of government who recently joined Downing Street, said she believed that the 1973 law banning the use of temporary workers during strikes should be repealed as soon as possible. Her recent statements express the will to attack again the right to strike with a panoply of restrictive measures such as the extension of the notice period from 2 to 4 weeks, the limitation in time of the validity of a vote in favor of a strike or the increase of the thresholds of validity of consultations.

Post and telecoms join the strikes

Finally, at the end of August, it was the turn of the postal services to join the strike. The management of the Royal Mail, privatized in 2013 and now listed on the stock exchange, was willing to accept a 5% pay rise. But for Dave Ward of the Communication Workers Union (CWU), this proposal is not serious, especially as it combines a 2% linear increase with a £500 cheque. For the CWU, only a catch-up with inflation was possible. At the end of July, the consultation involved 77% of the workforce, 96.7% of whom voted in favor of strike action. The strike was announced in two stages. The first day of strike action, on 31 August, concerned only the 125,000 Royal Mail workers. This was followed by a ‘sectoral’ strike on 8 and 9 September involving 40,000 British Telecom employees. The 31 August strike was very well attended, with over 2,000 pickets.

According to the views of trade unionists I interviewed, the strike was also followed by some frontline managers. It should be noted that post offices are, for the most part, run as retail outlets or grocery shops that have a franchise for mail-related activities. The bulk of the business – and a lucrative one at that, given that the Royal Mail has made £170 million in net profits in 2021 – is concentrated in the collection, sorting and distribution of letters and parcels. In this respect, it is clear that the Royal Mail has followed the same trajectory as many other postal services that combine neo-taylorian rationalisation with chronic understaffing and under-equipment. This also explains why we find in the background of the pay issue the experience of deteriorating working conditions:

‘We have been taken away from fixed hours, which adds work that will never be paid. Now we are being asked to come in on Sundays, with the festive season. [I started at the Royal Mail three and a half years ago and I can say that the workload is increasing all the time. Our tours are getting longer and longer. As some people finish early, at district management level they tell us we have to do more. These kinds of managers have never been a ‘postie’. They don’t understand that we live in Luton, Bromley or Bedfordshire… a long way from London with more than an hour and a half to travel. Inevitably, we skip the lunch break, which allows us to finish earlier and arrive home around 5-6pm, knowing that we also get up at 4am! The route calculations are absurd. We have always had fewer parcels in the summer than in November and December, but they don’t care about that. They base the winter rounds on the summer volumes. A real rip-off. What’s more, our equipment is in a terrible state: there aren’t enough trolleys and we have to make do. We make do and we tinker. A colleague will fill the van to the brim and leave some of the parcels to be delivered at a grocery store affiliated to the network. From there, another colleague takes over and includes it in his round. The next day, we swap rounds between the one who walks and the one who drives. It’s normal, there’s no reason why some people should have a harder time than others. The management knows this very well and they turn a blind eye. In fact, a lot of them are on strike with …’

As in the railway sector, the management is trying to exchange a wage increase for the imposition of a ‘modernisation of operations’. But for the CWU, linking the two is out of the question ‘as it would mean taking back with one hand what was conceded with the other’. For Dave Ward, ‘a 10% increase would be very reasonable given that the Royal Mail has made over £650 million in profits in 2021 and almost £500 million has been distributed to shareholders and top management’ [17] .

3 – Towards a hot winter?

 The death of the Queen has certainly put social tensions on hold for a few weeks. However, there is no sign that the strike wave will abate. So, if the summer is behind us, there is also the question of the outcome of strike action. Will management make concessions or engage in a showdown?

It is impossible to answer this question except to say, with a great deal of phlegm, that nothing has been decided… It is true that the public sector has remained rather on the sidelines until now. Unison, the main union in this sector, supports the centre-left orientation of Labour led by Keir Starmer, who says he is ready to govern ‘with reason’. At the level of the NHS, Unison put to the vote the managerial proposal of an increase of only 4.5%. But this was overwhelmingly rejected and the union was forced to consult workers on strike action before 27 October. In the local authority and public schools, the pay rise proposals appear to be more significant and could involve a flat rate of £2,000 and an extra day’s holiday, which would amount to a 10% rise for the lowest paid and 6-8% for middle and high earners. Again, the union put the proposed increase to the vote without taking a position.

Meanwhile, the Liz Truss government announced a drastic reduction in the number of civil servants (90,000 out of a total of 600,000), angering the PCS (Public Civil Servants Union), which immediately launched consultations for a series of strikes in November. In education, the University and College Union (UCU) has also mobilized its members, having already obtained a favorable strike notice in 22 universities and colleges for October.

It is true that no major conflict has so far resulted in a victory for the trade union camp. At the same time, some important but more local disputes show that victories are far from being out of reach. In Coventry, for example, the city’s refuse collectors won a 12.9% pay rise after six months of strike action. The same is true in Thurrock. A number of emblematic disputes on issues other than pay have been won. Examples include London hospital staff fighting to be integrated into the internal workforce; Manchester bus drivers and British Airways workers at Heathrow airport fighting against the ‘Fire and Rehire’ system; and workers at the manufacturer of a range of products and services. There are also the workers at pallet manufacturer CHEP, who after a historic 20-week strike won a 9% pay rise.

Very recently, Liverpool dockers and Unite succeeded to secure a deal with Peel Port authority with a pay increase between 14.5 and 18%. This demonstrates that where balance of forces change in favor of the workers, employers are ready to dig into their pockets.

The molecular accumulation – in the sense that this remains ‘invisible’ until it expresses its disruptive impact – of partial victories can also lead employers to harden their position. From their point of view, any concession is dangerous because it may encourage others to strike too. But not making concessions will inevitably strengthen the position of the trade union side. For Mick Lynch, general secretary of the RMT, workers have seen their purchasing power melt away while profits have reached new heights: ‘We’ve seen wages stagnate and now we’re seeing a decline because wages are not keeping up with inflation. If we accept this, we will end up with a pittance that will plunge us into poverty. No way!  For the leader of the RMT, it is time for the working class to go on the offensive: ‘We are ready for it, especially since the job market is giving us a boost since employers can no longer find anyone to work in unbearable conditions for miserable wages. (speech 17 August launch meeting Enough is enough).

Asked whether we are witnessing the death of the Thatcherite project, or simply a return to social conflict, Lynch replied, ‘Well, I don’t know if Thatcherism will end, because to end it you have to put something else in place. (…) The only way to end it is to put in place a system, or a set of reforms, and that’s why I think Labour leadership under Keir Starmer has an opportunity. At the same time the Labour Party does not reflect the social aspirations for change. I think they are too cautious. I think they’ve been brought up in a way that makes them afraid of radicalism.[18]

In the absence of adequate political support, sectors of the trade union movement decided to launch a unitary campaign Enough  is  enough  that is meeting with a growing response in the country. ‘Enough is enough’ was initiated by the most combative sectors of the trade union world, in alliance with housing associations, youth and the left of Labour, with the idea that ‘they are acting in their class interests, it’s time we did too’. For Zarah Sultana, Labour MP for Coventry, ‘the current crisis is a cost of living crisis, it is a social crisis for labour, not a crisis for capital which continues to reap profits and distribute millions in dividends. [It is a crisis not because there is not enough wealth, but because wealth is being monopolized by a tiny minority’ (speech at the meeting on 17 August 2022).

‘Enough is Enough’ campaigns for the convergence of wage struggles into cross-industry and societal strike action, with explicit reference to Britain’s only general strike in 1926. The platform defends the adoption of emergency measures to protect purchasing power in the face of the inflationary spiral (price freeze, wage adjustment to inflation) and advocates a tax on excess profits in the energy sector. As social pressure continues to mount, the TUC leadership has recently adopted a position in favor of coordinated strike action, which is exceptional for this trade union confederation.

On Saturday 1er October, the first day of joint strikes by railway workers, postal workers and dockers was a success. A rare occurrence in the UK, it gave rise to numerous street demonstrations. Other strike days are already announced for October and November. It is very likely that the public sector or health care will join the movement, which could destabilize the new government just in place and lead to early elections. The Labour leadership is adopting a moderate stance, reminiscent in some quarters of the Antony aka ‘Tory’ Blair era, but the Labour left and the trade union left are mobilizing to push for emergency measures, prompting editorial writers in the centre-left Guardian, the Times and the right-wing Telegraph to say that the unions are once again ‘the leading opposition force’ in the country.

This social opposition may be able to take advantage of a divided and somewhat chaotic government. Very recently, the crisis in the Conservative Party took a dramatic turn for the worse when Liz Truss, having just come to power, approved a budget that would reduce taxes on the wealthiest groups by £45 billion. However, the same government decided to cap energy bills at £2,500 per year, a measure that is expected to cost between £70 and £140 billion depending on the evolution of basic prices. Even for the IMF, such a policy is completely inconsistent. The financial markets also disapproved of the package, immediately causing the British currency to fall, which endangered the pension funds that derive a considerable fraction of their income from financial investments. Faced with the risk of a stock market collapse – similar to that caused by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 – the government was forced to back down. For its part, the Bank of England is persisting in its anti-inflationary policy by raising key rates, following the example of the FED and the ECB. This can only make credit more expensive and cause a large number of companies to go bankrupt. The energy crisis is far from being resolved, not least because the war in Ukraine has stalled. Even if the emergency measure of capping bills has succeeded in temporarily halting the rise in inflation, if it remains at 10% for much longer, it is clear that the impoverishment of entire layers of the workforce will not go unchallenged.

However, on the political front, at the time of writing, chaos remains. In mid-October, the finance minister Kwasi Kwarteng was sacked and replaced by Jeremy Hunt who tried to jump after that to Downing Street, the only way to avoid early elections. Unfortunately for him, the Tories have elected Rishi Sunak, a multibillionaire, as leader in order to take this uncomfortable position.

The combination of social mobilisations and strikes on the one hand and political chaos on the other forms a veritable explosive cocktail, to the point where The Economist headlined its 18 October edition as Welcome in Britaly. The disarray within the ruling class is gaining ground, as it is becoming difficult to combine right-wing populism with neoliberal economic reason.

4 – At least the end of a long social winter

The miners’ strike of 1984-85 resulted in a historic defeat for the British labour movement. This defeat not only demoralized the most combative sectors of the trade union movement but also changed the overall balance of power, facilitated by a fierce restriction on the right to strike through a long list of restrictive procedures [19] . These restrictions were recently reinforced when David Cameron’s government imposed a minimum threshold of 50% of the electorate and 70% of the vote in favor of strike action in 2016.

This epochal shift could be summarized by saying that neoliberalism has succeeded in imposing a ‘forced social pacification’ and this can be seen in the collapse of the number of individual days not worked (IDNW) due to strikes. Indeed, after peaking at 30 million days in the late 1970s, strike activity fell to 5 million in 1985 and then declined to between 150,000 and 300,000 IDNWs per year in the 1990s and 2000s. We find this notion of coercive pacification in the analysis of Dave Lyddon (2007, 2015) for whom neoliberalism expresses the constant desire to repress trade union action.

Data: Office of National Statistics – UK.

The number of strike days per 1,000 employees, which is an indicator of the social density of strike activity, confirms this finding. In the UK, since the early 2000s, the threshold of 50 working days lost per 1,000 employees has very rarely been exceeded. By way of comparison, in other countries such as Belgium, France and Spain, in years of cross-industry strikes, there are peaks of 300 to 500 days lost per 1,000 employees, while in years of ‘social calm’, strike activity remains at around 80 to 100 days lost. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the neoliberal governance model has succeeded in making strike activity residual and marginal.

Source: ETUI – Kurt Vandaele.

However, it should be pointed out that the British statistical data only count strikes of more than 20 employees lasting at least a whole day. This leaves aside work stoppages, which historically represent a privileged mode of action, to the point these micro-strikes were considered a singularity of British industrial relations.

At this point, it is difficult to prejudge what will happen next. On the other hand, it is possible to measure the change of era and to say that social conflicts emerged from a long period of hibernation. Already, the number of Individual Days Not Worked has exceeded 2 million, which shows that strikes are no longer a taboo for trade unions and that they are ready to engage in social conflicts such as we have seen in the past.

It remains to be seen whether the long cycle of defeats and social setbacks will give way to a new offensive cycle with an accumulation of social conquests. This brings us back to the debate of the early 1980s about the existence of long waves in the class struggle and their relation to long waves in capital accumulation. The notion of long waves was initiated by Nikolaj Kondratieff in the 1930’s and reframed by the Marxist economist Ernest Mandel (Mandel, 1980; Kleinkecht, Mandel & Wallerstein, 1992). It postulates the existence of sequences long periods of upswing and downswing in the cycle of accumulation. In the late 1970s, some started to seek after linkages between longs waves and trends in conflictuality that could have an indirect but real relationship.

Even if this approach has been criticized by some for its impossible empirical validation (Beverly Silver, 1980; 1991), others, such as John Kelly (1998), were inspired by it to highlight that conflictuality not only maintains a sort of ‘path dependency’ but that there are also more structural realities that facilitate or hinder striker activity and, more broadly, strikes. Of course, these structural determinants are located as much in the infrastructure (the social relations of production, the labour market) as in the superstructure (the rules and norms, the ideological hegemony or the vitality of the trade union movement). I will leave the long wave controversy aside because it requires a proper investigation in the economic field and in particular the evolution of profitability. On the other hand, following here the insights of John Kelly, it is certain that certain infra and super-structural coordinates influence the amplitude and the intensity of strikes and conflict.

In the case of Great Britain, the fall in unemployment to 3.5% certainly plays in favor of the return of social conflict. It is certainly not yet ‘full employment’ (with a lot of precariousness) but the demand for labour is approaching the supply of labour, which changes the situation from the workers’ point of view. For the CIDP, a HR research centre [20], in a recent report, companies are experiencing increasing difficulties recruitment . According to their latest barometer of HR departments last spring, six out of ten companies are facing prolonged difficulties and would be willing to increase the hiring salary to facilitate recruitment and make the job more attractive.

It should be noted that the fall in unemployment is less the result of net job creation than of a double structural change, namely the ageing of the population and Brexit. The first is common to other OECD countries. The baby boom generation, born between 1946 and 1968, has started to retire, leaving a growing number of job vacancies. According to a study made in 2018 by CEDEFOP (the European Centre for the Study of Skills and Qualifications), 9 out of 10 job vacancies in Europe are now linked to retirement. The latest report on the UK sounds the alarm about the rapidly increasing need for labour. According to the calculations of demographer Ilias Leanos, in the coming decade will need to recruit over 15 million people by 2030 in the UK alone. Even if this figure is an overestimation of recruitment needs (given de coming recession), the scale of the need is enormous, as is not far from evoking a renewal of more than half of the working population [21] !  It should also be noted that in this set of vacancies, half of them concern semi- or unskilled workers. Since a couple of years, the labour shortages are severely felt at all skill levels, which improves the overall social balance of power in favor of the workers.

A recent study by Oxford University has found that the Brexit is playing a significant role in the surge in labour shortages [22] . According to the authors of the study, the post-Brexit immigration system has introduced visa requirements for EU citizens who could previously work in any job. To date, this labour supply has not been matched by access to the labour market for non-EU citizens. As a result, low-wage jobs that relied heavily on EU workers are no longer eligible for work visas [23] . Indirectly, the Brexit has contributed to the drying up of the recruitment pool for a number of jobs at the lower and middle end of the skills spectrum.

In addition to these structural aspects linked to the state of the labour market, we are also witnessing a return to ‘collectivism’. This concept will make some people smile – but it has nothing to do with the Soviet model – it only leads not to limit analysis to a rise in individualism. Even if the notion of collectivism is absent from most of French-speaking sociological analysis of industrial relations [24], it is not without relevance since it allows us to question the availability for a collective commitment, whether it be union membership or commitment to strike action. For John Kelly (Rethinking Industrial relations, 1998), ‘collectivism’ is part of mobilization theory and is based on a feeling of shared injustice and the conviction that it is possible to improve one’s social condition on a collective basis. So it is not only acting in the interest of oneself but express also the awareness that acting together can deliver more than being a ‘free rider’, even in the olsonian way.

In this respect, several facts indicate that collectivism refers to a molecular process of mutual solidarity that precedes social conflict. The spontaneous strikes at Amazon – which are part of a non-unionized dispute – indicate that deep resentment had been building up for some time. Resentment and anger are fueled by a sense of injustice that spreads and ends by expressing itself in a work stoppage.

In addition to this specificity of the wildcat strike, it is important to underline how the very heterogeneous social composition of the working class in no way hindered the mobilisation. In the Amazon Fullfilment centre in Tilbury, the majority of workers are under forty, a third are women and more than half are ‘non white’ or of foreign origin. The’ variety of subjective experiences and conditions did not prevent the coagulation of anger towards collective action. This is not always the case and it is therefore worth emphasizing. Other sectors on strike, such as the postal service or the railways, are also marked by diversity in terms of gender and cultural identity. However, the strikes demonstrate, by their absolute majority character, that heterogeneity is no longer an obstacle.

Mick Lynch confirms this in his own way when he explains that questions of identity, gender, racialization or sexual orientation can be ‘articulated to the class struggle’. The latter remains a unifying factor, but on condition that racism and sexism are also fought (Jacobin interview).  In other words, identities structured around struggles against specific oppressions have a place in the trade union movement. This has been the case for a long time, as British unions have been applying the principle of self-organisation for specific groups such as black and colored people, Asians, women and LGBT people since the 1990s. It is understandable that one third of the RMT’s members in the London Underground are from racialized minorities. More generally, according to government statistics, the proportion of unionized employees is highest among ‘black and black British’ workers (26.9 per cent), followed by workers classified as ‘mixed’ (24.1 per cent) and ‘white’ (24 per cent). Overall, there are more women than men in the TUC.

Collectivism is also expressed in the ‘grey areas’ of the labour market, on the side of gig workers, with the emergence of proto-union action by platform workers who have begun to form a multitude of action collectives. Sometimes these collectives become part of new unions, such as the Independent Workers Union of Great Britain, founded in 2012 by a collective of cleaning workers all of Latin American origin. Sociological studies (Gandini, 2018 ; Cini, 2022) on these mobilisations observe a number of common features: rejection of piecework and self-employed status, the desire to benefit from social protection and community-based mobilisation dynamics. Most of these collective structures combines mobilisation and legal or court action, resulting in an important victory that is beginning to set a precedent.

The UK Supreme Court’s February 2021 decision considers that Uber drivers should be treated as workers, not as independent contractors. This unanimous decision is expected to have a significant impact on platform businesses as drivers are entitled to benefits such as holiday pay, minimum wage and a supplementary pension. The reason is simple, Uber imposes fares and routes without any negotiation and imposes a disciplinary regime on drivers based on their ratings. The court, rejecting Uber’s long-standing practice of treating its drivers as independent contractors, also ruled that the company’s more than 70,000 UK drivers will have to be paid for the hours they are logged on to the Uber app, regardless of the demand for transport.

Since this judgement, a number of similar cases (Pimlico plumbers, CitySprint and Excel Services delivery workers, Bolt delivery workers) have been brought to court and have all resulted in a confirmation of the judgement in the Uber drivers’ case [25] . In terms of status, it is interesting to note that the mobilisations combining direct action and legal action are making progress towards the recognition of the hybrid status of ‘Limb (b) workers’, who are neither freelancers nor self-employed nor employed and integrated into the workforce in the classical sense of the term, but dependent workers to whom the company must pay the minimum hourly wage as long as they are connected by their application, as well as social protection and days off [26] .

In the end, it is certainly still too early to validate the hypothesis of a new cycle of offensive struggles, but the examples of mobilisations are multiplying and the gaps are opening up here and there. The decline in unemployment should continue for structural reasons and the revival of collectivism is helping to revitalise trade union action.

5 – Conclusive reflections

Firstly, it is clear that purchasing power, already at half mast since the pandemic, has become a central issue for workers in all sectors. The 2009-2019 decade was one of wage stagnation, and this is not accepted anymore in an inflationary context. The rationalization of the work process has led to a deterioration in working conditions, which in turn has nourished the feeling that effort must continue to increase even though it is less and less well paid. The sharp drop in purchasing power in the spring of 2022 is just one more drop in a pot that was about to overflow. When the latent sense of injustice is widely shared, it does not take much – such as the announcement of record profits – for it to turn into a spirit of revolt. The conviction that strike action is necessary has become a widely shared idea in a very short time.

The second finding is that the regulatory obstacles to strike action are far from insurmountable. But to succeed in crossing the threshold of approval, the union must necessarily convince a majority of workers that strike action is justified and that it can bring about substantial improvements. To succeed in such a campaign – commonly called a ‘strike ballot campaign’ – it is necessary to mobilise the whole union apparatus, the reps, publish leaflets, emails and ultimately text every worker. It is significant that combative unions such as the CWU, RMT, Unite or PCS are doing this as much as the more moderate unions (Unison, GMB). This indicates that the trade union ‘base’ and more broadly the workers are exasperated by the loss of purchasing power after a long period of wage moderation. The union leadership is in tune with this feeling and understands that such a situation is untenable. But as trade unionists, they also feel that the trade union movement can take revenge after years, if not decades, of losing and conceding much. This is what Mick Lynch says when he announces that the working class is back.

Thirdly, trade unions, even limited in their scope of action, remain powerful institutions. In the 1970s, unions had almost 13 million members. From the 1980s onwards, they have been steadily loosing membership to 6,5 million members but since 2015 around at least 100,000 workers have decided to join every year. The majority of these new members are women, young people, people with recent migrant background, black, asian and colored people. This reflects a collective awareness that the union is an indispensable tool for defending one’s rights and interests. At the same time, this process reflects the social recomposition of the working class. If Labour has a lot of trouble mobilizing its traditional electorate, the unions kept a very broad base and thus formed the central institution of a working class which, of which important sections do express again it’s existence ‘for itself’ again, particularly through these conflicts.

Fourthly, social dialogue is not much institutonalized, which puts the unions themselves, or even the workers themselves (Amazon), at the centre of the playfield, rather than the institutional bodies and the distribution of mandates, which is much more the case in France. As was pointed out at the very beginning of this article, the British model of collective bargaining in no way favors ‘social dialogue’. Since these relations between employers and trade unions operate almost on a voluntary basis, around what is known as the ‘single channel’ system, there is not much normative or contractual production. As a result, the coverage of collective agreements is painfully low at 30%, which is among the lowest levels in Western countries. Even when a trade union is recognized and plays the role provided elsewhere by employee representative institutions, the employer may or may not agree to negotiate. Such an institutional ‘vacuum’ can also fuel social conflict, as employers’ refusal to concede improvements, which in turn may reinforce the feeling of injustice and make workers receptive to the idea of an open dispute. Information and consultation is done at the whim of the employer. This deleterious situation has led the trade union movement to reorganize, to conduct membership campaigns, inspired by the American model of ‘organizing’ [27] . At the level of TUC member unions, several unions have come together under the banner of Unite and the GMB [28] (public and private sector) while several unions merged together  in the public sector (Unison). The leader of Unite, Sharon Graham, is taking a much more antagonistic approach to industrial relations also organizing cross-sectoral coalitions at local level.

The fact that social conflict is making such a massive and tumultuous return after four decades of enforced pacification does not yet explain this phenomenon. In order to make progress in this direction, we will also have to draw up an in-depth assessment of British neoliberalism and question the persistence of a structural antagonism between capital and labour. I will do this in two forthcoming articles: the first on the splendours and miseries of neoliberalism; the second on the depth of class divisions and antagonisms.

 

Stephen BOUQUIN

21st of October 2022 (updated 14th of November).

* I would to thank Michael Roberts, Erik Demeester and Nicola Cianferoni for their suggestions and comments.

Websites with background information

Notes From Below   (with a lot of first hand reports)

Tribune Magazine

Socialist Appeal

Socialist Worker

References

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Footnotes

[1] Great Britain includes England, Scotland and Wales; the UK also includes Northern Ireland. As there has been less strike action in Northern Ireland, I prefer to call it Great Britain. At the same time, politically, the primary entity remains the United Kingdom.

[2] This expression echoes the winter of discontent of 1978-1979, during which a wave of strikes had put the Labour government in difficulty. See Marc Lenormand, L’« hiver du mécontentement » de 1978-1979 : du mythe politique à la crise interne du mouvement travailliste, in Revue française de civilisation britannique, XXII- hors-série | 2017, https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1683

[3] In other countries with a ‘dual system’, such as Germany, there are both IORPs such as the Betriebsrät (works council, similar to the CE, now the CSE) and Vertrauwensleute (people of trust) who are elected on a trade union list. This is known as a ‘dual channel of representation’.

[4] Chartism is a political expression of the nascent labour movement that developed in the mid-19ème century following the adoption of the People’s Charter. The imposition of a censal electoral system had excluded the working class from parliamentary democracy. The People’s Charter was adopted in 1838 and called for universal male suffrage, fair constituency boundaries, the abolition of property ownership as a condition of eligibility, annual parliamentary elections and the secret ballot. The movement remained active until 1848 and gave rise to mutual aid funds, cooperatives and the first trade union movement. EP Thompson; Jacques Carré, La Grande-Bretagne au 19ème siècle, Paris, 1997, 160 p.

[5] Employers and employees face a “great cost squeeze” as government support fails to lift sufficient pressure say managers, 22 April, see www.managers.org

[6] Unite Investigates: Corporate profiteering and the cost of living crisis. Report commissioned by Sharon Graham, June 2022, mimeo, 28p.

[7] The notion of excess profits refers to profits that are added to those already made, due to causes external to the market, such as a war. But there is no consensus on this definition. For my part, I prefer the notions of profit and rent (rents thank to dominant positions on the market or speculative rent).

[8] Jonathan Bradshaw, University of York, “Fuel Poverty: Estimates for the UK”, available here; see also https://www.york.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/2022/research/fuel-poverty-uk/  

[9] https://aslef.org.uk/

[10] Transport Salaried Staffs’ Association, https://www.tssa.org.uk/  

[11] 71% of the workforce took part in the vote and of those, 89% were in favor of strike action. https://www.rmt.org.uk/news/rmt-declares-overwhelming-mandate-for-national-strike-action-on/    

[12] See in particular https://www.independent.co.uk/independentpremium/uk-news/mick-lynch-rmt-rail-strike-poll-b2113181.html   

[13] https://www.rmt.org.uk/news/rmt-on-opinium-poll/  A majority of young people and transport users support them, but older people (over 50) or residents of rural areas tend to be opposed. Although almost 70% of Labour voters express support for rail strikes, Keir Starmer, Labour’s centre-left leader who succeeded Jeremy Corbyn, believes that the Labour Party should remain neutral above all else, which allows him to call on Labour MPs to stay off the picket line. See Katherine Swindells, “Where does public opinion stand on the rail strikes?, Younger people are far more likely than older people to support striking train workers”, in New Statesman https://www.newstatesman.com/chart-of-the-day/2022/07/public-opinion-stand-on-rail-strikes

[14] It takes 100 pennies to make a pound.

[15] In English, these spontaneous strikes are called wildcat strikes, referring to the unannounced strike action taken by activists of the Industrial Workers of the World, a revolutionary trade union organisation in the United States. These strikes were aimed at disrupting production in order to protest against management decisions. In this case, they are strikes that do not follow the normal procedures leading to a strike (consultation and notice).

[16] In 2001, Amazon decided to counter a campaign for union recognition by kicking out some union members while giving a 10% pay rise. As a result, the union received dozens of resignation letters and suffered a painful setback with 80% of workers voting against union recognition.

[17] For an overview of the results for 2021, see https://www.internationaldistributionsservices.com/media/11687/royal-mail-plc-fy-2021-22-results-19-5-22.pdf   

[18] See Jacobin, 10 June 2022, https://jacobin.com/2022/10/mick-lynch-profile-rmt-general-secretary-strikes )

[19]. Mathilde Bertrand, Cornelius Crowley, Thierry Labica, C’est ici que notre défaite a commencé. La grève des mineurs britanniques(1984-1985), ed. Syllepse, 2016.

[20] https://www.cipd.co.uk/knowledge/latest-research

[21] Ilias Leanos, Cedefop, Skills forecast United Kingdom, see https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/files/cedefop_skills_forecast_2018_-_united_kingdom_0.pdf

As well as the more global analysis of the post-pandemic labour market https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/news/baby-boomers-retiring-wake-pandemic

[22] https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/how-is-the-end-of-free-movement-affecting-the-low-wage-labour-force-in-the-uk/

[23] Madeleine Sumption, Chris Forde, Gabriella Alberti & Peter Walsh (2022), How is the End of Free Movement Affecting the Low-wage Labour Force in the UK? first report, 15 AUG 2022, The Migration Observatory COMPAS (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society), University of Oxford.

[24] – In France, either this ‘collectivism’ is taken for granted, or its absence is, based on an analysis that notes the atomisation of work collectives, the omnipresence of consent and servitude, docility and loyalty. There is, however, a possibility of thinking about things in a more dialectical way, by mobilizing, for example, the notion of resistance at work or that of ‘relevant communities of collective action’ proposed by Denis Segrestin (1980). See S. Bouquin (2020), Bellanger and Thuderoz (2012) or, on the subject of collective action, D. Segrestin (1980).

[25] https://scesolicitors.co.uk/news/update-on-gig-economy-case-law-and-developments

[26] Under section 230 of the Employment Relations Act 1996, a worker is defined as an individual who has entered into or is working under (a) a contract of employment or (b) any other contract, whether express or implied, whether oral or written, by which the individual undertakes personally to do or perform work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not, by virtue of the contract, that of a client of a profession or business carried on by the individual. Persons who are not employees but who meet the requirements of paragraph (b) above are sometimes referred to as Limb (b) workers. See also https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/feb/19/uber-drivers-workers-uk-supreme-court-rules-rights  

[27] Organizing is a new trade union practice which emerged in the United States in the early 2000s and which aims to win over sectors of workers in a company to a majority vote in favor of recognition of the role of interlocutor. It is now criticized for its very institutionalist approach, and some people oppose it to the deep organizing model, which refers to in-depth action based on the constitution of semi-clandestine networks, inspired in particular by the IWW. See Milkman R., Bloom J., Narro V. (2010), Working for Justice: The L.A. Model of Organizing and Advocacy.

[28] Unite the Union, a merger of Amicus and TGWU, organises more workers in the industrial, logistics and construction sectors. It has 1.2 million members; the GMB, formerly the General, Municipal, Boilermakers’ and Allied Trade Union, has 640,000 members employed in industry, retail, security, schools, distribution, public services, social services, the National Health Service (NHS), ambulance services and local government.

 

 

No truce in sight. Labour in times of managerial hegemony

1 – Introduction

In the 1950s, French sociology of work and labour relations distinguished itself from North-American social psychology by recognising the conflicting dimension of work and the emancipatory stakes this could contain. From the 1980s onwards, sociological analyses focused more on social interactions, and above all on the internalisation by employees of the logic of performance and management standards. It is also during this last period, from 1990 to 2010, that the issue of domination emerged, favouring an analytical grid where employees have ceased to oppose management.

During my doctoral studies, and throughout my research activities of the last two decades, I favoured an approach that continued to integrates conflict and resistance into the analysis of work and labour. This is as much a theoretical choice as it was and remained an empirical observation. Such a conceptualisation of work and labour does not consider conflict as an ‘anomaly’ but recognises the antagonistic nature of labour relations at the very core of them. From there on, I took a position in some sociological controversies regarding work, labour and its ongoing transformations by asserting that these are at least partially determined by the need for management to increase or to maintain the level of surplus extraction as well as resistance and oppositional behaviour by labour.

Certainly, the wage relationship contains several types of conflicts. Competition between employees can be characterised as a kind of ‘horizontal’ conflict that can take on many faces, ranging from competition for favours, disassociation, harassment or some kind of inter-statutory and intergenerational conflicts. Still, there is always also, even in a minimal way, a ‘vertical’ conflict which opposes the workforce to the management and the employer. This conflict is not only fuelled by issues of power, as pointed out by Michel Crozier and Alain Touraine[2], but also by a conflict of interests concerning the partition of surplus value and the monetary and symbolic recognition of the effort made.

At the origin of my approach, a disagreement can be found with a conceptualisation of work that limits the definition of it to the exercise of a constraining activity, or an expenditure (skilled or not) of energy surrounded by exchanges of information. Such an approach limits the sociological analysis to the concrete way it’s being carried out, to gestures and postures and to symbolic interactions within the workplace. These aspects are important, but they tend to leave aside structuring dimensions such as inequalities of power, the division of labour as well as the impact of wage labour, both at the domestic level and at the level of the public space (labour market and normative regulations). The aspect of pay, or work-effort bargaining is an aspect that is quite often disregarded or even neglected by French sociology of work. Apart from the institutional separation of academic disciplines such as sociology and political economy, another more silent explanation can be found in the strong Proudhonist tradition – and the concomitant marginal Marxist traditions – that can be found among scholars as well as trade unionists. The fact that paid work or labour is not limited to the execution of tasks, that it does not exist in itself, but is carried out against the background of a social relationship of exploitation[3], under control of management is not quite often acknowledged. The fact that this reality will affect social behaviour as well as the relationship to work that people tend to adopt even less. A sound analysis of wage labour implies integrating the existence of the employer, the company, and management as well as recognising that the constrained act of working involves surplus extraction which will be embodied in a higher workload and / or a partial or false recognition of one’s contribution and commitment.

In other words, wage labour remains based on an antagonistic social relationship in which employers cannot fail to try to maximise profits by making people work more for the same wage, or by reducing the latter in relation to the work done (productivity increases). At the same time, wage workers cannot refrain themselves to try to be better paid for their efforts or ask to be better paid on the basis of increased efforts. Insisting on this aspect should not make us forget that this social relationship is also asymmetrical and that it therefore implies a ‘subsumption’– a term I prefer to that of ‘domination’ – whose faces can vary enormously, ranging from factory despotism based on coercion and repression to ‘controlled autonomy’ through targets, performance, strong work ethos, the occupational culture of corporate chauvinism.

To put it differently, when we understand wage labour as a social relationship, we have to do so from two opposite viewpoints, both that of the employees and that of the employers. From this double viewpoint, the observation that there is no ‘truce in sight’ is even truer. Almost all managerial reorganisations can be understood as acts promoting more effort on the part of ‘living labour’, more creativity and commitment, in view of stagnant or slightly increasing pay, in view of the efforts made.

This critique, which can be identified as Marxian, extends the analysis of André Gorz[4], from when he considered wage labour as a heteronymous reality, or elaborated by Jean-Marie Vincent[5] when he recalled the extent to which real subsumption always nourishes oppositions and a critique of work. The reality of ‘domination’, so often evoked in sociological literature, refers basically to the domination of abstract labour over concrete labour, which does not mean this domination is ever completed, definitive nor absolute. Firstly, because it is not insensitive to the balance of power between employers and trade unions (when the latter are present), neither to the legal-administrative frameworks of industrial relations (particularly the right to strike), as well as it involves both bodies and minds mobilised during working time. Faced with various intensities of psychological sufferingor or the resentment of not being sufficiently recognised for one’s contribution, sooner or later employees may lose their credulity towards management and slide into various kinds of opposition. We could also mention Oscar Negt [6], member of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, who remobilised Marx and the concept of ‘living labour’ (lebentige arbeit) to emphasise the extent to which this ‘living’ nature of the workforce, in opposition with the ‘death labour’ (tote arbeit, i.e. capital), implies also a permanent uncertainty towards the concrete course of the labour process. Other works, quite often ignored by French labour sociologists, such as those of Cornelius Castoriadis [7], could also be cited. Apart form his early writings as member of the journal Socialisme ou Barbarie and political group, Castoriadis is characteristic for an analysis articulating social relations of production with state and the development of civil society institutions, considering the pacification of work and labour as harder to achieve than it is the case on the level of a political regime.

A whole series of research investigations confirm the approach of work situations as incessantly conflicting, even without necessarily adopting a Marxian conceptualisation. One example is the historian Alf Lüdtke [8], who studied work behaviour in the context of the Nazi regime in the nineteen thirties finding traces of ‘rebellious subjectivity’ through shopfloor reports from hierarchical superiors, sanction vouchers and testimonies of middle management. These traces revealed that a productive activity was accompanied by a permanence of oppositional behaviours, even after the elimination of trade union presence. Following Alf Lütdke, this kind of conduct can be identified as Eigensinn which he defined as a kind of silent but stubborn oppositional attitude – such as ‘I tend do only doing what I want to do’ – expressing also a kind of undisciplined individualism.

2 – The blind spot of French sociology of work

The publication of a collective reader Résistances au travail in 2008 [9] was an opportunity to reopen the discussion on how ‘atmosphere at work’ did evolve the last decade. The expression of ‘athmospère’ or ambiance was used by the labour historian Nicolas Hatzfeld when he referred to shopfloor situations marked by informal behaviour [10]. Being himself a former ‘établi’ –political activists choosing to work in factories as ordinary workers in order to be among ordinary working people – he tended to acknowledge variations of work commitment that were mots of the time intentional.  Others such as Jean-Pierre Durand [11] after having elaborated a typology of wage relationship configurations in the automotive industry focussed research upon consent and ‘voluntary servitude’ – a notion borrowed from Gustave de la Boëtie – considering the workplace as pacified since the unions lost all bargaining power, the workers fear to lose their jobs and most of them are subjugated by the hegemonic ideology of effectiveness. Danièle Linhart, in a quite same way, emphasised the disappearance of the ‘collective worker’ in the face of omnipotent management[12]. In addition to this, there was the idea, defended in particular by Stéphane Beaud and Michel Pialoux, that workers wanted to be considered as technicians or operatives but certainly not as members of the working class. It should be noted that the mainstream definition of the ‘classe ouvrière’ is quite restrictive and limit the class boundaries to blue collar workers, to productive labour (in opposition to unproductive labour in services sector) which concern only a section of the labouring class if we apply a larger definition of the labouring class [13].

The new forms of work organisation imported from Japan in the 1990s, such as team work, Kaizen or Kanban, certainly succeeded to obtain greater involvement of work groups and to guarantee better quality[14]. These new forms of organisation aimed to obtain from workers a degree of implication in correspondence with demanding standards of lean management and the ongoing juts-in-time flow of production.  This had to be done through the mobilisation of informal resources and tacit knowledge in order to increase productivity. However, by the end of the 1990s, productivity gains were also obtained through intensification and other elements of degrading of working conditions (health and safety), which resulted in a minimalist and consequently worn-out workforce. In some cases, this translated itself into a return of open social conflict, while in others, opposition remained invisible. A detailed analysis of the emergence and spread of lean production in the automotive industry (such as Bouquin, 2006) shows how and why it has become a hegemonic model.

It is true that, like Taylorism, there are many variants of this new ‘one best way’, but the fundamentals can be identified quite easily: cutting costs at all levels, not only of labour but also regarding capital (investment), intensification of work and extension of the use of technical installations, recurrent evaluation of oneself and colleagues; versatility and reduction of stocks and immobilised capital; segmentation of workforce according to status and imposition of team (or project) work; fragmentation of the labour process through subcontracting and the introduction of business units acting like small firm supplying to each other[15]. In the end, while lean management certainly led to increases in productivity, it can also be said it acted as a source of wasting human energy, just as it can give way to quality losses, serial defects and ruptures in the labour process [16].

However, the main sociological analysis in France asserted that workers where defeated, collective workers was atomised and has chosen to reconcile themself with work and management. Contrary to this interpretation, I maintained the opposite: firstly, that there was no definitive pacification possible, secondly, that in some productive spaces, open conflicts (strikes) where still present even if the bargaining power of unions was losing ground; thirdly, that oppositional practices and behaviours at the shopfloor level demonstrate both the necessity for employees to cope with the situation as well as their unwillingness to consider this situation as ‘fair enough’ [17].

The sociological study of work settings, factories or shopfloors should not only look at (apparently) pacified situations but also integrate atypical cases which contradict the thesis of pacification, as I was able to do on the basis of case studies about the Renault Trucks assembly plant in Caen, the factories of Chausson (specialised in vans and camping cars) in Parisian suburbs and in Picardy or the Volkswagen-Audi assembly plant in Belgium (Brussels).

Following the hypothesis that the way employees realise their work tasks not necessarily match their opinions, I started to look after traces of critical reflexivity about work[18]. Even in the late nineties, one could already find such traces in surveys. Let us mention, for example, the survey done by Christian Baudelot and Michel Gollac[19] at the end of the 1990s showing that 74% of white-collar employees had ‘the feeling that they were being exploited’, much more than the 45% blue-collar workers thought. It should be noted that these beliefs appeared in combination with the feeling of being treated unfairly and basically express the expectation for professional recognition that management refuse to honour. Of course, these opinions do not necessarily question the social order of capitalism as such, but that is not really the point. Indeed, let us not forget that such a critique occurs most of the time during exceptional and relatively short periods, such as before or during social upheavals or general strikes such as the ones of 1936 and 1968 in France.

Given the fact that work settings and labour relations are much more heterogeneous than one might suppose, it is essential to analyse the labour process as far from pacified and normalised. In reality, the approaches centred upon domination do suffer from a double flaw. The first flaw is heuristic or empirical. Very often, they neglect social behaviour and opinions that do not consent to managerial domination, under the pretext of their great marginality. However, what exists now has not always been and will not necessarily be the case in the future. Unless we affirm that nothing has ever changed and will never change, sociology must also seek to integrate contradictory trends unfolding and recognize that any present situation contains a range of possible futures. The second flaw is both theoretical and ethical. Through publications, lectures at the university and debates in the public arena, sociology had always a public character, which means that sociologists should acknowledge that their narratives also structure representations of social reality. When sociological analysis is reducing actors to consent and ‘voluntary servitude’, this may end up in the reproduction of a discourse – wrapped or not in an academic format – that contribute to deprive actors of their capacity for action. Even if the performative effect of sociological narratives is reduced, in France, they find audience among trade union activists, who are looking after explanations for their lack of effectiveness. With some help of structural-functionalist sociology, the explanation is ready-made: collective action is doomed to be ineffective because the employees do not want it, since they have internalised the performance injunctions and adhere to management. Paradoxically, where the sociological reflexivity which was called by Pierre Bourdieu should allow for a better understanding of social reality, it ends up proclaiming the status quo as unsurpassable, which has never been the case anyway.

Broadening the field of analysis nevertheless requires precautions. Following Jean-Claude Passeron in Le Raisonnement sociologique[20], the first pitfall of an approach aimed at restoring some kind of heuristic justice is to substitute ‘populism’ for ‘miserabilism’. In other words, to project wishes and expectations onto the conduct of actors, where miserabilism expresses the disappointment of these expectations on the part of the researcher. It is therefore necessary to take all methodological precautions and to avoid hasty theorisations. But to me, the basic premise remains, namely not to ‘freeze’ a social situation by locking actors into behaviours not all of them had or will have, and by qualifying their opinions as manufactured and alienated. That is why I kept up to a certain amount of caution in the analysis of the social behaviours grouped together under ‘resistance au travail’ defined in the following way:

“Resistance is certainly ambivalent and coexists with practices that allow for adjustment, adaptation and (partial) reappropriation of work situations. However, they differ from the latter since they express latent and informal forms of dissent, opposition, of refusal to conform or to comply. Resistance at work refers to behaviour that is to a certain extent disruptive and intolerable for those who supervise, employ and put others to work”[21].

Other sociologists in France favour a very specific restrictive definition of ‘resistance’, which corresponds to intentional and open ‘sedition’ towards management and work. The limit of such a definition is that it has almost no heuristic value[22]. Searching after resistance as a ‘partisan sedition’ does not make much sense when we know how many employees – even well-off –are indebted and how many depend on their present job, especially in times of unemployment, precariousness and difficult labour market mobility. But, let us remember how much in periods of full employment in France, most firms faced a 30-50% turnover, while this did not prevent strikes at all, some of which took place without the support of trade unions[23]. Gradually, the economic crisis of the nineteen seventies and eighties led to the reconstitution of a ‘reserve army’ of labour, which forms a coercive and disciplinary social context, to which has been added a series of workfarist reforms regarding the welfare system, reducing both the amount and duration of unemployment benefits. In such a context, searching after resistance as ‘partisan sedition’ means expecting behaviour that in reality corresponds to social suicide. To put it bluntly, adopting such a definition makes of resistance a kind of strawman…

Despite all of this, the controversy is all but over. How should sociologists analyse social behaviour corresponding to ‘exit’? How many professionals, white collar employees around the age of 45 start to look after a way out of their job, in the form of a ‘second career’, a better work-life balance, notably through the choice to refuse promotion and the acceptance of a ‘dead-end’ job. How many young temp workers, even being confronted with precarity, do not really engage in the way that they are expected to do, i.e., engage in a harsh competition for some scarce positions? [24] Others are happy to be able to leave the company at 55 thanks to early retirement. We can identify all kinds of conduct corresponding to ‘high end’– exit such as becoming a farmer, a cooperative entrepreneur or a self-employed person. Such behaviour may be the contrary of (internal) opposition and resistance but there is still a link between them, namely the degree of dissatisfaction regarding tasks, targets, managerial standards or a general work climate.

A broader definition of resistance refers not only to the persistence of informal behaviours such as braking, loitering, wigging and sometimes sabotage, but also to the existence of oppositional or critical spirit regarding work and to integrate this into a broader set of conduct by which employees try to re-appropriate, even if only partially, their work situation; if not to loosen the stranglehold of the logic of performance. In fact, resistance to work is often blurred and mixed with adjustment or accommodation behaviours.

Why should this broader definition be prioritised? Because human work is a ‘living matter’ characterised by great plasticity and by its reflexive nature. Acting at work is therefore never a case of complete ‘domination’ and, even if it seems to be, we cannot exclude the hypothesis that employees mimic their servitude and pretend to fully ‘play the game’. Still, this game implies margins of freedom, as has been shown by a number of studies in the 1970s and 1980s on the difference between ‘prescribed work’ and ‘real work’[25]. It is true that information technologies and the injunction of new work ethics have changed the situation, but without moving beyond subsumption, quite the contrary…

For Michael Burawoy[26] who’s analysis on shopfloor behaviour carried him very close to Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical analysis about the ‘double nature of work’. Following Burawoy, production games represent a kind of alienated behaviour that leads the individual to deliberately participate to his own exploitation. Burawoy analysis of production games became quite popular among French sociologists after the publication of some large extracts in the journal Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales[27]. For many years, Buwavoy’s account was taken for granted in French sociology and served as demonstration on how uncontested management has become and how successful alienation could be. Still, Burawoy overlooked the importance of financial gains the production games could offer, sometimes even by 30%. This aspect was already highlighted by Donald Roy who conducted a similar survey twenty years earlier in exactly the same company. When production games integrate a wage-effort bargaining to such an extent, it can hardly be considered as being outside the productive relation between labour and capital, as was recalled by Paul Thompson and Pierre Desmarez in two classical works on the sociology of work [28].

In reality, those games do not express the will to collaborate actively to one’s own exploitation in the Marxian sense of the term, but an attempt to reduce the degree of exploitation by seeking to be paid as much as possible for a constant or reduced effort. Indeed, wage labour remains a relationship where the work performance is exchanged for a pay, which implies on the side of the employee the possibility of ‘pulling on the rope’ or ‘tugging at the heartstrings’… The production games are not reducible to ‘false consciousness’ since they also express a workshop culture based on cooperation between workers, which allowed the ‘collective worker’ to exist socially and to assert its social existence from a management viewpoint.

Our own sociological research included the study of collective action frameworks and trade unions practices on the shop-floor level. A comparative analysis helped me to take into account the various realities of labour relations in big and small firms, as well as the variations determined by the strength of trade unions sometimes renewed by counter-power practices at organisational level. While remaining cautious and recognising the existence of very different situations, depending on the size of the company and the profile of the trade union teams, the fact is that one can still encounter situations similar to what Jean-Daniel Reynaud has called ‘combined regulation’ which can be understood as collective bargaining with some concessions by employers[29].

Of course, when social conflict is less present and trade union action is no longer able to improve working conditions, it is certain that the ‘collective worker’ become more vulnerable which will push individuals to find other ways of coping with the situation. Informal groups can take over and different kinds of conflicts develop, more interpersonal, informal and most of the times confidential. Certainly, management has the power to counteract upon these, by mobilizing surveillance technologies, by repressing recalcitrant spirits ; by promoting docile employees, management gives itself the means to influence the conduct of workers. At the same time, the productive demand for quality cannot be obtained solely by coercion. It also requires loyalty and commitment, which opens up certain margins for negotiation. Managerial practices take this into account and combine intensive mobilisation of ‘human resources’ and high turnover. Core workers are given more and better working conditions, work is less hard while temp or peripheral employees are submitted to high pressure and a performance that is obtained by the promise of a better contract and recruitment among the stable employees. A high turnover makes it possible to externalize the social and human effects of this wear and tear at work. This is illustrated by the high turnover in fast-food restaurants, call centres and logistics. Similarly, the segmentation of the workforce – with a flexible section approaching 30% in many many situations in France – makes it possible to discipline behaviour at work and to reduce open conflicts such as strikes. For insiders, loyalty is obtained in exchange for a certain amount of job security and better work conditions; for peripheral employees, temp workers, commitment is obtained through the promise of future stabilisation, using the status of insider as a perspective for the outsider.

In the tradition of labour process theory, resistance and misbehaviour has been the subject of much interpretations[30]. Following Paul Thompson[31], one of the leading sociologists on this issue, organisational misbehaviour certainly has various origins such as the refusal of work intensification, being underpaid, resentment linked to non-promotion or unappreciated conduct of management. And indeed, if we reason in this way, resistance towards and at work cannot be dissociated from labour relations in a capitalist environment. The following diagram based upon Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) shows how resistance to work can be articulated to the relationship to work as well as other aspects of labour relationship.

Figure 1 – Dimensions of social behavior at work / regarding work

Appropriation of time Appropriation of work Appropriation of production Appropriation of identity
(Loyalty) self-acceleration Self-control of labour process Self-organisation Identification to targets
EngagmentMotivation Acceptance of the rate Normal execution of tasks Working on a fast lane Rituals of

desocialisation

Conditional Cooperation Putting the brake on the rate Negociate the rate (freinage) Output restriction Local work cultures in office and shopfloor.
(Voice) Mastering working time (refusing overtime) Revendications Workers control Games, recreational or sexual activities
Retrait Strolling and braking Minimalism service ‘Perruque’ (wigging) Indifference
Denial Wasting one’s time Retention of quality Larceny Playing the fool
Hostility Absence Destruction and sabotage Fraud Group or class solidarity
(Exit) Turnover   Looking after another job / position Theft Rejection of the company, or the brand

Published in Bouquin (2008) and based upon Ackroyd & Thompson (1999)

How should this diagram be read? First of all, it is important to recognise the vast variety of work conduct that can hardly be understood as stable and unequivocal. The relationship towards labour and work is never solely instrumental (financial) nor expressive (self-fulfilment and joy), but combines several aspects which may be mixed or under tension. This relation towards labour also evolves according to the concrete experience of the working day, of age and seniority. It will also be underpinned by expectations in terms of recognition, career development and better working conditions that may or may not be met. Employees are not insensitive tools and consequently, they can slide from consent to resistance. The fact that the latter category will be a minority does not change anything from a scientific point of view since informal autonomous and resistant behaviour remain present and pay fuel social space. In saying this, I am also questioning a sociological approach that limits itself to what is apparent and refuses to acknowledge that certain practices will remain quite invisible. Finally, this diagram highlights the fact that it is important to study dynamics that allow social groups to continue to exist in the face of management, as well as the reasons that may lead some individuals to opt for recalcitrant or the opposite, docile behaviour.

Before concluding this section, I would like to make some critical remarks about two approaches that differ from my own. The first, developed by Daniel Bachet [32], criticises the tendency to reduce social interactions in the firm to power games, which feeds into, following him, the illusion of a capacity to influence labour relations on the basis of micro-resistances.

“It seems that one of the problems of a certain sociology of work is that it has not always succeeded in reconstructing the mechanisms of interdependence which unite labour relations and the more strategic rules of action structuring the economic and social game within and outside the company. There is therefore a great risk of reducing the analysis of conduct at work to ‘power games’ and forms of opposition that are somewhat disconnected from the broader fields that guide the actions of agents.”

For Bachet, ‘transgressions’ or deviant conduct do not change anything and cannot replace a collective action that defends different criteria of management and accountancy such as a fair partition of added value (surplus value) through wage increases or reduction of working time. Of course, it is true oppositional behaviours ‘don’t change anything’ fundamentally at the level of the capitalist social order but at the same time, it is absolutely wrong to consider them as ‘functional’.

To demonstrate this, we can take a closer view upon ‘wigging’ or la perruque as it is analysed by Robert Kosmann who was a former skilled worker at Renault and militant CGT trade unionist during almost three decades. Far from being a sort of ‘safety valve’, they participate, following Robert Kosmann [33], in maintaining links between members of the ‘collective worker’ and to mobilise this quite vague social entity along lines of cleavage that converge with labour and capital antagonism. In his book, Kosmann collected many proofs of ‘wigging’ or la ‘pérruque’ with workers working for themselves. For sure, ‘wigging’ challenges the legitimacy of the employer’s power to have complete disposability of tools and working time. Its practice represents the refusal of alienation and the mobilisation of professional skills for the sole purpose of the operational result. Robert Kosmann considers also that ‘wigging’ is first of all the expression of professional skills that are inseparable from a professional aesthetic and the will not to sell them out to the employer[34].

Rather than considering all types of employee resistance as futile, or even functional, as did Bachet, it seems more judicious to us to understand its presence in relation to unions, their weakness, as a sort of consequence of a ‘deficit’ in collective bargaining power, which, without remedying to this problem, will lead to a ‘productivity deficit’. Following this path, we can also consider that empowerment of trade unions and rebuilding the capacity for collective action imply the recognition of critique of work as it is expressed among workers. Secondly, resistance should also be understood as expression of a shared culture and ethics about work, about the fact being employed as a worker and often misrecognised.

If management wants to make more sense of working, in order to obtain a reconciliation with constrained action and sufficient productivity, it will have to use the carrot as much as the stick. In other words, although resistance towards work does not open up a horizon for transforming the capitalist social order – which was never pretended to be the case – it may also contribute to maintain a collective spirit, a work-culture and even lead sometimes to the reorganisation of the wage relationship. By its mere existence, resistance as much as harsh and intelligent ways of coercion all testify the non-pacification of the wage labour.

A second approach, developed by Christian Thuderoz and Jacques Bellanger[35], has taken the decision to fully recognise micro-resistances at work by inserting them into a broader typology of oppositional behaviours. This figure n°3 shows how they articulate different dimensions of control and resistance.

Control by submission Control by accountability
opposition opposition
Weak Strong Weak Strong
Engagment Weak Withdrawal Recalcitrant Cynicism Rebellion
Strong Irreverence Militancy Distance Renouncement

 

The overview contains some real heuristic virtues, since it reveals a seesaw between weak and strong opposition figures, and is linked to a mode of control exercised by management which recalls the notion of factory regime developed by Michael Burawoy in Politics of Production[36]. By articulating modes of control with the forms of employee commitment, this figure makes it possible to question a variety of situations. Moreover, the structural dimension is not absent, since the authors consider the ‘employment relationship’ as asymmetrical. Still, the pay/effort equation, the state of the labour market, as well as the socio-professional trajectory and age, will influence the relationship to work and determine how much some a willing to resist or misbehave.

This leads us to some other observations. First of all, it should be noted that oppositional behaviour, and ‘rebellious subjectivity’ are not solely rooted in the experience of work. Let us recall Edward P. Thompson[37] on the origins of the formation of the working class when he highlighted how much the egalitarian desire for fairness have led the first generations of proletarian workers to organise themselves. Barrington Moore’s study on the social origins of obedience and revolt completes this picture, revealing in particular the presence of a ‘moral economy’ based on the values of justice, equity and reciprocity[38]. We could also recall the work of Charles Tilly, for whom the sentiment of injustice is the first driving force behind strike action and even to what may precede it, namely the refusal to submit oneself to management injunctions[39]. John Kelly, a British sociologist of industrial relations, extends this analysis by linking it to the lowering working conditions, caracterised by a constant demand for a very high level of involvement in the work activity[40]. For Kelly too, labour relations are structurally antagonistic, and therefore structurally unfair, which fuels hostility and opposition on the part of employees.

Moreover, these socio-historical interpretation around the moral economy have the merit of not closing the scope of analysis to the internal relations of the workshop or the firm, nor to the institutions and collective bargaining. Indeed, the study of work as a conflicting reality requires not only recognition of the asymmetrical nature of the ‘employment relationship’, as Thuderoz and Bellanger did, but also gains in legibility when class relations structured on the scale of society are included.

Certainly, the long post-war period was one of social progress based upon the extension of welfare, increasing real wages and recognition of social conflict and trade unions. But this happened thanks to geopolitical ‘cold war’ balance as well as the autonomous activity of the working class. The adoption of a middle-class standard norm of consumption may have nourished the belief that upward mobility was easy going. Still, the research about the ‘affluent worker’ done by John Goldthorpe and his team shows that a better living does not necessarily imply losing one’s class identity. However, over the last decades, this upward social mobility has become much more difficult, to that extent that self-employment or ‘using oneself against oneself’ to use French psychologist Yves Clot’s notion, does not help much [41]. Class barriers are difficult to break down, while the condition of the labouring class became more precarious at the corporate level as much as the professional career. The trend towards the degradation of work and labour, such as it was analysed by Harry Braverman [42] in 1975 continued during the 1990s. Since more than a decade, this socio-economic uncertainty also affects stable employment (especially in the public services, care and teaching) as well as skilled categories of the workforce such as engineers and technicians.

3 Between holding out and burning out

It is now established that the 2008 financial crisis had a negative effect on job quality in OECD countries[43]. Following Robert Castel, author of Les métamorphoses de la question sociale : une chronique du salariat (1995-2000)[44], a historical account of the salariat with a long durée analysis, one can observe a movement of casualisation of the ‘stabilised categories’ and the impoverishment of the unstable, precarious workers and thirdly, a growing group of ‘super-numeraries’ that are constrained to live in poverty without any perspective. Following Castel, these developments reflect the return of a ‘wage labour condition’ marked by severe or growing socio-economic insecurity. These evolutions were already underway during the last two decades of the 20th century through a rampant erosion of living standards facilitated by the disempowerment of trade unions. Harsher and degraded living conditions were not only caused by rising unemployment. In many European countries, employment policies followed the path of reduced social protection, lowering benefits and shortening the duration of receiving benefits as well as the increased conditionalities of entitlement. These policies mobilised the ‘reserve army’ in order to increase pressure to accept lower standards of employment[45]. For these reasons Bob Jessop wrote about a ‘Schumpeterian workfare state’[46] while French tandem Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval evoked an ‘ordo-liberal state’, referring to ‘ordo-liberalism’ as a kind state interventionism that supports the accumulation of capital[47].

In many sectors and companies, precarity coincides with substandard working conditions as we can notice in many European surveys. The surveys of the French department of the ministry of labour [48] allow us to observe that assembly line works increased a lot. From 1984 to 2016 the proportion of employees saying ‘their work pace is imposed by the automatic movement of a product or part’ rose from 2.6% to 18% of the total. This trend has now reached the service sector, where supermarkets, call centres and logistics have seen an increase in speed and mechanisation of the labour process. The proportion of employees who have to repeat the same tasks over and over again has increased from 27.5% in 2005 to 42.7% in 2016. Those who report having a work pace imposed by digital monitoring increased from 25% in 2005 up to 35% in 2016. The proportion that declare they frequently have to give up a task for ‘an unscheduled one’ increased from 48.1% in 1991 to 65.4% in 2016. At the same time, those reporting ‘a work pace imposed by an external demand requiring an immediate response’ increased from 28% in 1984 to 58% in 2016. Additionally, pressure is mounting thanks to interventions that are not necessarily consistent. The proportion of employees saying they receive conflicting orders rose from 41% in 2005 to 45% in 2016. As a result, solutions, often on an individual and informal basis need to be found. The number of employees who stated that a mistake or error could result in ‘sanctions’ has risen from 51.3% in 1991 to 63.1% in 2013. The increased responsibilities due to relational work with customers is putting even more pressure on their shoulders.

An equal trend of intensification can be observed, albeit to varying degrees, in several EU countries[49]. It is no exaggeration to say that there is a tendency to constantly increase the pressure on employees. The number who reported having continued to work, while being sick increased significantly during the last decade. In 2016, in France and the United Kingdom, almost six out of ten employees worked whilst being ill. This phenomenon, also known as presenteeism, affects less people in Germany (3/10) and Belgium (4/10), two countries with strong unions at the level of the shopfloor. In terms of work-life balance and working time flexibility, 60% to 70% of respondents (in countries such as Benelux, UK, Germany, France and Italy) declare they have worked at least one full weekend in the four weeks, whereas the proportion of employees was around 45% before the 2008 crisis. The working day is also getting longer: in France, 40% of respondents report having worked more than ten hours a day, at least twice in the past month[50].

Despite the introduction of new work organisations, ‘discretionary autonomy’ (the ability to personally decide how to carry out tasks) remains low. This can be seen as a consequence of lean management, which pursue rationalisation through demanding more effort in less time and with fewer resources. About one third of respondents in France, Germany, Belgium and the UK say they are unable to determine the pace of work. This is a huge minority. However, even more than a third say that they can never determine a break in their work by themselves. Monotonous tasks are still the daily fate for one quarter of the workforce. At the same time, the number of factors fixing the pace of work tends to increase. In France, quite close to the European average, 28% of respondents are confronted with two intensification factors, 24% with three and 18% with four or more. All of these figures have increased compared to the period between 2005 and 2010.

The intensification of work continues and that high pressure targets became unavoidable for almost 20% of the workforce. Beyond a group that is permanently exposed, another 30% to 40% of respondents admit being confronted with such a constrain for about a quarter to half of their working time. When we regroup both segments together, we can say that about 50% of the workforce is nowadays permanently or intermittently exposed to high work pressure. The table below shows how this phenomenon affects employees in different European countries.

Table 1 – Overview of work constraints and workload – European Working Conditions Survey (2017)

  France Belgium Germany United Kingdom
Are you subject to high work rates? • 24% almost all the time

• 30% between ¼ and ¾of the working time

• 22% almost all the time

• 36%between ¼ and ¾of the working time

• 20% almost all the time

• 43% between ¼ and ¾of the working time

• 23% almost all the time

• 42% between ¼ and ¾of the working time

Does your job require you to work under very strict and tight deadlines? • 42% almost all the time

• 29%between ¼ and ¾of the working time

• 41% almost all the time

• 34%between ¼ and ¾of the working time

• 34% almost all the time

• 47% between ¼ and ¾of the working time

• 42% almost all the time

• 38% between ¼ and ¾of the working time

Source: European Working Conditions Survey, 2017 (survey was carried out in 2015)

How do employees behave given this tightening of constraints and demands on their work activity? Initially, most common attitude is to cope with it as best they can, to ‘put up with it’, so to speak. But for a significant proportion of the workforce, those exceptional situations tend to become an implicit standard and in the absence of actions improving working conditions, both bodies and minds are worn out and workers ends up exhausted.

It can be observed, in certain circumstances, from a high turnover rate, that the recurrent replacement of staff becomes a ‘functional’ social norm. Many young workers engage in low quality employment for a certain duration but will quit when they can’t bear the pressure anymore. For employers, this is not a problem as long as they can easily find other workers to engage into such intensified work. Such a regime of intensive labour mobilisation is characteristic for employment sectors that have been described as ‘low road’ in the Anglo-Saxon literature[51]. These ‘low road’ situations include call centres, cleaning, fast food (‘chain workers’) and handling activities in logistics. A survey about job satisfaction and well-being by Ambra Poggi and Claudia Villosio[52], observe quite evidently that jobs with poor autonomy, combining a sustained effort and low pay, high levels of working time flexibility without job security, is making employees much less satisfied regarding their jobs as well as less happy in life. It should also be noticed that most exposed to such working conditions are male unskilled workers, women in the service sector and elder workers.

Since some work situations also demand high quality performance, it will require stable teams with skilled employees and a guaranteed loyalty which is obtained on the basis of various transactions (salary amounts, bonuses and job security). In these circumstances, lean management cannot be so fussy. This is, at least, the interpretation of work situations described as ‘high road’, a metaphor for the way to sustainable, quality employment (Poggi & Villosio, 2015).

My hypothesis is that such a dualistic regime is now in crisis, as shown by the extent of the burn-out. Even if a common medical definition of this pathology is still lacking [53], the fact remains that a growing number of epidemiological studies are devoted to this issue. In Austria, a large survey carried out by general practitioners concluded that almost one in two employees is or has been affected by burn-out [54]. From the medical viewpoint, someone suffering a burn-out will go through different stages: at first, which seems non-pathological in itself, the employee’s conduct corresponds to over-commitment, with an attitude such as ‘I can handle everything’. However, the person neglects hobbies, personal needs, is sometimes irritable and may start to suffer from disordered sleep or lack of appetite. A second stage corresponds to denial – ‘I can still manage’ – but contains the seed of the awareness of problematic work behaviour. The person is trying to maintain this high involvement but will slip into social isolation and start to suffer from physical and psychological somatisation. The third stage is the one where the pathology of burn-out is openly declared, which corresponds to the emergence of phobias, anxieties and other symptoms of depression, to which is sometimes added complete social withdrawal, recurrent insomnia and above all the development of a feeling of exhaustion with an inability to continue working. The final stage occurs when a long sick leave has become inevitable.

According to this survey, out of 45% of people declared being affected by burnouts, the survey evaluates the proportion of people in stage 1 or 2 respectively at 18% and 15%, while 8% of people will slide into the third situation and 2% went as far as stop working for at least a couple of weeks. According to Marc Loriol[55], a French sociologist specialized in the study of health at work, burn-outs should be seen as a process embedded in social and professional contexts:

“Burn-outs results from the combination of a strong commitment to one’s activity and work situations where there are no a priori limits to the needs to be met. If the organisation demands more and more, or if work groups are unable to set these limits or to discuss the adequacy of means to an end, employees will burn out and end up by sick leave in order to keep a job that puts them under pressure at distance. Still, employees who are exhausted by pursuing an unattainable ideal end up, in order to protect themselves begin to develop cynical attitudes or to dehumanise others. As a result, they lose all professional self-esteem and undermine the meaning in their work. If this process is not interrupted by individual accommodation (transfer, retraining, search for forms of self-esteem outside of work, etc.) or collective accommodation (definition of less ambitious objectives, obtaining new room for manoeuvre), it can lead to forms of pathological depression.”[56]

In a 2016, a study by Mickael Rose based on a very large panel of more than 4000 respondents linked burn-outs to the lack of autonomy over workload[57]. Following their findings, it appears that several factors facilitate the onset of a burn-out: 1) the absence of a managerial policy that allows individuals to modulate their efforts, 2) a weak collegiality and solidarity within work teams, 3) the lack of professional training to better adjust to quantitative and qualitative demands. A particularly ‘pathogenic’ dimension seems to be the degree of depersonalisation of work combined with the impossibility to express one’s emotions at work.

Table 2 – Prevalence of burn out and degree of autonomy (Germany, 2015)

Degree of autonomy Men Women
High

6%

7%

Rather high

9%

8%

Rather weak

11%

13%

Weak

17%

15%

Source:Rose et al. (2016) p.36.

Overall, whether one adopts the point of view of an ‘epidemic disease’ or that of a ‘malaise’ specific to ‘fragilised’ people, the fact remains that the syndrome of exhaustion and is now at the forefront of the professional and academic literature.

The use of psychotropic substances is another phenomenon that tends to develop in the workplace. The second congress of French general practitioners about ‘Work, health and the use of psychotropic drugs’, held in 2017 discussed the question of the extent at which there is a causal link between the increased use of psychotropic drugs and the evolution of work[58]. Following the survey among the association’s member doctors, a vast majority of respondents consider that almost two out of three employees regularly use all kinds of drugs to ‘stay in the game’. These drugs range from ordinary painkillers to illegal substances (cannabis, cocaine, amphetamines) or legal drugs such as alcohol. More specifically, a majority also observed an increase in the abuse of opiate derivatives in recent years which seem to be linked with various forms of pain (elbow, back, etc.). “Today, our patients carry a mini-pharmacy with them and pass on tranquilizers among colleagues” explained a doctor who spoke at the congress.

According to their conclusions, this overconsumption is the result of the intensification of work in a context of social isolation, without mutual support and where the sense of community and sharing skills tend to diminish. This makes those exposed to high pressure even more vulnerable. While the consumption of psychoactive substances was primarily the result of professional situations such as stress and increased work demands, today professional rituals such as a shared lunch on Friday come into play in second place. The survey of doctors concludes that individuals seem increasingly helpless to cope with a high performance work culture and find no other way out than ‘doping for coping’. The main medical concern is that, in the absence of solutions, abusive over consumption use becomes a taboo, while the feeling of powerlessness will provoke a crisis in family environment and educational setting for children.

Can we conclude that ‘holding on’ or resilience is already a kind of resistance? Of course not, since the work activity continues to deliver the expected added value and contributes to the overall economic performance of the company. But when we take into account the subjectivity of employees, their relationship towards work, with many employees that continue to cope with targets and constraints, we also know that they tend to convince themselves that efforts will not be vain. But this type of acceptance is based upon denial and will feed a clinical situation that will end up being really pathological. In other words, ‘holding on’ is not so much making oneself resilient as it is the antechamber of an open crisis of one’s commitment to work hard.

4 – Governance of subjectivity and the return of critique upon labour

The non-pacification of work relations can also be analysed through the lens of management’s practices. Of course, management is far from an invariant since it may opt for putting more pressure upon employees as well as it concedes space for autonomy or accept some ‘constrained regulation’ through dialogue with trade union representatives. However, nowadays, certainly in France, the main trend in large firms in the manufacturing sector as well as in the services sector, including the public sector, is to rationalise activity following the recipe of lean management, with a constant search of increased work performances.

In the wake of permanent rationalisation, following Daniel Mercure, the regime of mobilisation of ‘passive agency’ with a workforce whose activity was governed by procedures and bureaucratic control was substituted by a regime conferring employees the role of performers. If the ‘executing agent’ was the typical figure of Taylorism, the post-Fordist regime of mobilisation is structured around the figure of the ‘assigned actor’, considered as responsible but endowed with versatility and reactivity[59]. During the last decade, we saw a new figure of a ‘self-regulated subject’ emerging which aim to mobilise, beyond the individual, the person at work. Oriented towards a strong sense of responsibility and commitment, based on empowerment, the individual ends up considering himself as an entrepreneur of himself and the author of his employability[60]. Subjectivity is represented as free of constraint, with an engagement in work through internalised high-performance requirements.

All these figures can be present in various ways, given that their functionality is strongly correlated with the content of work. Still, to me, the important question here is not to correlate these figures of ‘executing agent’, ‘assigned actor’ and ‘self-regulating subject’ according to job content, the type of organisation, but rather to question the degree of acceptance and internalisation of these figures. Our fundamental hypothesis remains unchanged, namely the fact that management and mobilisation regimes will give rise to critical reflexivity with regard to them. Let us recall, for example, that already at the end of the 1990s, surveys highlighted the mounting of critical views about work and its organisation, especially among skilled employees (clerks, technicians, engineers, supervisors even middle management).

More recent surveys reveal the permanence of such critical views. At a first level, we can observe that the employees may show lot of job satisfaction, even among employees under pressure[61]: 88% of respondents declared themselves satisfied with their work, of which 37% were ‘very satisfied’ and 51% ‘moderately satisfied’. The same survey also revealed that 20% were looking for a job elsewhere and, above all, there was a significant gap between the general opinion and the view on one’s own situation. Thus, 67% consider respectful treatment of staff to be important for job satisfaction, but only 31% consider themselves ‘satisfied’ in this respect. The same discrepancies can be observed regarding other fundamental dimensions of the working relationship:

  • 63% consider pay to be crucial, but only 23% consider themselves satisfied in this respect;
  • 58% consider job security to be an important issue for job satisfaction, but only 32% consider themselves satisfied in this respect.

Similar differences exist in terms of recognition of performance (48% versus 26%), about the content of the work (48% consider the work to be interesting, but only 27% consider theirs to be as such).

As was demonstrated before, in many cases, employees tend to rephrase their opinion in a positive way since this helps to ‘hold on better and longer’ because denial and recoding of bad feelings is needed to pursue full commitment because otherwise demotivation slides in.

Still something changed in the last decade since the governance of subjectivities transformed the issue of job satisfaction into an obligation of love where loving one’s work becomes a categorical moral imperative [62]. It is worthwhile to quote Steve Jobs explaining why: ‘(your) work will fill a large part of your life and the only way to be truly satisfied is to do your job. And the only way to do this is to love what you do’[63]. Therefore, we have moved from the slogan of ‘do what you love’ to ‘love what you do’…

Is this a surprise? Not really since both figures of ‘assigned actor’ as ‘self-regulated subject’ are calling upon powerful emotional and existential springs. Taylorism of subjectivity (in the sense of a prescription of the subjective relation to work) has gradually become a standard based on the sacredness of work that engages both soul and body. Therefore, we can speak about a bio-political dimension that goes beyond the search for recognition of one’s person, talents and contribution to the company. According to Kathi Weeks [64], this evolution is based on the mobilisation of values and resources borrowed from the traditional feminine role of ‘taking care with love’. As long as jobs are considered typically ‘feminine’, this emotional relation to the work effort remains invisible or naturalized. Care work is basically that, i.e; taking care which can only be done well ‘with love’, i.e. with a certain emotional commitment. However, the obligation to perform one’s work ‘with love’ has now spread to other sectors and activities. For Kathi Weeks, the trivialisation of loving your work has been accelerated by the increasing porosity between the spheres of work and non-work, facilitated by the use of nomadic objects and information and communication technologies[65]. Indeed, as long as the spheres of sentimental (romantic) love and the sphere of work were largely dissociated, with the exception of creative arts, they are now overlapping and sometimes merge, making it all the more difficult for individuals not to love too much what they do. In the end, it is not so much loving one’s work that counts as being able to continue to love it despite frustration and disappointment. The promises of love, joy or happiness at work are examples of what Lauren Berlant calls ‘cruel optimism’ because the object of desire overrides the goals that originally led you to it [66].

Are these people fooling themselves? Is this the über-example of voluntary servitude? Even if we can’t exclude this explanation, we should also retain the hypothesis of critical reflexivity, knowing that agency is always present to a certain extent. It is also important to integrate behaviour outside work and the relation towards career development. Both among younger workers as among those over forty, we can observe conduct of avoidance or rejection of jobs considered as meaningless [67]. In France, where student debt is not a massive phenomenon, many young people prefer, as long as the situation allows it (by staying with their parents or sharing the cost of living), a nomadic existence which reflects a refusal to commit to and pursue the effort of social promotion through work. Nowadays, life choices take into account aspects such as leisure, sports, art or travelling around the world, considering work in an instrumental way. The desire for autonomy may also lead individuals to favour non-submissive work settings, even if this means paying the price of a certain social marginality[68]. For those in their forties, some choose for a second career, mobilising vocational training if their status allows it. Sometimes, a refusal of promotion is accompanied by a commitment to activities with a strong ethical content, or even, in some cases, a quite late commitment to the trade unionism.

Some recent research among middle management, engineers and skilled technicians sheds new light on the question of the links between involvement and criticism of work [69]: those who adhere to the values of performance or the company culture are also the ones declaring that they limit their involvement to what is strictly necessary, while the ‘critical minds’ tend to correspond to those who want to appreciate their work for its content. They ‘keep the company going’, as long as the work situation is not too much in conflict with their critical mindset.

Other research shows the variety of tactics used in home care work, aiming both to preserve the care dimension and the relationship with the person being cared for, while at the same time seeking to make the best possible arrangements for working conditions and to secure the job [70]. In other cases, when work requires creativity and intelligence, we can observe levels of over-commitment that is difficult to maintain over time. The importance given to the value of work, by isolating it from the institution/organisation couple represented by the organisation or the employer, is then a source of involvement in itself, similar to the protestant work ethic. It is here that individuals find themselves trapped, especially when they have lost solidarity links with colleagues.

It is by having discovered these new emotional sources of productivity that management manufactured new ways of governance of subjectivities. However, by becoming an institutional narrative, this governance will reveal sooner or later its real nature, namely a sentimental manipulation, a trap, or even an emotional swindle. This is why it is important to continue search after contradictions inside the arrangements of subjectivity.

It is my certainty that those renewed regimes of mobilisation and governance, based on subjectivity and emotions will feed a renewed critique of heteronomy and alienation. The fact that this is not yet fully visible does not mean that it does not exist underneath. Each employee may, depending on his or her professional trajectory and experiences, made up of satisfactions and frustrations, evolve from adherence to misbehaviour and resistance, in relation to his or her position in the hierarchy, level of qualification, age, as well as collective group dynamics or the presence of collective action frameworks (unions, etc.).

Several recent surveys confirm the thesis of recurrent resistance to work as well as a continuous critical reflexivity towards work and management albeit both may vary, i.e. more or less contextual, radical or definitive. Specific research among industrial engineers shows how much the growth of managerial tasks, linked to project-based management, leads to a densification of work and reduces margins of autonomy regarding ‘noble’ technical tasks[71]. Of course, engineers complain about this trend and develop tactics to circumvent and distance themselves from managerialism (i.e. evaluation or performance measurement procedures). Other investigations among the cleaning industry demonstrate how low wage workers will mobilise sanitary standards, in addition to cunning and restraint, to challenge authority[72].

In the service sector, my own field research reveals the extent of mixed behaviour[73]. We identified several modes of action on the part of employees. In the hotel and catering sector, behaviour of waiters is based upon tacit alliances with customers: offering an extra drink or recording a less expensive order while serving a more substantial dish is prompting the customer to pay tips, which can accumulate to 20 or 30 euros per day. As pub-managers may ‘cut’ alcohol in cocktails for example, in order to increase their profits, waiters are doing the same, but regarding their employer. In supermarkets, similar forms of income capture can be found by turning a blind eye to theft. The French Employers’ Federation of Distribution and Trade does not like to publish about this, but training schemes for shopkeepers and middle level management pay a lot of attention to counteract losses from theft, which, according to training, can amount to a significant proportion of stocks. Damaging a package or marking a product as defective is a way of side-lining goods that can be used or resold.

Sometimes, resistance can also translate itself into deliberately unpleasant or repressive customer service. As some research has shown[74], the reception staff of public services may behave in a fussy manner, become overzealous or refuse to deliver the support a customer is asking. Train controllers may use all the latitude they have in applying the rules. Some will turn a blind eye to an infringement, even if it is difficult when they are under the gaze of colleagues, while others will mobilise the security forces. When a train is overcrowded, some may downgrade a business class carriage to an ordinary one, while others will systematically let people pile up each other into and repress with a certain disdain anyone who objects. This kind of behaviour comes close to ‘inverted resistance’ since it means the public service goals are deliberately not met. Still, from the viewpoint of the employees behaving that way, such an attitude is justified since resources for a fluent and good working public service are lacking. It is obvious that the relation to work, the ethos of service to the public and the existence of a professional culture introduce many variables, but the fact remains that the service relationship even in the era of rationalisation and highly formalised ‘customer relationship’ management, leaves room for different kinds of adjustments.

5 – By way of conclusion

Ten years ago, analysis according to which the collective worker is atomised while employees consent enthusiastically, even playfully, to the heteronomy of work, was a one-sided narrative. Even if it was true that the logic of lean management and high-performance work systems had become hegemonic, this does not mean that critical visions and behaviours existed and still do.

Ten years ago, as much as now, at least in France, it is still not easy to make this divergent analysis heard, also because sociology of consent and servitude is presented as compassionate, sometimes even very critical towards capitalism, especially when it develops a narrative that echoes ‘authentic’ speech on the part of employees, sometimes coupled with a trade union-oriented narrative complaining about the lack of awareness and consciousness of workers.

Ten years after the ‘Great recession’ and the financial crisis, the wage labour condition has not improved much in France nor in Europe. Restructuring, casualisation, unemployment, increased competition, blackmail and relocation, the application of digital control technologies, the logic of competence, and the development of managerial policies that make the love of work sacred, have certainly made life at work harder, more stressful and worrisome. These negative aspects may have been counterbalanced for a time by playful and creative dimensions, by a certain autonomy as well as the valorisation of one’s personal contribution and the patient expectations of (very selective) promotion. Of course, as long as employees continue to believe in this, it will be reflected in their behaviour. But what happens when disappointed hopes accumulate and a widespread sense of injustice gains ground?

More fundamentally, when many people need stimuli or psychotropic drugs, when they become sick because of their job, the first thing to recognise is that the social sphere around wage labour or paid work is by no means ‘pacified’. Intensifying work to an extent than people are not capable to sustain is indeed a form of aggression or violence, not only symbolically, since it physically hurts bodies and minds. Sooner or later, this kind of situations will not fail to give rise to reactions, both at the level of subjectivity, representations as regarding behaviour, .e. the way in which people work together and complete their work.

In view of the extent of the degradation of working conditions, we can formulate the hypothesis that critique of work now affects managers, whether they are executives or supervisors, as much as technicians or engineers, and even more so subordinate employees such as workers and employees. This critique does not imply that people no longer appreciate their work and its content; they can do so and still carry the value of work high. On the other hand, I am convinced that we are witnessing a return of critical and even ‘rebellious’ subjectivity that is directed as much towards management as at it targets the abstract logic of valorisation (like sacrificing everything for the purpose of a career) perceived as ‘cold’ and almost inhuman. This critique will be all the more vigorous as it is well understood that many misbehaviours and resistance practices are not able to change what has become unbearable ‘in the long run’. In such a situation, only ‘exit’ or moments of social revolt open up some perspective both on individual as collective level.

This collective dimension can emerge where it is not expected. When we understand the wage condition as a whole and observe how many workers and couples belonging to ‘lower France’ have difficulty finding housing, healthcare and healthy food and when we add to this the impoverishment of the ‘middle classes’ and their growing difficulties in becoming homeowners or sustaining their social status, the social revolt of the gilets jaunes becomes more easily understandable.[75] This social revolt of the invisible of peripheral France is a perfect example of how a vast accumulated anger ends up exploding brutally, far from the immediate work space. In that regard, the idea that a new kind of human being has emerged, manufactured by lean production, and that he/she will consent to work hard in order to consume as much as possible while keeping silent, sounds like a bizarre interpretation of contemporary reality[76]. As Yann Le Lann has shown, based on a sociological survey of the Gilets jaunes occupying the roundabouts[77], this tax revolt was at the origin of a spontaneous and unexpected plebeian mobilisation, fuelled by a lack of recognition of work, both at the level of wages (or social benefits), as well as the shrinking earnings of small entrepreneurs.

The question remains, which we have not addressed yet: how does resistance relate to more general social conflict, whether institutionalised or not. The most reasonable conclusion is that both sociological analyses as social actors have every interest in not turning its back on what happens at the level of concrete work and the subjectivities that are involved in it.

(achieved in Summer 2018, published spring 2020)

English translation by the author

 

Stephen BOUQUIN (°1968) is a historian by training, has a PhD in political sciences (University of Paris 8) and qualified as sociologist by the CNU (1999). From 2000 to 2010, he was a senior lecturer in sociology at the University of Picardie-Jules-Verne followed by a position of professor at the University of Evry Paris-Saclay. He was director of Centre Pierre Naville between 2011-2018, and has been the editor of the biannual journal Les Mondes du Travail (www.lesmondesdutravail.net) since it was launched in 2006. He has published several books, including Résistances au travail (2008) and participated in several European research programmes.

 

Footnotes & bibliography

[1]– The original French version was published in Daniel Mercure (coord.) (2020), Les transformations contemporaines du rapport au travail, University of Laval Press.

[2] – Crozier, Michel, De la bureaucratie comme système d’organisation, Archives européennes de sociologie, vol. 2 – pp. 18-52; Touraine, Alain, « Pouvoir et décision dans l’entreprise », in G. Friedmann, P. Naville, Traité de sociologie du travail, T. II, 1962, pp. 3-41; Touraine, Alain, L’évolution du travail ouvrier aux usines Renault, Paris, CNRS éditions, 1955.

[3]– By ‘exploitation’ I mean a relationship of surplus extraction by the company and its shareholders, via the non-remuneration of a segment of the working time. There has been a long debate in French sociology since Raymond Aron explained the impossibility to quantify and therefore to prove the real existence of tearing our wealth by a non-payment for it. (Aron

[4] – Gorz, André, (ed.), Critique de la division du travail, 1973; Gorz, André, Métamorphoses du travail, quête du sens, 1988.

[5] – Vincent, Jean-Marie, Le Travail. Entre le faire et l’agir, 1987, PUF, Paris; Vincent, Jean-Marie, ‘La domination du travail abstrait’, in Critiques de l’Economie Politique, n°1, October-December 1977. POSTONE

[6] – Negt, Oskar, Lebendige Arbeit, enteignete Zeit: Politische und kulturelle Dimensionen des Kampfes um die Arbeitszeit, 1987; Negt, Oskar, L’Espace public oppositionnel, 2007.

[7] – Castoriadis, Cornelius, Political Writings 1945-1997. The Questions of the Labour Movement (Volumes I and II), 2012.

[8] – Lütdke, Alf, Des ouvriers dans l’Allemagne du XXe siècle : le quotidien des dictatures, L’Harmattan, 2000; Alf Lüdtke, Eigen-Sinn : Fabrikalltag, ArbeitererfahrungenundPolitikvomKaiserreich bis in den Faschismus, 1993, 445p. For an introduction to Lütdke, see also Alexandra Oeser, ‘Penser les rapports de domination avec Alf Lüdtke’, in Sociétés Contemporaines, vol. 99-100, n° 3, 2015, pp. 5-16.

[9] – Bouquin, Stephen (ed.), Les Résistances au travail, Paris, Syllepse, 2008.Most of this work dates from the early 2000s and was not necessarily very visible, given the status of young researchers or doctoral students, or even students, who turned their summer jobs into a field of participant observation and collected information showing, even if the confidentiality of these practices was fiercely defended, that braking, loitering, stealing and even sabotage was still practiced.

[10] – Hatzfeld, Nicolas, Les gens d’usine. 50 ans d’histoire à Peugeot-Sochaux, 2001, see also Durand, Jean-Pierre and Hatzfeld Nicolas, La Chaîne et le Réseau, Peugeot-Sochaux, ambiances d’intérieur, éditions Page 2, Lausanne, 2002.

[11] – Durand, Jean-Pierre, La Chaîne invisible. Travailleur aujourd’hui: flux tendu et servitude volontaire, Paris, 2004.

[12] – Linhart, Danièle, Travailler sans les autres, Paris, 2009.

[13] – Beaud, Stéphane and Pialoux, Michel, Retour sur la condition ouvrière, Enquête aux usines Peugeot de Sochaux-Montbéliard, Paris, 1999.

[14] – Bouquin, Stephen, La Valse des écrous. Labour, Capital and Collective Action in the Automobile Industry, Syllepse, 2006. See in particular chapters 1 (L’Archipel perdu, pp. 21-34) and 2 (De la voie unique à la diversité des modèles? , pp. 34-46).

[15] – Smith, Tony, Technology and Capital in the Age of Lean Production: A Marxian Critique of the ‘New Economy’, New York, SUNT, 2000; Bouquin, Stephen, 2006, op.cit; Bouquin S. e.a., Temps durs et dur travail. Un retour critique sur les modèles productifs à l’ère néo-libérale », in Jacquot Lionel, Higelé, Jean-Paul, Lhotel Hervé, Nosbonne, Christophe, Formes et structures du salariat : crise, mutation, devenir, 2011, pp. 110-123.

[16] – Examples can be found in the pharmaceutical industry as well as in the automobile sector. See Muller Séverin, ‘Modes de production du médicament générique et conditions d’emplois’, La nouvelle revue du travail [Online], 12 | 2018, online 01 May 2018, accessed 31 October 2019. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/nrt/3501; DOI: 10.4000/nrt.3501 See also, for the automotive sector, Bouquin S., La valse des écrous. Travail, capital et action collective dans le secteur automobile, Syllepse, 2006.

[17] – Bouquin S. (2006), ‘Visibilité et invisibilité des luttes sociales: question de quantité, de qualité ou de perspective?’, in Cours-Salies P., Lojkine J.,Vakaloulis M. (2006), Nouvelles Luttes de Classe, Actuel Marx, PUF, 2006, pp. 103-112.

[18] – Following the approach of James C. Scott, then still little known in France, who highlight the existence of a hidden narrative that is only expressed behind the back of power. See Scott, James C., Domination and the Arts of Resistance. The Hidden Transcript, 1990.

[19] – Baudelot, Christian and Gollac, Michel, Travailleur pour être heureux, Seuil, Paris, 2003. See in particular pp. 277-297.

[20] – Passeron, Jean-Claude, Le Raisonnement sociologique. L’espace de raisonnement naturel non popperien, Paris, Nathan, 1991.

[21] – Bouquin, Stephen, ‘Les résistances au travail entre domination et consentement’, in Bouquin, Stephen op.cit. 2008, p. 44; see also Bouquin, S., ‘Les résistances au travail. Il est temps de sortir de l’imprécision’, in Caldéron, José-Angel and Cohen, Valérie (eds.), Qu’est-ce que résister? Usages et enjeux d’une catégorie d’analyse sociologique, 2014, p. 111-123.

[22] – See in particular Flocco, Gaëtan, Les cadres, des dominants très dominés. Pourquoi les cadres acceptent leur servitude, Raisons d’agir, 2015.

[23] – Spitaels, Guy, Les conflits sociaux en Europe: grèves sauvages, contestations et rajeunissement des structures, Marabout, 1971. For a review, see Bachy Jean-Paul, Guy Spitaels, Les conflits sociaux en Europe, Marabout Service collection, 1971. In: Sociologie du travail, 14ᵉ année n°4, Octobre- décembre 1972. pp. 476-478.

[24] – Farcy Isabelle, Ajustement et oppositions masquées par mes intérimaires, in Bouquin S., op.cit.,  (2008), pp. 157-178; Letexier Jean-Yves, Autonomie et resistances chez les intérimaires, Mémoire Master, Université de Picardie Jules Verne, 2012.

[25] – Clot, Yves, Travail et pouvoir d’agir, Presses Universitaires de France, 2014.

[26] – Burawoy, Michael, Produire le consentement. [édit orig. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism, 1979], Les Prairies ordinaires, 2015, 303p.

[27] – Fournier Pierre (1996), ‘Deux regards sur le travail ouvrier’. In: Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. Vol. 115, décembre 1996. Les nouvelles formes de domination dans le travail (2), pp. 80-93. https://doi.org/10.3406/arss.1996.3206 ; www.persee.fr/doc/arss_0335-5322_1996_num_115_1_3206

[28] – Thompson Paul (1983), The Nature of Work: An Introduction to Debates on the Labour Process, 1983; in French, one can consult Desmarez Pierre, (1986), La sociologie industrielle au Etats-Unis.

[29] – see Reynaud Jean Daniel (1997), Les règles du jeu. L’action collective et la régulation sociale, Paris, A Colin, coll. « U », 1989, 314 p ; Reynaud Jean Daniel (1995), Le conflit, la négociation et la règle, Toulouse, Octarès, « Travail »,268 p.

This ‘joint regulation’ also has its roots in certain trade union traditions, inspired by the doctrine of ‘workers control’ (a counter-power with a right of veto) and a desire to make trade union incursions into management criteria and investment choices. A counter-project trade unionism that can sometimes go as far as co-management while still having social reserves for mobilisation. The fragmentation of the ‘collective worker’ is therefore not the only trend, even if it may seem to predominate in France. For my part, I would explain the weakness of a structured opposition between labour and capital by the fragmentation of the trade union field, their weak collective bargaining power and a relationship to the state on the other hand which translates itself in a tendency to transform any conflict into a legal case before courts.

[30] – Whitson, Kevin, ‘Workers Resistance and Taylorism in Britain’ in International Review of Social History, Amsterdam, 1986.  See also Ackroyd, Stephen and Thompson, Paul, Organisational Misbehaviour, 1999; Ackroyd Stephen and Thomspon Paul (2016), Unruly Subjects: misbehaviour in the workplace, in The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Work and Employment, édité par Stephen Edgell, Heidi Gottfried et Edward Granter (2016), Londres : Sage Publications.

[31] – Thompson Paul, ‘Dissent at Work and the Resistance Debate: Departures, Directions and Dead-Ends’, mimeo ; Thompson Paul, ‘Dissent and Resistance in the Workplace in the Context of Neo-Liberalism’, McMaster University 3rd October 2014  

[32] – Bachet, Daniel, “Résistance, autonomie et implication des salariés. Quelle sociologie pour le travail”, in

Les Mondes du Travail n°12, November 2012, pp. 139-148.

[33] – Robert Kosmann, Sorti d’usine. La perruque, un travail détourné, Paris, 2018; For a different approach considering ‘wigging’ as a possible source of extra-income, see Étienne de Banville, L’Usine en douce: le travail en « perruque », Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001.

[34] – Kosmann, Robert, Sorti d’usine, op.cit., p. 23.

[35] – Bellanger, Jacques and Thuderoz, Christian, « Le répertoire de l’opposition au travail », in Revue Française de Sociologie, 51 (3), July-Sept. 2010, pp. 427-460.

[36] – Burawoy, Michael, The Politics of Production, Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism, Verso, 1985.

[37]–  Thompson, Edward P., The Making of the English Working Class London, 1963; see also Thompson, Edward P. (1991). Customs in Common. New York: New Press.

[38] – Moore, Barrington, Injustice. The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, London, Palgrave, 1978, 540 pp.

[39] – Tilly, Charles and Tilly, Chris, Work Under Capitalism, London-NY, 1998, 336p.

[40] – John Kelly (1998), Rethinking industrial relations, Routlegde.

[41] – Clot, Yves, Le Travail sans l’homme? Pour une psychologie des milieux de travail et de vie, Paris, 1995.

[42] – Braverman, Harry, Labor and Monopoly Capital. The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, NY, 1974.

[43] – Watt, Andrew and Leschke Jane, Report on job quality in Europe, ETUI, 2015 (2012)

[44] – Castel Robert (1995), Les métamorphoses de la question sociale : une chronique du salariat, Fayard, Paris, 478 p.

[45] – Bellal, Selma and Bouquin, Stephen, ‘Towards a redefinition of collective rights embodied in work and its status: employment and social rights under the test of the active social state’, in Année Sociale 2000, ULB – Institut de sociologie, pp. 264-284.

[46] – Jessop, Bob, “Post-Fordism and the State”. In Greve, Brent (ed.), Comparative Welfare Systems, Basingstoke, 1996.

[47] – Dardot, Pierre and Christian Laval, La Nouvelle Raison du monde. Essai sur la société néolibérale, Paris, 2010, 498 p. published in English under the title ‘The New Way of the World. On Neoliberal Society’, Verso Books, 2014.

[48] – All the statistical data here are taken from the “Working Conditions” surveys conducted at regular intervals by DARES and the Ministry of Labour since 1978. Some questions were introduced later, hence the different dates in the comparisons presented. Data available online https://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/dares-etudes-et-statistiques/statistiques-de-a-a-z/article/les-contraintes- physical-and-intensity-of-work

[49]https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1634en.pdf

[50] – Flexibility is not necessarily the same everywhere, as in Belgium 30% report having worked more than 10 hours, while in Germany this number drops to 22%.

[51] – Gallie, Duncan, Employment Regimes and the Quality of Work, Oxford University Press, 2009, 277 p.; Turner, Lowel, Wever, Kirsten S. and Fichter, Michael, “Perils of the high and low roads: Employment relations in the United States and Germany”, In K. S. Wever (Ed.), Labor, business, and change in Germany and the United States pp., 123-155; Holthgrewe, Ursula, Kirov, Vassil, Ramioul, Monique, Hard Work in New jobs, The Quality of Work and Life in European Growth Sectors, 2015, 305p; see also Duncan Gallie Skills, “Job Control and the Quality of Work: the Evidence from Britain’, The Economic and Social Review, 2012, 43, 3: 325-341; Gallie, Duncan, Felstead Alan and Green Francis, ‘Job preferences and the intrinsic quality of work: the changing attitudes of British employees 1992-2006’, Work Employment and Society, 2012, 26, 5: 806-821..

[52] – Poggi, Ambra and Villosio, Claudia, “Subjective well-being at the workplace”, in Holthgrew, Ursula, Kirov, Vassil, Ramioul, Monique, Hard Work in New Jobs. The Quality of Work and Life in European Growth Sectors, 2015, pp. 70-83.

[53] -With the exception of Italy, burnout is hardly recognised as an occupational disease in any EU country. In France, its recognition was rejected during parliamentary debates on the Labour Law. In Sweden, the ‘fatigue syndrome’ has been recognised as a pathology belonging to ‘stress related adaptation disorders’ in response to severe stress situations.

[54] – This is also confirmed by a YouGov survey in the UK, which found that half of respondents said they were suffering or had suffered from burnout or anxiety related to working conditions. With the exception of older workers, all occupational categories were more or less equally affected.

[55] – Loriol, Marc, « Reconnaitre le burn out. Une fausse bonne idée? », in La Revue Parlementaire, February 2018.

[56] – Loriol, Marc, « Comprendre les risques psychosociaux complexes, multiformes et multifactoriels », in

Psychiatric Care, Vol 39 – No 318, p. 20-23 – September 2018.

[57] – It should be noted in passing that their definition of burn-out is restrictive, limiting it to symptoms once the pathology has occurred. See Rose, U., Müller, G., Burr, H., Schulz, A. and Freude, G. (2016), Arbeit und Mentale Gesundheit. Ergebnisse aus einer Repräsentativitätserhebung der Erwerbstätigen in Deutschland, Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin (BAuA), Dortmund, Berlin and Dresden. For a European overview, see Eurofound (2018), Burnout in the workplace: A review of data and policy responses in the EU, 57p.

[58]https://www.additra.fr/crbst_6.html . About the congress, see https://congresadditra.fr/; see also Crespin, Renaud, Lhuillier, Dominique, Lutz, Gladys, Se doper pour travailler, Eres, 352 p., 2017.

[59] – Mercure, Daniel (2017), “ Capitalisme contemporain et Régimes de Mobilisation Subjective au Travail”, in Mercure, Daniel and Bourdages-Sylvain Marie-Pierre (eds.), Travail et subjectivité. Perspectives Critiques, 2017, p. 53

[60] – Mercure, Daniel (2017), op. cit. p. 55-57.

[61] – Baudelot, Christian, Gollac, Michel (2003), Travailler pour être heureux, Fayard, Paris.

[62] – see Jaffe Sarah (2021), ‘Work won’t love you back: How Devotion to Our Jobs Keeps Us Exploited, Exhausted and Alone’, New York, Bolt press.

[63] – Employee satisfaction and engagement. Revitalizing a changing workforce, Society for Human Resources Management, see https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and- surveys/Documents/2016-Employee-Job-Satisfaction-and-Engagement-Report.pdf

[64] – Jobs, Steve. 2005. ‘You’ve Got to Find What You Love, Jobs Says.’ Stanford News, June 14. http://news.stanford.edu/2005/06/14/jobs-061505/.

[65] – Weeks, Kathi, ‘Down with Love: Feminist Critique and the New Ideologies of Work’ in Women Studies Quarterly: Precarious Work, vol. 45, no. 3&4, Fall-Winter 2017.

[66] – Berlant, Lauren. 2011. Cruel Optimism, Duke University Press, 2011.

[67] – Cingolani, Patrick, Révolutions précaires: essai sur l’avenir de l’émancipation, Paris, La Découverte, 2014; Vakaloulis, Michel, Précaires, pas démotivés. les jeunes, le travail l’engagement, Paris, 2013, Bouquin, Stephen, op. cit, 2008. See also Cingolani, Patrick, ‘Travail précaire, précaires et résistances’, in Caldéron José-Angel and Cohen, Valérie, Qu’est ce que résister? Usages et enjeux d’une catégorie d’analyse sociologique, Lille, Septentrion, 2014, 27-38.

[68] – Cingolani, Patrick, 2014, op. cit.

[69] – Moulin, André, Social commitment in the economic field with regard to personal ethics: Diversity of expressed perceptions and social conduct of employees: a question of convictions and passions? Ph.D, University of Evry-Val d’Essonne Paris Saclay, under supervision of S. Bouquin, 2017.

[70] – Avril, Christelle, Les aides à domicile. Un autre monde populaire, Paris, La Dispute, coll. “Corps, santé, société”, 2014.

[71] – Petit, Sébastien, ‘Recomposition de la division du travail de conception : le travail en bureau d’études dans un cadre gestionnaires’, in Les Mondes du Travail n°11, nouvelle série, February 2012, pp. 13-26.

[72] – Reyssat, François, Dominations et résistances au travail. Investigation into the bodily experience of cleaning workers. Thesis directed by Numa Murard, defended at the University of Paris-Diderot Sorbonne (December 2015)

[73] – Bouquin, Stephen, Le Travail réel et ses ambivalences en temps de crise. Enquête dans le secteur des services, mimeo, 2019, 45p.

[74] – Leduc, Sacha, « Les résistances à la modernisation des techniciennes de l’Assurance maladie. Quand le contrôle des populations devient enjeu d’affirmation professionnelle », in Durand J-P., Dressen M. (coord.), Violence et Travail, Toulouse, Octarès, 2011; Leduc, Sacha, Le Respect de l’égalité et de la légalité. Les résistances à la modernisation, GTM, CPAM 58, mimeo, 2007.

[75]– Bouquin, Stephen, « La révolte en gilet jaunes ou Le retour en force de la question sociale », in Les Mondes du Travail n°22, winter-spring 2019, pp. 121-132.

[76] – As is put forward by Durand Jean-Pierre (2019), ‘Creating the New Worker: Work, Consumption and Subordination’, Palgrave London, original French publication in 2017.

[77]– Le Lann, Yann, « Ce sont les classes populaires, employés et ouvriers, qui sont sur les barrages », in Le Monde, published on the 24th of December 2018.

 

Brisons les chaînes algorithmiques !

[article publié dans Travailler au Futur n° 6]

Le travail se numérise de manière fulgurante. Depuis le début de la pandémie, cette numérisation s’est amplifiée au point où elle envahit désormais toutes les sphères de la vie sociale. Dans cet article, nous proposons d’analyser en profondeur les effets de cette numérisation. L’enjeu est de taille : soit nos sociétés glissent toujours plus vers un futur dystopique digne de 1984 ou de Brave New World soit un sursaut démocratique et social fait que notre avenir restera digne d’être vécu[1].

La numérisation de la production a commencé bien avant l’arrivée des ordinateurs et d’internet. En effet, les premières machines à commande numérique sont apparus dans l’industrie à la fin des années 1940. Mais c’est bien plus tard, lorsque certaines limites techniques furent dépassées à la fin des années 1970, que la première vague de robotisation se développa. Dans les années 1990, les constructeurs du secteur automobile ont imposé aux opérateurs la signature de leur travail. Ainsi, l’ensemble des opérations de travail devenaient traçables, facilitant ainsi un contrôle de qualité intégré au process industriel. Au cours de la décennie suivante, celle des années 2000, le numérique a fait son apparition du côté des chauffeurs-livreurs, dotés de systèmes de navigation embarquée pour s’étendre très vite du côté des préparateurs de commandes dans les dépôts de logistique, des postiers ou encore des cadres qui travaillent avec des progiciels. Aujourd’hui, la numérisation s’amplifie avec le télétravail, la mise en réseau des activités de production et de service. Les services publics se digitalisent tandis que dans l’éducation nationale, élèves et enseignants sont sommés d’intégrer des espaces numériques d’apprentissage. Le métier d’enseignant est bouleversé autant que celui d’étudiants ou élève…

Partout où il se manifeste, le numérique facilite la mesure comparative de la performance, non seulement du côté des salariés mais également des fournisseurs, prestataires ou sous-traitants. Il s’agit bel et bien d’une révolution technologique de premier ordre. Reste à savoir comment l’appréhender et comment y résister, si tant est qu’il faut le faire…

Pour élucider cette question, il faut avant tout commencer par briser le secret du « code source », comprendre la nature de la révolution numérique. Pour concrétiser cela, je propose de procéder en deux temps : primo, il faut commencer par déchiffrer ce qu’est le numérique dans sa réalité la plus concret et pratique ; secundo, il faut conceptualiser de manière adéquate l’innovation technologique en général, numérique en particulier. Le numérique mobilise des informations fragmentaires sur lesquelles s’opèrent des opérations logiques. L’informatique traite ces informations sur un mode binaire, en mobilisant des langages qui organisent le classement de ces informations de manière complexe. C’est ici que l’algorithme fait son apparition. Pour Gérard Berry, chercheur en science informatique, un algorithme c’est :

« tout simplement une façon de décrire dans ses moindres détails comment procéder pour faire quelque chose . Il se trouve que beaucoup d’actions mécaniques, toutes probablement, se prêtent bien à une telle décortication. Le but est d’évacuer la pensée du calcul, afin de le rendre exécutable par un automate numérique. On ne travaille donc qu’avec un reflet numérique du système réel avec qui l’algorithme interagit. »

Il ne s’agit donc pas seulement d’un raisonnement mais aussi d’une action, au vrai sens du terme . Le script codé est chargé d’une finalité concrète à savoir résoudre un problème [2] donné.Un algorithme n’est donc rien d’autre qu’une suite finie et non ambiguë d’opérations et d’instructions qui permettent de résoudre une classe de « problèmes ». Ceci permet à son tour de mobiliser de manière standardisée l’évaluation de l’effectivité [3].

L’usage des algorithmes dans la programmation de tâches machiniques automatisées ne date pas de hier. Après la seconde guerre mondiale, les machines à commande numérique ont fait leur entrée dans l’industrie. Là aussi, un algorithme dictait à la machine ce qu’il fallait faire, comme par exemple arrêter l’usinage d’une pièce dès qu’une « tolérance critique » fut atteinte. L’algorithme a donc besoin d’informations et d’instruments de mesure, de capteurs fiables, faute de quoi le codage algorithmique devient caduc et dysfonctionnel. Dans ses développement récents, rendus possibles par l’interconnectivité apportée par internet, ces informations sont extraites à partir de l’activité travaillée de ceux qui utilisent ces machines

Aujourd’hui, les algorithmes sont une composante essentielle du fonctionnement des réseaux et de « l’intelligence artificielle » qui correspond en réalité à une sorte d’intelligence programmée qui reste dépendante de cette dernière. Avec internet et la constitution de larges bases de données (les big data), les algorithmes se sont démultipliés à tous les niveaux. Chaque année, plusieurs centaines de milliers d’étudiants voulant s’inscrire à l’université sont orientés par l’algorithme de « Parcoursup ». Les échanges sur les réseaux sociaux sont organisés par des algorithmes. La navigation sur internet alimente les centres de données et sont traités par des algorithmes. Les caméras de surveillance font le tri dans les images à l’aide d’algorithmes. Inutile de poursuivre la liste des exemples, les algorithmes sont effectivement partout.

Les philosophes Thomas Berns et Antoinette Rouvroy ont identifié l’émergence de cette réalité comme une « gouvernementalité algorithmique »[5]. En effet, les algorithmes permettent de classer les comportements hétérogènes, ce qui permet de brasser un océan de données, pour les traiter, les trier, les personnaliser et les insérer dans des instructions de commandement. Le code source de l’informationnel algorithmique contient donc une puissance de « faire faire », ce qui, dans un environnement où le pouvoir est inégalement distribué, en fait une arme redoutable…

Mais il ne suffit pas de briser le secret du « code source » algorithmique, il tout aussi essentiel de conceptualiser de manière adéquate l’instance technologique. Bien souvent, l’analyse sociologique tend à considérer le numérique comme un dispositif technique, comme une « chose », certes abstraite, mais une chose quand-même. Une telle approche nous fait voir que le dispositif tout en laissant hors champ les rapports sociaux de production, de propriété, de pouvoir et surtout les contradictions qui les travaillent. Pour ma part, je préfère résister à la tentation du « fétichisme numérique »[6], avatar d’un déterminisme technologique que les sociologues ou économistes reproduisent souvent inconsciemment. La raison est simple, ce fétichisme numérique fausse notre compréhension et nous oriente soit vers l’optimisme béat (l’émancipation par le numérique) soit vers un catastrophisme paralysant (l’humanité dominée par les robots). Or, notre avenir ne sera ni l’un ni l’autre mais seulement ce qu’on nos actions sociales réussiront à empêcher et à faire advenir…

La technologie numérique n’est donc pas une sorte de force autonome mais seulement un dispositif d’agencement des rapports sociaux de production. Les informations numériques sont à la fois force productive et marchandise, tout comme la force de travail au demeurant. Loin d’être neutres, elles répondent à un double objectif : maximiser la profitabilité et minimiser les risques (la concurrence, la rétention de productivité par le travail vivant). Le numérique algorithmique n’est donc rien d’autre qu’un rapport social dédoublé, qui aussi assujettissant qu’il puisse être, engage toujours le travail vivant et demeure donc dépendant de ce dernier. Ce qui signifie que le pouvoir du numérique algorithmique demeure contingent, tout autant que celui du capital sur le travail. Dit autrement, dans l’antagonisme qui oppose capital et travail, il faut comprendre pourquoi on est perdant et comment on ne l’est pas forcément tout le temps… Par conséquent, si la technologie n’est pas neutre mais une relation sociotechnique sous contrôle du management (ou de l’entreprise-plateforme), elle devient en même temps un terrain contesté, de luttes et d’oppositions [7].

L’algorithme comme puissance de « faire faire ».

Dans le contexte actuel, il est certain que les algorithmes créent de nouvelles possibilités pour contrôler et diriger l’activité de travail. Cette puissance algorithmique s’exerce de plusieurs manières qu’on peut distinguer facilement. Les algorithmes permettent de recommander, de restreindre, d’enregistrer, d’évaluer, de remplacer et de récompenser. L’ensemble de ces actions viennent renforcer les modalités de contrôle dont le management dispose déjà et qui s’organisent autour du contrôle technique et bureaucratique [8].

La recommandation renvoie à l’usage de scripts offrant des suggestions destinées à inciter un opérateur à prendre les décisions préférées de l’architecte de choix [9]. Cependant, contrairement aux régimes de contrôle technique et bureaucratique-rationnel, la recommandation algorithmique guide les décisions des travailleurs en identifiant des récurrences, grâce aux schémas d’apprentissage automatisés (machine learning). Le travailleur est donc invité à se conformer à un scénario fixé par le programme.

En général, ces recommandations prennent la forme du nudging [10] – une sorte d’incitation subtile et paternaliste – que l’on peut difficilement ignorer. Par exemple, Uber s’est engagé dans un processus de nudging individualisé en temps réel pour inciter les chauffeurs à rentrer chez eux lorsque trois passagers consécutifs signalaient qu’ils ne se sentaient pas en sécurité [11]. Un autre exemple : Uber s’est appuyé sur des données personnalisées telles que la vitesse de freinage et d’accélération, pour analyser si les chauffeurs conduisaient de manière erratique pour recommander de manière algorithmique le moment où ils pourraient avoir besoin de se reposer [12]. Signalons aussi que les helpdesks utilisent des systèmes qui trient les messages écrits suivant leur degré d’agressivité.

La plupart des enquêtes convergent pour dire que recommandations algorithmiques ont des effets négatifs sur les conditions de travail [13]. Dans la logistique des entrepôts, les systèmes de recommandation algorithmiques s’appuient sur des catégorisations opaques. Par exemple, le système de recommandation d’Amazon approvisionne ses entrepôts à l’aide d’un algorithme de stockage chaotique, qui attribue des marchandises sur les étagères en fonction de l’espace et de la disponibilité. Comme la logique algorithmique reste opaque, les travailleurs ne peuvent plus se fier à leur propre cognition pour trouver des articles et n’ont aucun moyen de trouver des articles lorsque le serveur tombe en panne…[14] . Dans le domaine de la santé, où la recommandation par algorithme est appliquée au niveau des diagnostics en ligne, les enquêtes indiquent que ce mode opératoire augmente le doute et l’incertitude parmi les professionnels en termes de décisions à prendre [15].

Pour les travailleurs, les recommandations algorithmiques ne sont pas forcément intelligibles, ce qui peut provoquer des frustrations et nourrir des sentiments de dépossession et d’aliénation. Forcément, le dirigisme algorithmique va mettre sous tension la coopération dans le travail puisque celle-ci s’organise autour de process automatisés.

La restriction est un deuxième mécanisme de contrôle qui passe par l’utilisation d’algorithmes qui déterminent l’affichage sélectif d’informations afin d’induire des comportements spécifiques et d’en empêcher d’autres. La plateforme de recrutement Upwork a utilisé des chatbots (robots de dialogues) pour signaler aux télé-opérateurs leur engagement de ne pas travailler en dehors de la plateforme, et ce dès qu’ils utilisent certains mots tels que Skype, Smartphone ou courriel dans leurs conversations avec les clients. La restriction se fonde également sur la rétention d’information. Ainsi, Uber n’indique pas le lieu où se trouve le passager à transporter, ce qui empêche le chauffeur de mesurer la « profitabilité » d’un trajet avant d’accepter la course. Uber et Lyft utilisent également l’algorithme forward dispatch qui attribue la course suivante avant la fin de la course en cours. Les chauffeurs peuvent mettre en pause cette fonction, mais dès qu’ils acceptaient leur prochaine course, la fonction est réactivée. On comprend que l’algorithme fonctionne ici comme un dispositif de subordination des chauffeurs et que leur acceptation de la course n’est qu’un alibi pour leur imposer un statut de chauffeur indépendant. La restriction algorithmique permet aussi de limiter les possibilités de « prise de parole » de la part des travailleurs. Les systèmes de feedback en ligne combinent de manière interactive les expériences et les évaluations des travailleurs en ne sélectionnant que les expressions positives [16].

La restriction algorithmique tend à renforcer la précarité. Les plateformes à médiation algorithmique peuvent fragmenter les efforts de plusieurs travailleurs interconnectés sans qu’ils le sachent. Le travail fragmenté se fait avant tout avec des travailleurs indépendants, « utilisateurs » de ces plateformes, plutôt que comme des employés salariés. L’usage de l’algorithme permet de remplacer le rapport de subordination – variablement présent dans le rapport salarial – par une sorte de subordination à la puissance algorithmique. L’activité décomposée en micro-tâches permet alors d’atomiser le collectif de travail pour ensuite le réassembler de manière opaque.

L’évaluation algorithmique est une autre modalité de contrôle. L’examen de l’activité des travailleurs permet de corriger les erreurs, d’évaluer la performance et d’identifier les « canards boiteux ». Mais cette évaluation exige un enregistrement permanant de l’activité ce qui permet d’identifier les groupes informels qui interagissent fréquemment, de relier ces groupes informels à la productivité et d’identifier les liaisons et les isolats de communication, et bien sûr aussi de repérer les orientations oppositionnelles [17] .

Dans l’industrie du transport de marchandises, les employeurs ont perfectionné leurs systèmes de gestion de flotte pour intégrer un large éventail de données concernant les chauffeurs, y compris l’efficacité énergétique du conducteur, le temps de marche au ralenti, la géolocalisation, la fréquence des sorties de voie, les schémas de freinage et d’accélération, le statut de la cargaison et les informations sur l’entretien du véhicule [18]. En organisant sur une base algorithmique la livraison de colis, la société UPS applique l’adage « petites quantités de temps = grandes quantités d’argent », calculant qu’en économisant une minute par jour par chauffeur-livreur, elle pourrait générer une économie près de 15 millions de dollars par an [19]. Au vue de tels chiffres, on peut se demander pourquoi le management se gênerait en effet

Tout comme pour le contrôle bureaucratique, le management utilise l’enregistrement algorithmique pour informer les travailleurs à propos de leur évaluation. Ce qui est une manière de mettre les personnes sur la défensive, comme étant toujours insuffisamment performants. Mais contrairement au contrôle bureaucratique, l’enregistrement algorithmique utilise ces procédures pour fournir un retour en temps réel. Lorsque l’activité est enregistrée en permanence, ce qui est de plus en plus le cas, les travailleurs reçoivent ces informations en temps réel, indiquant qu’ils sont « en retard » dans la réalisation de leur volume d’activité. Lorsque le score est systématiquement trop bas, une alerte se déclenche et le superviseur robotisé signalera la nécessité de réorienter le travailleur…

Dans le monde du gig work, les évaluations algorithmiques se focalisent avant tout sur la valeur « réputationnelle ». Du covoiturage aux plateformes de travail, les bonnes évaluations assurent la visibilité de la prestation de travail ou du service, ce qui détermine le potentiel de valorisation. Par exemple, sur la plateforme de services de soin Care.com, les notations algorithmiques sont utilisées pour créer différentes catégories de travailleurs : le label Care-Pros ne mentionnera que les soignant.e.s avec une note élevée, répondant à 75 % des appels dans les 24 heures. Une telle valorisation des « champion.ne.s » se retrouve sur l’ensemble des sites d’intermédiation qui visibilisent les plus performants. Mais comme l’a rappelé Antonio A. Casilli, sur les sites comme Mechanical Turk d’Amazon comme ailleurs, les champions sont aussi des brokers, des micro-employeurs qui mobilisent des « petites mains » afin de maintenir leur sur-visibilité. En même temps, sur les plateformes de micro-services, ce type de notations conduisent les prestataires à fausser les données. Si les algorithmes poussent les micro-travailleurs à l’auto-exploitation afin d’augmenter leurs chances d’obtenir une commande future, cette conduite nourrit aussi une prise de conscience qui peut donner lieu à un comportement opportuniste, déloyal ou encore oppositionnel.

Plus globalement, les algorithmes fonctionnent comme des dispositifs disciplinaires qui sanctionnent et récompensent. Dans le cas d’un contrôle par la technique, la loyauté est assurée par le recrutement d’une armée de réserve de travailleurs secondaires (intérim ou CDD) prêts à remplacer les travailleurs primaires en CDI qui ne coopèrent pas suffisamment avec l’employeur. Dans le cas d’un contrôle bureaucratique, la discipline est obtenue par des mesures incitatives et des sanctions. Les travailleurs ayant le comportement souhaité seront récompensés par des promotions, des salaires plus élevés, des postes à plus grande responsabilité ou des tâches plus intéressantes, tandis que ceux qui n’ont pas le comportement souhaité sont exposés aux brimades et au harcèlement.

Les plateformes peuvent très bien « bannir » un travailleur non coopératif ou insuffisamment performant[20]. Sur des plateformes comme Amazon Mechanical Turk, les travailleurs qui ne se conforment pas aux directives seront soit bannis de la plateforme, soit sanctionnés en rendant leur profil difficile à trouver. Dans la gestion des ressources humaines « guidé » par algorithme, les profils instables, susceptibles de quitter l’entreprise sont tout de suite identifiés[21]. Les agences intérimaires ont déployé des algorithmes pour analyser le parcours et le développement d’une carrière et identifier les profils à « haut potentiel » versus des profils « stagnants » ou « paresseux ». La récompense algorithmique forme un mécanisme de contrôle interactif et dynamique qui soutient les travailleurs les plus performants en leur offrant davantage d’opportunités, une rémunération ou des promotions.

Du côté des plates-formes, tout est fait pour garder les algorithmes de notation et de récompense secrets afin de décourager la manipulation et l’inflation des notes. Dans le marché du travail en ligne hautement qualifié, les plateformes sont passés d’un système d’étoiles transparent à un système opaque. Ne sachant plus ce sur quoi l’évaluation se fait, ni de la manière dont les évaluations sont utilisées, ni des raisons pour laquelle des propositions sont rejetées, le sentiment d’aliénation explose, ce qui nourrit la méfiance et l’esprit critique.

Si la mobilisation d’algorithmes fournit un nouvel arsenal de contrôle au management, la puissance de ce « faire faire » n’annule pas la possibilité de s’y opposer ; elle ne fait que déplacer le domaine du conflit et de la lutte. Comme je l’ai développé dans mes recherches, je pense qu’il est essentiel de comprendre que les innovations technologiques font partie intégrante d’une sorte de « luttes des classes » telle qu’elle est menée par « en-haut », c’est-à-dire par l’employeur ou le management et qu’elle ne peut donc annuler celle-ci. Tôt ou tard, des résistances sociales, individuelles ou collectives, réapparaissent. Il est donc essentiel d’intégrer cette dimension conflictuelle dans l’analyse des algorithmes au travail, tant pour comprendre leur raison d’être que les limites de leur efficacité.

Ceci est d’autant plus vrai que le management algorithmique affecte profondément la subjectivité des travailleurs. On pourrait penser que cette surveillance conduit les travailleurs à contrôler leur propre comportement afin de se conformer aux attentes de la structure, de sorte qu’ils en viennent à se voir eux-mêmes de la manière dont ils sont définis par la surveillance [22]. C’est le pari du management et c’est aussi la narration des sociologies domino-centrées qui, tout en se présentant comme « critiques », n’appréhendent qu’une seule dimension d’une réalité pourtant contradictoire. Mais une telle sociologie ne fait que rabattre la réalité sur elle-même, en masquant les tensions et les contradictions qui la traversent, ce qui interdit aussi de voir les possibles évolutions sous-jacentes.

C’est pourquoi je soutiens l’hypothèse que le management algorithmique conduit à pousser la relation de travail jusqu’à un point de rupture, tant sur un plan subjectif qu’objectif. Comment peut-on encore obtenir une collaboration loyale alors que la méfiance et la surveillance deviennent la norme ? Que des cadres (encadrants) gagnant au-delà de 4000 euros par mois consentent à collaborer loyalement est plus que compréhensible, mais peut-on s’attendre à la même chose avec ceux qui gagne le SMIC voir à peine le double de celui-ci ? Sachant le durcissement des inégalités, la dégradation des conditions de travail et l’omniprésence d’un chantage affectif à la performance (à partir de l’injonction amoureuse du travail), on peut se dire que la surveillance et le management algorithmique s’exposent à une usure rapide, produisant une perte de motivation et des turnovers élevés. A cela se rajoute les effets dysfonctionnels d’un management qui, en chassant les temps morts, casse aussi les dynamiques collaboratives et produit une érosion de la productivité [23].

L’hypothèse d’une contestation larvée et silencieuse des systèmes algorithmiques est non seulement pertinente mais se vérifie d’ores et déjà ce qui conforte l’idée que, même sous la férule d’un panoptique informatisé, le travail vivant « se rebiffe » et qu’il tente de déjouer la puissance algorithmique, ne serait-ce que pour retrouver une marge d’autonomie indispensable à sa survie psychique.

Les résistances au contrôle algorithmique

Le développement de formes de contrôle algorithmique n’est pas resté sans réponse. On peut même dire qu’il existe une continuité avec les formes de résistances qui se sont manifestées contre les régimes de contrôle technique ou bureaucratique. Néanmoins, l’environnement numérique et la tendance à l’extension de la surveillance changent la donne et font apparaître un activisme d’un nouveau type que je propose regrouper sous le vocable d’«algo-résistance».

Face au contrôle algorithmique, les travailleurs – salariés ou pas – peuvent s’engager dans la non-coopération de différentes manières, en raison du caractère instantané et interactif des algorithmes. Une des nouvelles modalités de résistance renvoie à l’exploitation inversée des algorithmes. Celle-ci passe par une sorte de négociation avec les clients et les parties tierces. Les uns vont ignorer les recommandations ou les récompenses algorithmiques tandis que les autres résistent à la gamification en refusant d’apprendre les règles du jeu ou en jouant volontairement très mal [24]. On peut donc « trainer des pieds », flâner, perdre son temps en appliquant des tactiques nouvelles. Le but est de se créer des espaces d’autonomie sur le plan psychologique, social, temporelle ou physique, à la fois sur le lieu de travail et à l’égard de la prestation attendue [25].

Une autre manière de s’engager dans la non-coopération consiste à perturber l’enregistrement algorithmique. Dans une étude sur le fonctionnement des tribunaux et des services de police, des chercheurs ont constaté que les professionnels du droit et les policiers mettent en jeu un ensemble de tactiques dont l’objectif relève d’un « obscurcissement des données » ; en bloquant la collecte de données ou en produisant une inflation d’informations que l’algorithme n’est plus en mesure de catégoriser [26].

Plusieurs enquêtes ont mis en évidence que les chauffeurs Uber résistent au contrôle en désactivant leur mode conducteur lorsqu’ils se trouvaient dans certains quartiers, en restant dans les zones résidentielles pour éviter certains types de clients ou en se déconnectant fréquemment pour éviter les longs trajets peu rémunérants dans la tarification de la plateforme [27]. Une enquête récente [28] a constaté que ces travailleurs de plateforme tendent à analyser le comportement passé des clients en matière d’évaluation avant d’accepter les contrats. Lorsque les mauvaises évaluations de leur performance s’accumulent, ils mobilisent des avatars pour éviter d’être « désactivés ».

Il semble même possible de tirer parti des algorithmes pour résister au contrôle. Certains travailleurs appliquent une sorte d’ingénierie inversée en priorisant les activités qui semblent avoir un impact positif sur leur évaluation [29]. Ce type de conduite se retrouve aussi du côté des prestataires. Les hôtes d’Air-Bnb participent à des forums en ligne, lisent la documentation technique de l’entreprise et surveillent les profils et les notes des concurrents pour comprendre quelles caractéristiques ou quels comportements semblent influencer positivement leurs notes. Dans le même ordre d’idées, les travailleurs de Mechanical Turk ont déployé leurs propres algorithmes pour tenter de prendre le dessus sur le régime de contrôle de la plateforme. D’autres travailleurs utilisent des scripts qui surveillent le marché des tâches qui donnent l’alerte lorsque des tâches appropriées deviennent disponibles. Les plus audacieux ont mené des opérations de hacking pour supprimer les informations de l’interface utilisateur [30].

La résistance au contrôle algorithmique se fait aussi en négociant de manière inversée avec les clients afin de contourner ou de modifier les évaluations algorithmiques. Au niveau de la vente en ligne, les vendeurs contactent des acheteurs ayant laissé une évaluation négative et tentent de les convaincre de la retirer [31]. Sur le marché du travail en ligne, ont tend à demander de manière préemptive des garanties d’évaluation « kharma » [32]. Ainsi, un chef de projet demande à son équipe de terminer un « déliverable » en échange d’une note « Karma » attribuée à chacun [33]. De telles interactions négociées autour des évaluations algorithmiques expliquent en partie pourquoi les marchés du travail en ligne connaissent une inflation des notes et des évaluations.

En plus des stratégies individuelles, les travailleurs peuvent aussi résister de façon collective, ce qui n’a rien de nouveau. Historiquement, les syndicats ont permis de faire valoir les droits et revendications du personnel. En effet, sans contre-pouvoir syndical dans l’entreprise, l’Etat de droit s’arrête aux portes de l’entreprise et l’arbitraire règne à tous les étages…

Aujourd’hui, on voit apparaître cette logique collective chez les coursiers. Dans les métropoles comme Paris, Londres, Rome ou Amsterdam, des collectifs de coursiers sont émergés en quelques années seulement. Souvent, cela commence par une organisation parallèle, un forum ou une liste Whatsapp qui permet de briser l’atomisation sociale. Dans ces communautés en ligne, les travailleurs s’entraident pour apprendre de nouveaux systèmes et pratiques, éviter les processus disciplinaires, retrouver l’accès lorsqu’ils sont exclus des plateformes, identifier les clients ou les emplois souhaitables, ou encore apprendre comment lisser leurs revenus [34].

Des informaticiens et des collectifs syndicaux ont également conçu des plateformes permettant aux travailleurs de signaler ceux qui maltraitent le personnel embauché. Par exemple la plateforme Turkopticon qui est une plateforme d’information militante permettant aux travailleurs de rendre public leurs relations avec Amazon Mechanical Turk. Il y a aussi la plateforme Dynamo qui permet aux micro-travailleurs de se rassembler, d’atteindre une masse critique avant de se mobiliser [35]. Dans le même ordre d’idées, Peers.org propose un système de mise en commun de plusieurs comptes tandis que Guild.net permet de mener une pression collective de négociation sur les rémunérations. La plateforme Zen99 propose un tableau de bord intégré qui aide les travailleurs indépendants à organiser leurs finances, leurs impôts et leurs polices d’assurance.

Ces forums et plateformes peuvent aident les travailleurs à corriger partiellement l’asymétrie de pouvoir qui découle du contrôle algorithmique. Ce n’est pas rien et il ne faut pas mépriser ces petites, marges de liberté. Dans certains cas, ces travailleurs s’engagent collectivement dans des tâches, partagent des informations sur les clients et organisent une discussion sur les astuces du métier. Dans d’autres cas, ils utilisent des forums en ligne pour partager des ressources et identifier des clients ou des commandes de travail à éviter ou acceptables. Cela rappelle un peu les Bourses du Travail, une invention du prolétariat français… On voit également apparaître des outils de secours mutuel, y compris sur la manière d’anticiper ou d’éviter les mesures disciplinaires ; ou encore sur les manières de retrouver l’accès à la plateforme alors qu’on a été expulsé. L’entraide existe aussi au niveau de l’échange d’informations sur les manières de lisser les gains et de maximiser les revenus en passant d’une plateforme à l’autre. Les forums en ligne permettent aussi de s’engager dans une mobilisation collective contre les plateformes. Le mouvement #Slaveroo critique les pratiques abusives des plateformes de livraison de nourriture et a été à l’initiative de grèves et de mobilisations des coursiers.

Parfois, les micro-travailleurs se livrent également à une « surveillance inversée », que certains proposent de conceptualiser comme une sorte de sousveillance [36]. Il s’agit d’enregistrer le management, de télécharger tous les évènements se déroulant dans le procès de travail, et de garder des « preuves documentaires complètes » au cas où les employeurs agiraient contre eux. Les employeurs sont évidemment réticents face à cette « sousveillance » informelle ou démonstrative. Pour évincer ce type de comportements, le management interdit au personnel d’Amazon d’apporter des appareils personnels dans l’entrepôt. Toutefois, tant que les collectifs de travail, ou les syndicats, n’ont pas accès aux données et aux algorithmes propriétaires des employeurs, l’impact de ces tactiques demeure limité.

Lorsque la résistance est impossible, notamment parce qu’elle est réprimée et qu’une « armée de réserve » prête à prendre la place des récalcitrants, il n’y a guère d’autre choix que la soumission ou le départ, appelée exit dans triptyque d’Albert Hirschmann[37]. C’est ce qui explique l’émergence d’un coopérativisme des plateformes visant à offrir le même travail mais libéré de la surexploitation. Le consortium « Platform Co-op » rassemble un large éventail d’organisations qui adhérent au projet de plateformes appartenant à leurs membres et où les revenus excédentaires sont transférés aux coopérateurs. Ce coopérativisme de plateforme rassemble désormais à travers le monde près de 300 structures de service. L’augmentation du nombre de plateformes coopératives contribue certainement à la transparence algorithmique, ce qui va atténuer la partialité des informations et atténuer l’extraction d’informations que permettent le management algorithmique. Mais en même temps, ce type d’alternatives coopérativistes demeurent limitées et conduisent à ne pas engager le combat contre les géants du net. Il faut donc oser se poser la question de savoir si cette voie-là est la première à prendre pour transformer l’ordre des choses ou pas.

Historiquement, l’action syndicale s’est toujours fondée sur un ensemble de valeurs que sont la justice sociale, une sécurité d’existence ou encore le travail décent. Face au management algorithmique, il est évident que ces valeurs gardent leur raison d’être. Le management algorithmique exacerbe le sentiment d’injustice, de partialité, d’adversité. L’opacité qui entoure les algorithmes nourrit une méfiance et alimente l’idée que « les dés sont pipés ». A juste titre.

Les géants du net n’ont pas bonne presse dans les opinions publiques et les campagnes en faveur d’une imposition fiscale minimaliste, d’une responsabilité sociale et de la transparence algorithmique reçoivent partout un écho grandissant. La critique publique du management algorithmique gagne donc en popularité. Il ne faut donc pas reculer sur ce front-là.

Aux Etats-Unis, les militants syndicaux et les informaticiens ont commencé à élaborer des codes d’éthique professionnelle et de de veille sur l’usage du numérique. Les informaticiens et des chercheurs en science de la communication mènent une campagne contre le secret du management algorithmique. La principale association professionnelle des ingénieurs informaticiens (Association for Computing Machinery, ACM) a rédigé un code de conduite éthique. Lors de la conférence annuelle de l’ACM en 2019, un collectif d’ingénieurs informaticiens a dressé la liste noire les mauvaises pratiques et rendu public des algorithmes biaisés qui permettaient de générer plus de profits en trompant les travailleurs, comme les clients-usagers ou encore les annonceurs de publicité.

Ces informaticiens progressistes plaident en faveur d’une cartographie des scripts informatiques à prohiber. Il s’agit par exemple d’interdire un modèle d’apprentissage automatique conçu pour détecter le sourire et qui pourrait être utilisé par les employeurs pour se livrer à la surveillance des émotions de leurs employés. La production de modèles de chartes éthiques s’oriente donc vers une définition de ce qui est inacceptable, ce qui est quand-même plus radical d’une politique incitative des bonnes pratiques…

L’existence de ces multiples pratiques d’algo-résistance soulève des questions importantes pour les recherches futures. Tout au long de cette analyse, j’ai évoqué le potentiel des employeurs à utiliser les technologies algorithmiques pour mettre en œuvre une forme de contrôle plus compréhensive, instantanée, interactive et opaque. Pourtant, la simple existence d’un éventail de stratégies de résistance suggère que les travailleurs continuent d’avoir un pouvoir d’action. Reste à savoir comment ces conduites modulent l’impact de la direction, de l’évaluation et de la discipline algorithmiques sur le terrain … Il faudrait pour mieux savoir entreprise des recherches-action, en mobilisant les premiers concernés. Par exemple, les recherches futures pourraient explorer comment les coopératives pourraient mettre en œuvre des consultations itératives de leurs membres et utilisateurs lors du développement de systèmes de contrôle algorithmiques. Elles pourraient rendre public les variables, les pondérations et les modèles utilisés et rendre les algorithmes transparents. Dans ces conditions, les données algorithmiques pourraient être utilisées pour ancrer les discussions collectives et promouvoir la réflexivité parmi les membres et les utilisateurs. Des recherches futures pourraient également étudier comment les syndicats s’impliquent dans l’organisation des plateformes [38].

La bataille ne fait que commencer

En ce qui concerne le management du travail sur le lieu de travail, des syndicats ont mené des campagnes contre l’enregistrement algorithmique en négociant des accords avec les employeurs sur la manière et les moments où les employeurs peuvent surveiller les employés et utiliser les données, ceci afin de limiter leur capacité à discipliner les employés [39]. Les usagers-consommateurs que nous sommes peuvent le faire aussi. Mais c’est à partir de l’activité de travail que l’on retrouve un vrai levier d’action.

Il est tout sauf insensé de revendiquer un droit d’arbitrage lorsque le management cherche à sanctionner les salariés à partir de données numériques tirées d’une surveillance algorithmique. Je citerai ici l’exemple du syndicat des chauffeurs d’UPS qui a négocié un accord selon lequel l’entreprise doit expliciter la surveillance tout en interdisant les sanctions uniquement basées sur les données numériques tout simplement parce qu’elles sont parfaitement falsifiables.

Les réglementations européennes sont encore très limitées. Il existe néanmoins une clause relative sur la protection des données (DPIA) du règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD) qui appelle à réaliser des évaluations préventives sur l’impact potentiel des systèmes algorithmiques à haut risque sur « les droits et libertés des personnes physiques » (RGPD, article 35 ). Pour l’instant, la mise en œuvre des cadres DPIA et RGPD demeure peu limitative, puisque chacun.e concède que l’usage des données personnelles est possible en acceptant les cookies, ce que tout le monde fait évidemment, puisque faire l’inverse est chronophage…. Mais la bataille pour une bonne jurisprudence est bel et bien engagée. Certains juristes appellent à re-conceptualiser le droit à la vie privée, y compris celle des travailleurs, à partir de critères de vie privée « contextuelle » ou « relationnelle », ce qui nécessite l’articulation d’un ensemble de normes reliées au contexte et qui devrait limiter les droits des employeurs de placer des « mouchards » dans les ordinateurs, de surveiller la correspondance électronique ou les activités de navigation sur le web.

Un autre développement important concerne le statut d’emploi des travailleurs sous contrôle algorithmique. La plupart des plateformes font appel à une main d’œuvre composée d’autoentrepreneurs indépendants. Mais les collectifs de lutte contestent de plus en plus cette classification juridique, arguant qu’ils doivent être considérés comme des salariés, des personnes employés plutôt que comme des gig workers. On ne compte plus les mobilisations menées pour mettre en œuvre des changements législatifs. En effet, à Paris, Milan, Madrid, Londres ou Bruxelles, les mobilisations des coursiers se renforcent en ces temps de pandémie. Le premier enjeu est de constituer un argumentaire socio-politique et juridique qui fait basculer les faux indépendants du côté du salariat. Le deuxième enjeu consiste à briser le code algorithmique, à les rendre publics et à exercer un contrôle sur leurs usages. Cette approche n’est pas nouvelle, elle rappelle l’action syndicale de codétermination sur le procès de travail, ou encore les pratiques de « contrôle ouvrier » sur la gestion de l’entreprise. L’enjeu est d’arracher un droit de regard, d’obtenir un droit de véto et de négocier des conditions de mise au travail qui ne dégradent pas l’activité réalisée ni l’humain au travail. Imposer des standards de qualité, compatibles avec une qualité de vie et le bien-être est donc une vraie bataille qui devrait mobiliser toutes les forces du « travail vivant ».

Aux Etats-Unis, les batailles juridiques autour du statut des chauffeurs se sont intensifiées ces dernières années afin de limiter le recours aux entrepreneurs indépendants en imposant le « test ABC ». En vertu de ce test, un travailleur serait présumé être un salarié employé, sauf si l’entreprise  fait la démonstration que (A) le travailleur est libre du contrôle et de la direction de l’entité qui l’embauche en ce qui concerne l’exécution du travail, tant sur le plan pratique (algorithmique) que contractuel ; (B) que le travailleur free lance effectue un travail qui sort du cadre habituel de l’activité de l’entreprise ; et (C) que le travailleur est engagé dans une activité commerciale, une profession ou une entreprise établie de manière indépendante du travail effectué pour l’entreprise. Dit autrement, si le chiffre d’affaires du travailleur indépendant est suffisamment diversifié. C’est suivant cette même argumentation que la cour de justice au Royaume-Uni veut imposer à Uber la reconnaissance du statut de travailleur salarié, ce qui a poussée la plateforme à thésauriser près de 630 millions de livres sterling pour régler des litiges présents et futurs avec près de 70 000 chauffeurs affiliés à la plateforme [40].

Désormais, les militants ont commencé à s’engager dans une série d’initiatives législatives liées à la pression pour la propriété des données des travailleurs. Comme nous l’avons vu précédemment, de nombreux employeurs procèdent à un recodage algorithmique de leur management. Ils le font aussi parce que ces données ont de la valeur, indépendamment des enjeux de contrôle de l’activité de travail. Les réseaux d’informaticiens radicaux plaident ici en faveur de l’octroi aux personnes de la propriété de leurs données numériques et en faveur du traitement des données comme une forme de travail qui doit être rémunéré [41]. Ce type de propositions implique que les individus soient autorisés à louer ou à revendre leurs données à des entreprises technologiques par le biais d’intermédiaires numériques, appelés MID (Mediators of Individual Data), qui négocieraient les redevances sur les données, afin d’apporter un pouvoir de la négociation collective aux personnes qui sont les sources de données précieuses. Cela permettrait également de promouvoir des normes basées sur la qualité et l’identité des producteurs de données qu’ils représentent [42].

Les mobilisations autour de la défense de la vie privée des salariés, en opposition à la surveillance managériale et pour la réappropriation des données représentent un autre champ d’action. En Europe, les organisations syndicales commencent à se saisir de ces questions. Elles plaident en faveur d’une codification précise visant à protéger la vie privée des employés, à limiter la surveillance managériale, à interdire les pratiques discriminatoires et à reclasser les autoentrepreneurs en employés.

Au niveau européen, après dix-huit mois de pourparlers, la fédération des compagnies d’assurance et les syndicats de cette branche ont signé une déclaration conjointe sur l’usage du management algorithmique et de l’IA. Les signataires réaffirment le primat du contrôle humain, en opposition au contrôle automatisé, et plaident en faveur d’un usage éthique et responsable des technologies numériques, fondé sur la transparence et la défense de l’intégrité du travailleur. Le recrutement et le parcours professionnel ne peuvent être guidés par des systèmes algorithmiques automatisés. Pour Christy Hoffman, secrétaire générale de UNI Global Union (regroupant les fédérions nationales d’employés, ingénieurs, cadres et techniciens), cette déclaration conjointe constitue une avancée qu’il faudra concrétiser à partir de négociations dans les entreprises.

En France, quand une innovation technologique affecte les conditions de travail, l’emploi, le CSE a l’obligation d’être informé et consulté. Ces termes juridiques sont larges et ce sont souvent des experts diligentés par le CSE qui établissent un rapport, ce qui peut contribuer à dessaisir les syndicats de la question. En Allemagne, le Betriebsrät reste une institution incontournable lorsqu’il s’agit d’introduire des nouvelles technologies, capable d’exercer une activité de veille réelle au niveau de l’impact sur les conditions de travail. En Belgique, une convention collective de travail des années 1980 impose à l’employeur de fournir au Conseil d’Entreprise (l’équivalent du CSE) minimum trois mois à l’avance toutes les informations concernant l’introduction de nouvelles technologies, leurs effets sur l’organisation du travail, les conditions de travail et l’emploi. Les représentants du personnel doivent donner leur aval et les conséquences sociales doivent être anticipées et débattues. Aujourd’hui, les syndicats revendiquent une actualisation de cette convention nationale afin d’intégrer l’IA et le management par algorithmes dans son champ d’action. La proposition est faite d’imposer un test d’usage afin de vérifier si l’impact sur les conditions de travail est neutre. Il existe donc des leviers d’actions à l’échelle des établissements ou des entreprises. Toutefois, les discussions actuellement menées au niveau de l’UE sur l’Intelligence Artificielle ouvrent aussi le risque de remettre en question certaines réglementations nationales [43].

En guise de conclusion

Le management par algorithmes divise mais unifie aussi. Les actions des collectifs de coursiers le démontrent pratiquement. Dans cet article, je n’ai pas réellement analysé la mobilisation algorithmes sur les activités des consommateurs ou des usagers des réseaux sociaux. Ils ne sont pas de nature différente : il s’agit tout autant de recommander, de restreindre, d’enregistrer, d’évaluer l’impact, de remplacer que de récompenser. Quand le client scanne un article, achète un billet sur internet, réserve une chambre d’hôtel ou quand l’usager apprécie ou partage des photos, il ou elle réalise un travail gratuit, souvent à son insu. Il s’agit d’un travail car cette activité est hétéronome et aliénante qui mobilise du temps tout en produisant des ressources informationnelles qui pourront qui être captées, transformées et valorisées par le capital [44].

Mais là aussi, les algorithmes tendent à unifier ce qu’ils séparent et c’est en prenant conscience de cela qu’une puissance d’agir collective peut émerger. L’enjeu est de refuser l’opacité des algorithmes et l’extorsion non délibérée des valeurs produites. Pour avancer dans cet objectif, la tâche première est de briser la chaîne algorithmique en exigeant la levée du secret et en prohibant ce qui transforme l’agir humain en automatisme social.

 

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Notes

[1] Je tiens à remercier Antonio A. Casilli, Jean-Pierre Morant, Mark Bergfeld et David Gaborieau pour leurs commentaires et la transmission d’informations.

[2] La notion de problème doit être vue dans un sens large : il peut s’agir d’une tâche à effectuer, comme trier des objets, assigner des ressources, transmettre des informations, traduire un texte, etc. Il reçoit des données ou entrées – par exemple les objets à trier, la description des ressources à assigner, des besoins à couvrir, un texte à traduire, les informations à transmettre et l’adresse du destinataire, etc. –  et fournit éventuellement des données, les sorties, par exemple les objets triés, les associations ressource-besoin, un compte-rendu de transmission, la traduction du texte, etc.

[3] Voir à ce sujet Cathy O’Neil (2016), Weapons of Math Destruction.

[4]. Shoshana Zuboff « Automate/Automate: The two faces of intelligent technology », in Organizational Dynamics Volume 14, Issue 2, Automne 1985, pp. 5-18.

[5] Thomas Berns et Antoinette Rouvroy (2013), « Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives d’émancipation. Le disparate comme condition d’individuation par la relation ? », in Réseaux n°177, p. 163-196.

[6] Le fétichisme numérique développe une compréhension fantasmée, imaginaire qui ne « voit » que le fétiche, alors qu’il s’agit de comprendre combien il organise les rapports sociaux comme un rapport de choses entre elles. Or, le numérique, internet ou l’IA sont avant tout des formes sociales de production qui organisent la médiation, la communication et l’échange d’informations.

[7] Je prolonge ici l’approche développée par Richard Edwards (1979) qui appréhende les transformations du travail de manière dialectique, en y intégrant une dimension conflictuelle.

[8] Le contrôle technique passe par les dispositifs mécaniques comme par exemple le convoyeur qui détermine la cadence du travail tandis que le contrôle bureaucratique s’exerce via la supervision, l’évaluation etc.

[9] Kellogg, K. (2018), Employment recontracting for mutually beneficial role realignment around a new technology in a professional organization. Paper presented at the Oxford Professional Services Conference. Oxford.

[10] Pour une rapide présentation, voir https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/hashtag/connaissez-vous-le-nudge

[11] Scheiber, N. (2017), How Uber uses psychological tricks to push its drivers’ buttons. New York Times (2 avril 2017) ; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html

[12] Rosenblat, A., & Stark, L. (2016). Algorithmic labor and information asymmetries: A case study of Uber’s drivers.in : International Journal of Communication, 10:3758–3784.

[13] Voir l’enquête menée à la Poste par Nicolas Jounin (2020) Le caché de la Poste. Enquête sur l’organisation du travail des facteurs, La Découverte ; voir également Gaborieau, David. « Quand l’ouvrier devient robot. Représentations et pratiques ouvrières face aux stigmates de la déqualification », L’Homme & la Société, vol. 205, no. 3, 2017, pp. 245-268.

[14] Danaher, J. (2016). The threat of algocracy: Reality, resistance and accommodation, in Philosophy & Technology,29(3): 245–268.

[15] Lebovitz, S., Lifshitz-Assaf, H., & Levina, N. (2019) Doubting the diagnosis: How artificial intelligence increases ambiguity during professional decision making, New York University.

[16] Askay, D. A. (2015), Silence in the crowd: The spiral of silence contributing to the positive bias of opinions in an online review system, in: New Media & Society, 17(11): 1811–1829.

[17] Leonardi, P., & Contractor, N. (2018), “Better people analytics measure who they know, not just who they are”, in: Harvard Business Review, 96(6): 70–81.

[18] Levy, K. E. (2015), The contexts of control: Information, power, and truck-driving work. The Information Society, 31(2): 160–174 (p. 164).

[19] Davidson, A. (2016), Planet money. In J. Goldstein (Ed.), The future Of work looks like a UPS truck. National Public Radio. Voir  https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2014/05/02/308640135/episode-536-the-future-of-work-looks-like-a-ups-truck  .

[20] Rosenblat, A., & Stark, L. (2016), Algorithmic labor and information asymmetries: A case study of Uber’s drivers. International Journal of Communication, 10: 3758–3784.

[21] King, K. G. (2016), Data analytics in human resources: A Case study and critical review. Human Resource Development Review, 15(4): 487–495.

[22] Sewell, G. (1998), The discipline of teams: The control of team-based industrial work through electronic and peer surveillance., in: Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(2): 397–428.

[23] Mon enquête auprès d’ingénieurs informaticiens met en évidence que le management par l’algorithme chasse non seulement les temps morts mais supprime aussi les temps libres qui sont souvent des temps d’apprentissage.

[24] Mollick, E., & Werbach, K. (2015), Gamification and the enterprise. The gameful world: Approaches, issues, applications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

[25] Bouquin S. (coord.) (2008), Les résistances au travail, Syllepse ; Bouquin S (2020), « Les résistances au travail en temps de crise et d’hégémonie managériale » (2020), in Mercure D., Les transformations contemporaines du rapport au travail, Hermann & Presses Universitaires de Laval, 208 p. (pp. 177-198) ; voir aussi Richard Edwards (1979), Contested terrain: The transformation of the workplace in the twentieth century: New York: Basic Books.

[26]Brayne, S. 2017. Big data surveillance: The case of policing, in American Sociological Review, 82(5): 977–1008.; voir également Levy, K. E. (2015) The contexts of control: Information, power, and truck-driving work, 31(2): 160–174.

[27] Lee et al. (2015), Working with Machines : the impact of algorithmic and data driven management on human workers, Paper presented at ACM conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, miméo.

[28] Lehdonvirta, V. 2018. Flexibility in the gig economy: Managing time on three online piecework platforms, in New Technology,Work and Employment, 33(1): 13–29 ; Lehdonvirta, V. (2016), Algorithms that divide and unite: Delocalisation, identity and collective action in ‘microwork’,  pp. 53–80. Berlin, Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.

[29] Jharver et al. (2018), Algorithmic anxiety and coping strategies of Airbnb hosts, Working Paper ; Lix, K. & Valentine, M. (2019). Kharma scores and team learning in software development gigs. Working Paper. Stanford University; Rahman, H. (2017). Reputational ploys: Reputation and ratings in online labor markets. Working Paper. Stanford University

[30] Lehdonvirta, V. 2018. Flexibility in the gig economy: Managing time on three online piecework platforms. New Technology,Work and Employment, 33(1): 13–29.

[31] Curchod, C., Patriotta, G., Cohen, L., & Neysen, N. 2019, Working for an algorithm: Power asymmetries and agency in online work settings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1–33. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0001839219867024.

[32] Rahman, H. 2017. Reputational ploys: Reputation and ratings in online labor markets. Working Paper. Stanford University

[33] Lix K & Valentine M. (2019), Kharma scores and team learning in software development gigs, Working Paper, Stanford University.

[34] Wood, A. J., Graham, M., Lehdonvirta, V., & Hjorth, I.( 2019), Good gig, bad gig: Autonomy and algorithmic control in the global gig economy. Work, Employment and Society, 33(1): 56–75.

[35] Graham, M., Hjorth, I., & Lehdonvirta, V. (2017). Digital labour and development: Impacts of global digital labour platforms and the gig economy on worker livelihoods. In : Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 23(2): 135–162; Scholz, T. (2016), Platform cooperativism. Challenging the corporate sharing economy. New York: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation; Martin et al. (201)4, Being a turker, Paper presented at the ACM conference ; Schwartz D. (2018), Embedded in the crowd. Creative freelancers, crowdsourced work and occupational community, Work and Occupations, 45, 247-282

[36] https://medium.com/@sam.shepherd/surveillance-of-digital-life-and-the-use-of-sousveillance-as-a-response-7b306cfdb6e8

[37] Albert O. Hirschmann (1970), Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press

[38]  Kochan T, Yang D., Kimball W. & Kelly E. (2019), Worker voice in America: is there a Gap between what Woprkers expect and What they Experience?, ILR Review, n°75 (1), pp.3-38 ; Wood et al., (2018), Workers of the internet unite? One line freelancer organization among remote gig economy workers in six African and Asian countries, in: New Technology, Work and Employment, 33 (2): 95-112

[39] https://labornotes.org/2021/05/breaking-draft-legislation-new-york-would-put-gig-workers-toothless-unions

[40] https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uber-loses-gig-economy-case

[41] Arrieta-Ibarra, Goff, Jimenez- Hernandez, Lanier, & Weyl (2018), Should we treat data as labor? Moving beyond “free”, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108 :38-42 ; Scholz T (2016), Platform cooperaztivism. Challeging the corporate sharing economy, New York, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation

[42] Lanier J. & Weyl E. (2018), A blueprint for a better digital society. Harvard Business Review.

[43] Voir Valerio De Stefano, The EU Proposed Regulation on AI: a threat to labour protection?, Regulation for Globalization, Avril 2021.

[44]. Voir Antonio A. Casilli (2019), En attendant les robots. Enquête sur le travail du clic, Paris, Seuil, 400 p.

 

 

 

Les résistances au travail en temps de crise et d’hégémonie managériale

Si la question du rapport au travail est restée présente dans les débats du champ académique, c’est beaucoup moins le cas pour celle des résistances au travail. Omniprésente lorsque les modèles productifs et les régimes de main-d’oeuvre étaient dominés par le paradigme taylorien et fordien, la question s’est évanouie, du moins en France, à partir des années 1990 et ce, jusqu’il y a peu. Les résistances au travail avaient cédé le pas à la domination, le consentement et la servitude. A contre-courant d’une lecture déterministe et unilatérale, l’auteur défend une orientation reconnaissant l’existence de conduites informelles, non seulement d’ajustement ou de type ludique, mais aussi la persistance de conduites d’opposition, que ce soit le freinage, les larcins, la perruque, voire des formes clandestines de sabotage. (…)

Chapitre publié dans Daniel Mercure (coord.), Les transformations contemporaines du rapport au travail (2020), Presses de l’Université de Laval, p.177-198.

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Raisons d’agir (ou pas)

Depuis début janvier, 2020, en l’absence de cours et avec peu de partiels, j’entame une « immersion » dans les mobilisations. Parfois en visitant des assemblées générales, des piquets ou encore en participant à des manifestations, à Paris et en province (Amiens, Montpellier). L’objectif est d’écouter, de participer à des discussions et prendre la « température ». Pour bien faire, il faut surtout savoir perdre son temps… Ce n’est pas totalement de l’observation participante, même si il y a des analogies. Dans le jargon militant, ce type de pratique existent et s’appelle faire un « travail de bouton de veste ». Certains le font en parlant beaucoup trop, à l’instar des Témoins de Jéhova. D’autres le font en sachant tendre l’oreille, en glissant ici et là une idée pour susciter la discussion, pour ensuite savoir convaincre et gagner l’adhésion évidemment. Pour ma part, j’ai opté pour une formule de type « reportage », proche d’un journalisme attentif à tous les détails, tout en essayant de comprendre le sens des mots utilisés par mes interlocuteurs.

extrait de Bouquin S. (2020), « Raisons d’agir (ou pas) ? », in Les Mondes du Travail, Hors-série mobilisations et grèves, mars 2020, (pp. 75-86).

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La Commune du Rojava

Bouquin S., Court M., De Hond C. (coord.) (2017), La Commune du Rojava. L’alternative kurde à l’État-nation, Paris, Éditions Syllepse (Paris), 274 p.

À l’été 2014, alors que les pays de la région, l’ONU et l’OTAN assistent impuissants à l’avancée des jihadistes, le monde découvre les combattant·es kurdes qui ont fait reculer Daesh à Kobané, cette petite ville devenue symbole. Le sacrifice de ces jeunes femmes et de ces jeunes hommes était bien sûr motivé par la nécessaire résistance à la barbarie de l’État islamique, qui s’est déchaînée contre les  Yézidis de la région de Sinjar. Mais cette détermination s’appuyait sur autre chose : la conviction qu’une société libre démocratique et égalitaire pour toutes et tous est possible, au Rojava mais aussi en Turquie. Autrefois imprégné par le marxisme-léninisme, le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) a dressé un bilan sévère des régimes bureaucratiques et autoritaires d’Europe de l’Est. Il a également pris ses distances par rapport au nationalisme et a questionné la pertinence de revendiquer un État-nation kurde. Emprisonné depuis 2000 et influencé par le libertaire écologiste américain Murray Bookchin, le fondateur du PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, a appelé à l’élaboration d’un nouveau paradigme qui confère à la démocratie directe un rôle pivot de la transformation sociale. En pleine guerre nourrie par des conflits intercommunautaires et des conflits d’intérêts géopolitiques, l’égalité entre les sexes, l’inclusion des minorités et la démocratie de conseils (quartier/village/canton) donnent corps à une révolution. Dans une région dominée par les tribus et les clans, s’est développée au Rojava une pratique d’inclusion et de représentation sur un pied d’égalité de toutes les minorités ethniques ou religieuses. Dans un contexte régional où les femmes sont au mieux privées de toute autonomie, le Rojava a inscrit l’égalité totale entre les genres dans sa charte, tandis qu’en Turquie, le Parti démocratique des peuples (HDP) instaurait le principe d’une double représentation femme-homme dans toutes les fonctions de responsabilité et envoyait au parlement des élu·es gays-lesbiennes, des Arméniens et des Assyriens. On dit de la poudrière du Moyen-Orient qu’une nouvelle guerre mondiale peut s’y déclencher. Mais on y voit naître aussi des idées et des pratiques qui montrent qu’un autre monde est possible.

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Temps durs et dur labeur. Un retour critique des modèles productifs de l’ère néolibérale

Bouquin S., Stewart P (2011), « Temps durs et dur labeur. Un retour critique des modèles productifs de l’ère néolibérale », in Jacquot L., Higele J-P., Lhotel H., Nosbonne C.(coord.), 2011, Formes et structures du salariat (Tome 1 : De la construction sociale du rapport salarial), Nancy, PUN, coll. « Salariat et transformations sociales »., pp. 198-210.

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